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ABSTRACT 
Danai Christopoulou 
An empirical investigation of the effect of Intellectual Property Rights 
systems on Foreign Direct Investment Flows and Spillovers 
Keywords:  Intellectual Property Rights, Foreign Direct Investment, Spillovers, 
Meta-analysis 
The major themes of this thesis are the impact of Intellectual Property (IP) 
systems on foreign direct investment spillovers and bilateral FDI flows.  
This thesis consists of three empirical studies. The first study integrates in the 
existing theoretical frameworks the distinct effect of the public IP enforcement 
element of IP systems on FDI horizontal spillovers. By employing a meta-
analysis approach and the ordered probit model estimation technique, it finds 
that the strength of public IP enforcement in a host country has a positive effect 
on FDI horizontal spillovers but it dampens the positive effect of IP law 
protection on FDI horizontal spillovers when it becomes too strong.  
The second empirical study examines the impact of IP systems on FDI vertical 
spillovers. This study employs a similar conceptual and empirical approach and 
finds that the strength of public IP enforcement has a positive effect on FDI 
vertical spilloversbut a negative moderating effect on the relationship between 
the strength of IP law protection and FDI vertical spillovers. 
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In the third empirical study, a gravity model is applied to test the effect of IP 
systems on bilateral FDI flows in OECD countries. Using the Poisson pseudo-
maximum-likelihood, it finds both the strength of IP law protection and the 
strength of public IP enforcement to have a positive effect on bilateral FDI flows.  
The broad implication of these findings is that countries should strengthen both 
their IP law protection and enforcement but apply appropriate measures to 
mitigate the negative effect resulted from excessive IP protection.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The potential productivity-enhancing role of spillovers from Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) is a matter of considerable importance for host countries. In as 
early as 1960s, policy makers across a small number of countries (e.g. 
Netherland, Ireland, Indonesia) with a view to overcome both investment and 
knowledge gaps started to make regulatory and policy changes to entice 
multinational firms to invest in their countries. Invigorated by the findings of 
positive FDI spillovers of seminal work by Caves (1974) for Australia, 
Globerman (1979) for Canada, and Blomström (1986) for Mexico, and 
encouraged by international organisations such as the GATT and World Bank 
and regional organisations such as the EU, such FDI liberalisation soon spread 
to other countries in 1970s and 1980s, and then accelerated its pace from 1990 
to 2007. By the end of 2007, the total number of international investment 
agreements rose to more than 3067 (UNCTAD 2015:106). Those IIAs together 
with national investment policies, a majority of them in favour of FDI, led global 
FDI flow to reach its peak of $1.49 trillion in 2008 and contributed to its recovery 
thereafter.1 
Alongside this aforementioned policy evolution, a large body of research has 
devoted attention to the existence and magnitude of FDI spillovers and 
                                                          
1 Policies that are favourable to FDI mostly include countries offering subsidies and tax breaks 
to foreign firms (Eapen 2013; Haskel et al. 2007). For instance in 1996 Siemens was offered an 
incentive package worth of £50 million to locate 1.000 worker semiconductor plant in Tyneside 
in northeast England. Similarly, in 1994 Mercedes was offered by the State of Alabama an 
incentive package worth of approximately $230 million for a new plant planning to employ 1.500 
workers. 
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developed an array of rich explanations. FDI spillovers refer to the changes in 
domestic firms’ productivity as a result of the foreign presence in the country. 
FDI spillovers can take the form of horizontal or vertical spillovers. FDI 
horizontal spillovers occur when the domestic firms engage in competing 
activities with the foreign affiliates while both of them operating in the same 
industry and this interaction brings changes to their productivity (Liu et al. 2009). 
FDI vertical spillovers occur when domestic firms and foreign affiliates operate 
in different industries and are divided into backward and forward (Liu et al. 
2009). FDI backward spillovers arise when domestic firms supply the foreign 
affiliates with good and services from the upstream industries (Liu et al. 2009). 
FDI forward spillovers arise when foreign affiliates sell goods and services to 
the domestic firms (Liu et al. 2009). The FDI spillovers literature posits ‘FDI 
holds the potential to contribute to increased productivity among domestic firms 
by providing them with advanced knowledge and technology, by improving the 
country's infrastructure for private investment, and by motivating domestic firms 
to improve their business practices’ (Spencer 2008).  This is because for a firm 
to be successful in venturing abroad, it must possess a countervailing 
advantage in the form of proprietary technology and management know-how 
over domestic firms in a host country. By transferring such advantages from its 
headquarter to its foreign affiliate, the foreign firm is able to offset its liability of 
foreignness (LOF) (Hymer 1960; Zaheer 1995). Such proprietary technology 
and management know-how however, can be leaked to domestic firms because 
of the public good nature of knowledge (Buckley and Casson 1998). Domestic 
firms with the necessary absorptive capacity can in turn acquire and utilize 
foreign affiliates’ advanced proprietary knowledge and experience changes to 
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their productivity.  The literature also establishes that theoretically there are four 
mechanisms through which the domestic firms might acquire foreign affiliates’ 
proprietary knowledge and further their productivity: i) demonstration effects, ii) 
domestic linkages, iii) labour turnover effects and iv) competition effects (see 
surveys by, Gorg and Strobl 2001; Gorg and Greenway 2003; Spencer 2008).2 
While there is a general consensus that demonstration, linkage and labour 
turnover effects lead to positive FDI spillovers to domestic firms, the competition 
effects are considered to be either positive or negative.3Increased competition 
resulted from the presence of foreign firms can induce domestic firms to reduce 
their X-inefficiency on the one hand and can drive up domestic firms’ average 
cost curve or drive down domestic firms’ market share (in some cases crowd 
out domestic firms from the market)on the other. 
1.1. Generation of FDI spillovers 
Following Spencer (2008), this thesis conceptualises the generation of FDI 
spillover as a three-stage process: i) knowledge transfer/acquisition stage, ii) 
diffusion stage and iii) absorption stage.  
When MNEs invest abroad they create a knowledge pool in order to be able to 
compete effectively against the domestic firms. This knowledge pool is created 
by i) the transfer of firm specific assets to their foreign affiliates (Cantwell 2017) 
and ii) the development of technology by the foreign affiliates inside the host 
country. Until recently, MNEs tended to create advanced knowledge at their 
                                                          
2Gorg and Greenaway (2003) identify two more spillover channels: export and wages pillovers. 
These two however, overlap with the four channels stated above and they are more suitable for 
analysing the effect of FDI presence on domestic firms’ export share and wage rate.  
3 For instance Barrios and Strobl (2002) find evidence that the demonstration channel enhances 
FDI horizontal spiilovers and Fosfuri et al. (2001) find support that workers’ mobility also 
increases possibility of FDI spillovers. In contrast Aitken and Harisson (1999) identify that the 
competition effect leads to negative FDI horizontal spillovers. 
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headquarters and transfer it to their foreign affiliates worldwide in the form of 
end products, managerial processes, IPR, marketing and corporate strategies 
(Almeida and Phene 2004).  This process enabled foreign affiliates to overcome 
the liability of foreignness (Xu and Shenkar 2002; Zaheer 1995) and gain a form 
of ownership advantage against the domestic firms (Dunning 1993). Nowadays, 
foreign affiliates show a tendency to specialise in developing particular 
technologies by combining their existing knowledge (gained through the 
interaction with the host country) with the knowledge newly acquired by the 
parent firms; engaging in R&D activities and developing their own knowledge 
based assets (Chang et al. 2012; Gupta and Govindarajan 2000; Lee et al. 
2008; Zander 1997). The acquisition and development of such proprietary 
knowledge, especially in the form of IPR, aids foreign affiliates to overcome the 
liability of foreignness as well as offering them a monopolistic/oligopolistic 
power in the foreign market (knowledge transfer/acquisition stage). 
Although foreign affiliates take on measures to safeguard their proprietary 
knowledge, in many cases it is impossible to avoid some degree of knowledge 
leakage. Knowledge leakages depends on: i) the public good nature of 
knowledge; and ii) the opportunistic behaviour of the domestic firms. The public 
good nature of knowledge suggests that knowledge can be transferred at zero 
marginal cost and that one party can benefit from the use of the common good 
(in this case knowledge), without paying full financial benefits to the inventor 
(Arrow 1962; Kogut and Zander 1993; Magee 1977). 
Transaction cost theory (TCT) posits that human beings firstly pursue their own 
interests before acting collectively and, in order to achieve the maximum 
benefits, may engage in lurking activities (David and Han 2004; 
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Williamson1981). Therefore, domestic firms driven by opportunistic behaviour 
may attempt to acquire the knowledge leaked by the foreign affiliates and use it 
for their own benefit and potentially against the foreign affiliates. The channels 
by which the foreign affiliates’ knowledge can be diffused to the domestic firms 
are: i) the demonstration effect, ii) the labour turnover effect; and iii) the 
competition effect (see Gorg and Greenaway 2003; Liu et al. 2009; Yi et al. 
2015). A demonstration effect (also known as imitation effect) occurs when 
domestic firms identify the key characteristics of the foreign affiliates’ end 
products, know-how, and/or managerial practices, and emulate or adopt them 
into their own practices, by applying reverse engineering (Gorg & Greenaway 
2003; Meyer & Sinani 2005; Yi et al. 2015). The scope of the demonstration 
effect, depends upon the complexity of the product/process/know-how that is 
imitated, with simpler processes and managerial practices being easier to 
imitate (Gorg and Greenaway 2003). Imitation does not always imply that illegal 
means are used or that IPR per se are violated, it could be that publicly 
displayed knowledge, such as patent citations, is exploited. A representative 
example of a demonstration effect is the Xiaomi smart-phone developed using 
similar technology and characteristics to the iPhone and positioned in the 
market as the ‘Chinese iPhone’ and the ‘little brother of Apple’ (Wong 2012). In 
this case, any upgrade to domestic firms’ knowledge and technological 
capabilities derived from the demonstration effect, could result in positive FDI 
spillovers with consequential benefits to domestic firms’ productivity (Gorg and 
Greenaway 2003; Liu et al. 2009).    
The second spillover channel is the movement of human capital or labour 
turnover. Although key strategic positions inside the foreign affiliate are usually 
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occupied by expatriates, foreign affiliates also need a skilled labour force to 
carry out day-to-day activities and as such often invest in the recruitment and 
training of local employees. However, when these employees move to 
domestically owned firms they carry with them new technological and 
managerial knowledge acquired by their former employers (Meyer & Sinani 
2005; Gorg and Greenaway 2003). In this way, domestic firms are exposed to 
international high quality practices and technologies, which if implemented can 
result in productivity gains (Gorg & Strobl 2001; Meyer & Sinani 2005). To 
minimise the diffusion of their knowledge, via the labour turnover channel, 
foreign affiliates tend to offer relatively higher salaries to their employees, that 
domestic firms can rarely match (Aitken et al. 1996; Gorg & Greenaway 2003).  
The last spillover channel is the competition. MNEs intensify competition in the 
sector they are entering by both increasing the volume of competitors and 
introducing new ways of competing (Meyer & Sinani 2009). To remain ahead of 
the competition, domestic firms tend to:(i) increase the speed of 
imitation/adoption of foreign affiliates’ technological and managerial knowledge; 
and/or (ii) use their existing technological and managerial capabilities more 
effectively and efficiently, to achieve productivity gains (Gorg & Greenaway 
2003; Gorg & Strobl 2001; Dimeli and Louri 2004).  However, intensive 
competition has been found to also negatively impact domestic firms’ 
productivity (Aitken & Harrison 1999). MNEs that are able to exploit economies 
of scale, can offer their products at relatively lower prices and draw demand 
from domestic firms forcing them to reduce production or target niche markets 
that MNEs are not interested in operating, thus reducing profits (Aitken & 
Harrison 1999; Blomstrom & Sjoholm 1999; Dimelis & Louri 2004). Moreover, 
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when MNEs enter a foreign country they often possess a form of ownership 
advantage (know-how, IP, technology etc.), in order to overcome the LOF 
(Hymer 1960; Zaheer 1995). Such ownership advantages may increase the 
demand for MNEs outputs and decrease the demand for domestic firms’ less 
innovative or reputable outputs. This adverse effect of competition may result in 
productivity losses for domestic firms at knowledge diffusion stage. 
Even in the face of knowledge leakages, the literature stresses the importance 
of absorptive capacity on the part of domestic firms (Cohen and Levinthal 
1989), as a necessary condition for beneficial FDI horizontal spillovers to occur 
(Cantwell 2017). ‘Absorptive capacity includes the ability to internalise 
knowledge created by others and modify it to fit their own specific applications, 
processes and routines’ (Narula and Marin 2003:23). Only those domestic firms 
with absorptive capacity, the ability to connect and transform the leaked 
knowledge in their own context, can benefit from the accumulation of foreign 
affiliates’ advanced knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Escribano et al. 
2009; Gorg and Greenaway 2003; Meyer and Sinani 2009). In order for 
domestic firms to absorb the foreign affiliates’ proprietary knowledge and benefit 
from it, they need to have the technological competences to do so (Cantwell 
1993; Escribano et al 2009). Domestic firms then also need to identify the new 
knowledge, transform it to fit their own practices, combine it with their existing 
knowledge, and apply it to their internal processes (Teece et al. 1997; Zahra 
and George 2002).  The absorption of advanced knowledge can improve 
domestic firms’ R&D capabilities, as well as managerial know-how leading to 
improved performance (absorption stage).  
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Guided by the above literature, much of the empirical work attempts to address 
whether the overall FDI spillovers are positive or negative, ‘in a framework in 
which labour productivity or total factor productivity of domestic firms is 
regressed on a range of independent variables’ (Gorg and Greenway 2003).  
Though the empirical evidence produced so far on FDI spillovers is mixed, one 
emerging finding is that FDI spillovers are contingent on: (1) characteristics of 
domestic firms such as absorptive capacity (e.g. Kinoshita 2001) and ownership 
type (e.g. Blomstrom and Sjoholm 1999); and (2) gaps between foreign firms 
and domestic firms such as technological gaps (e.g. Kokko 1992); (3) 
characteristics of FDI, such as the volume of FDI (e.g. Aitken and Harrison  
1999; Sjöholm 1999), foreign affiliates’ R&D intensity (e.g. Audretsch and 
Feldman 1996; Chuang and Lin 1999) and ownership type ( e.g. Brouthers 
2002; Dimelis and Louri 2002); and (4) host country characteristics, such as 
trade openness (e.g. Irsova and Havranek 2013; Meyer and Sinani 2009), 
financial development (e.g. Irsova and Havranek 2013; Meyer and Sinani 2009), 
and institutional quality including intellectual property rights (IPR)(Irsova and 
Havranek 2013; Havranek and Irsova 2011; Smeets and de Vaal 2011; Yi et al. 
2015). Table 2.1 summarises the results of empirical studies in relation to the 
aforementioned factors, which will be discussed in detail in the following 
sections.  
Table 2.1 Summary of FDI spillover studies  
Authors Country Year Cross 
sectional/ 
Panel 
data 
Firm/Industry 
level data 
Results 
Developing countries and Emerging Economies 
Aitken and 
Harrison 
Venezuela 1976-
1989 
Panel 
data 
Firm level Increased 
volume of FDI 
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(1999) leads to 
negative 
spillover 
effects 
Aslanoglou 
(2000) 
Turkey 1993 Cross 
sectional 
Industry level Increased 
volume of FDI 
leads to 
positive 
spillover 
effects 
Blomstrom 
and 
Sjoholm 
(1999) 
Indonesia 1991 Cross 
sectional 
Firm level The degree of 
foreign 
ownership has 
an insignificant 
effect on 
spillovers 
Chuang 
and Lin 
(1999) 
Taiwan 1991 Cross 
sectional 
Firm level Domestic firms 
R&D intensity 
leads to 
positive 
spillover 
effects 
Haddad 
and 
Harrison 
(1993) 
Morocco 1985-
1989 
Panel 
data 
Firm level and 
industry level 
Increased 
volume of FDI 
leads to 
negative 
spillover 
effects 
Kokko et al 
(1996) 
Uruguay  1988 Cross 
sectional 
Firm  level Intermediate 
levels of 
technological 
gap leads to 
positive 
spillover 
effects 
Sjoholm 
(1999) 
Indonesia 1980 1991 Cross 
sectional 
Firm level Large 
technological 
gap leads to 
positive 
spillover 
effects 
Takii 
(2005) 
Indonesia 1990-
1995 
Panel 
data 
Industry level Increased 
volume of FDI 
leads to 
negative 
spillover 
effects 
Zhang et 
al (2010) 
China 1998-
2003 
Panel 
data 
Firm level Intermediate 
levels of 
technological 
gap leads to 
positive 
spillover 
benefits 
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Developed countries 
Barrios 
and Strobl 
(2002) 
Spain 1990-
1998 
Panel 
data 
Firm level Spain: Low 
absorptive 
capacity leads 
to negative 
spillover 
effects 
Barrios et 
al (2004) 
Greece, 
Ireland, Spain 
1992,1997 Cross 
sectional 
Firm level Spain: Higher 
absorptive 
capacity leads 
to positive 
spillover 
effects 
Dimelis 
and Louri 
(2002) 
Greece 1997 Cross 
sectional 
Firm level Minority 
foreign 
ownership 
leads to 
positive 
spillover 
effects 
Dimelis 
and Louri 
(2004) 
Greece 1997 Cross 
sectional 
Firm level Minority 
foreign 
ownership 
leads to 
positive 
spillover 
effects 
Keller and 
Yeaple 
(2003) 
USA 1987-
1996 
Panel 
data 
Firm level Higher 
absorptive 
capacity leads 
to positive 
spillover 
effects 
Meyer and 
Sinani 
(2009) 
Variety of 
developedand 
developing 
countries 
1974-
2007 
Panel 
data 
Meta-analysis Countries with 
moderate 
degree of 
institutional 
quality least 
benefit from 
spillovers 
Openness to 
trade leads to 
positive 
spillover 
effects 
 
Low and high 
income 
countries 
appear to 
benefit more 
from spillovers 
Irsova and 
Havranek 
(2013) 
Variety of 
developedand 
developing 
2000-
2011 
Panel 
data 
Meta-analysis Financial 
development 
has an 
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countries insignificant 
effect 
onhorizontal 
spillovers 
 
Openness to 
trade leads to 
negative 
horizontal 
spillover 
effects 
 
Stronger IP 
law protection 
leads to 
negative 
horizontal 
spillover 
effects 
Havranek 
and Irsova 
(2011) 
Variety of 
developedand 
developing 
countries 
2000-
2010 
Panel 
data 
Meta-analysis Financial 
development 
leads to 
negative 
vertical 
spillover 
effects 
 
Openness to 
trade leads to 
positive 
vertical 
spillover 
effects 
 
Stronger IP 
law protection 
has an 
insignificant 
effect 
onvertical 
spillovers 
 
Smeets 
and de 
Vaal 
(2016) 
Variety of 
developedand 
developing 
countries 
2003-
2008 
panel Firm level Strong IP law 
protection 
leads to 
positive 
backward 
spillovers, 
negative 
forward 
spillovers and 
insignificant 
horizontal 
spillovers 
 12 
 
1.2. MNEs heterogeneity 
The IB literature suggests that when MNEs invest abroad many carry with them 
firm-specific advantages/ownership advantages in the form of superior 
technology and know-how in order to overcome the LOF (Hymer 1960; Zaheer 
1995). As such, it is often argued that the MNEs’ affiliates serve as a carrier of 
superior technology in the host country (Findlay 1978; Eapen 2012). However, 
this is not always the case. Whether parent firms will transfer different types of 
knowledge assets, is dependent on the foreign affiliates’ establishment mode in 
terms of being an R&D, sales, distribution or production centre. In the case 
where MNEs set up an R&D centre in the host country, advanced technological 
and managerial know-how is likely to be transferred to the foreign affiliate 
(Meyer & Sinani 2005; Meyer 2004) via the spillover channels to be diffused to 
the domestic firms benefiting their productivity. Empirical evidence for East 
Asian countries (Okabe 2002), the US (Audretsch and Feldman 1996), and 
Taiwan (Chuang and Lin 1999) suggests that domestic firms that are clustered 
around R&D intensive foreign affiliates, demonstrate greater innovative 
capabilities and increased productivity. In the case where the foreign affiliates’ 
operations involve local sales and marketing of imported products, or the 
manufacturing of products at the later stages of the product cycle, advanced 
technological and managerial know-how is not necessary and thus is less likely 
to be transferred to the foreign affiliates (Meyer 2004). As such the knowledge 
diffused and assimilated by the domestic firms will be of limited value causing 
no or minor changes to their productivity.   
The degree of foreign ownership in an international investment is another factor 
potentially affecting FDI spillovers. The ownership type that MNEs adopt abroad 
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is influenced by the host country conditions (institutions, market size, etc.) and 
the related transaction costs involved (Brouthers et al. 2003). MNEs opt for the 
ownership type that allows them to: (i) protect proprietary rights (and ownership 
advantage), which cannot be fully contracted out due to the public good nature 
of knowledge (Dimelis and Louri 2002; Puck et al. 2009); and (ii) minimise their 
monitoring costs (Dimelis and Louri 2002). The degree of foreign ownership 
(majority ownership, minority ownership, JV or wholly owned) is likely to 
influence the willingness of parent firms to transfer knowledge intensive assets 
(ownership advantage) to their foreign affiliates. Under shared ownership, 
imitation of MNEs’ technological and managerial know-how is easier since 
domestic partners are involved in the investment and the shared ownership 
gives domestic partners access and control over the partnerships’ assets 
(Dimelis and Louri 2002; Puck et al 2009; Brouthers et al 2003). In wholly 
owned affiliates, misappropriation of MNEs’ assets is highly unlikely (unless 
knowledge leaks to the market) (Blomstrom & Sjoholm 1999). Therefore, as 
foreign ownership decreases domestic partners gain more control over the 
investment and are more likely to be able to access the MNEs’ advanced 
knowledge with public good characteristics. In such cases, MNEs’ uncertainty 
and monitoring costs increase and although they may transfer advanced 
managerial know-how to the shared investment, they may withhold the transfer 
of advanced technological know-how or transfer near obsolete technologies. 
Nevertheless evidence suggests that productivity spillovers for domestic firms 
will be stronger when foreign affiliates have a minority ownership type of 
investment (Dimelis and Louri 2002). 
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1.3. Domestic firms’ heterogeneity 
Wang and Bloomstrom (1992) suggest that the majority of FDI spillovers do not 
arise automatically from the mere presence of foreign affiliates in the country. 
One factor affecting the spillover benefits is the level of domestic firms’ 
absorptive capacity. As such domestic firms need to invest in learning activities 
and in the upgrade of their existing technological and managerial competences 
(Liu et al. 2000) before being able to absorb and benefit from the foreign 
affiliates’ knowledge. Firms with low absorptive capacity rarely benefit from 
spillovers, as they don’t possess the minimum threshold level of technological 
and managerial knowledge needed to absorb foreign affiliates’ diffused 
knowledge (Eapen 2012; Haskel et al. 2007). Domestic firms with higher levels 
of absorptive capacity can connect their existing knowledge with that newly 
acquired, modify and incorporate it in their own context (Eapen 2012; Barrios et 
al. 2004; Barrios and Strobl 2002) increasing the spillover benefits.  
Technological gap refers to the extent foreign affiliates are technologically 
advanced compared with domestic firms (Zhang et al. 2010). When the 
technological gap is too small, it means that both domestic and foreign firms 
possess similar technological and managerial knowledge and thus the former 
have little to learn from the latter, resulting in little impact on the domestic firms’ 
productivity (Dimelis 2005). As the technological gap widens, domestic firms 
with relatively high absorptive capacity can access and incorporate the MNEs’ 
advanced and new knowledge into their own practices and experience 
productivity gains. However, when the technological gap is too wide, domestic 
firms will be unlikely to benefit from the foreign firms’ presence, because the 
technological and managerial competences of the domestic firms will be 
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insufficient to fully exploit the MNEs’ advanced knowledge (Blomström and 
Sjöholm 1999; Liu et al. 2000).  
1.4. Institutions and IP systems 
From an economics perspective, institutions are considered primarily to control 
the transaction costs associated with the incompleteness of all contracts (North 
1992; Williamson 1981). Indeed, institutions in a society begin to matter when 
transactions costs increase (North 1992). According to transaction cost theory, 
humans and consequently organisations suffer from bounded rationality that is, 
they do not possess all the necessary information or cannot predict any future 
events when developing a contract (Williamson 1981). As a result all contracts 
specifying a particular transaction between actors or organisations are bound to 
be incomplete increasing contracting, monitoring and enforcement costs 
(transaction costs) (Williamson 1981). Taking into consideration the 
incompleteness of all contracts and the public good nature of knowledge, it is 
difficult to specify and protect IP using only contracts between organisations. 
Consequently, IP laws were developed to protect IP owners’ rights, but whether 
IP laws alone achieve this protection is questionable. The literature suggests 
that, it is the enforcement of IP law that allows IP owners to uphold their rights 
in case of violation. For instance, 
‘[A]ny reference to or an examination of an IP system should be 
interpreted in respect of proper enforcement and consequently as an 
interpretation and examination of the content and adequacy of IP laws 
and regulations’, (Maskus 2004:22). 
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‘[A]nation can have strong laws or weak laws, but unless those laws are 
enforced they are virtually non-existent in terms of the protection afforded 
IP owners and investors’ (Ostergard 2000:353). 
This study conceptualises the IP system as having two distinct elements: a) IP 
law protection; and b) public IP enforcement (Khoury et al. 2014; Peng et al. 
2017a). IP law protection relates to the availability of IP law as this appears in 
the statutes of a country’s legislative framework. Public IP enforcement relates 
to the decision of public enforcement authorities (such as the judiciary, police, 
customs, border control, law firms) on whether or not to enforce the IP law 
protection in practice in the case of IP violation (Papageorgiadis et al. 2014). 
From the discussion so far, it can be argued that the strength of an IP system is 
subject to both the availability of IP law protection and also the effectiveness of 
the public enforcement agents when enforcing the legal framework.  
IP systems are increasingly considered important in today’s digitised networked 
world. Firstly, effective IP systems allow inventors to appropriate a share of the 
benefits of their creative activities and thus offer incentives to undertake the 
costly and risky investments in R&D activities that generate new knowledge and 
technologies. This in turn increases the global pool of knowledge, as well as 
induces the demand for new knowledge and technologies.  Second, innovation 
(in the context of new technologies) is said to promote countries’ economic 
growth and welfare, leading to the suggestion that effective IP systems 
stimulate economic activity and generate substantial employment in both 
developing and developed nations (Falvey and Foster 2006; WIPO 2014; ICC 
and WIPO 2011). Third, effective IP systems are said to increase the 
attractiveness of countries for raising levels of inward FDI, fostering technology 
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transfer from developed to developing nations, and also promoting innovation in 
less developed nations (ICC and WIPO 2011). Fourth, for a firm the ownership 
of IP is often viewed as its differential advantage that offers it 
monopolistic/oligopolistic power both in home and host markets (Hall 1992; Hsu 
and Ziedonis 2013; Reitzig 2004). 
1.4.1. Development of global IP systems 
The global IP system has come a long way. During the early economic 
development period in the 18th and 19th century, IPR violation was widespread 
(Peng et al 2017). A typical example is the United States IP systems, which 
protected domestic authors and inventors to some degree, but granted no IPR 
to foreigners (Peng et al 2017). This made the US a leading IPR violator in the 
19th century often misappropriating British technological designs and authors 
(Peng et al. 2017). However, in the long run as these economies developed 
global isomorphism pressures grew, pushing countries to enhance their IP 
systems (Meyer et al. 1997), to protect both domestic and foreign IPR and 
strengthen IPR enforcement in case of violations. Nevertheless inconsistencies 
among countries’ IP laws and IP enforcement were still evident.  For instance, 
in some countries patent rights were granted for a particular invention while in 
other countries the same patent received no protection. In order to address 
issues arising from differences in each country’s IP systems, harmonisation of 
countries’ IP systems at the global level has been a prominent item on the 
international policy agenda for years (Javorcik 2004). The evolution of the 
quality of national IP systems over the last 20 years Hs been strongly inﬂuenced 
by the TRIPs agreement introduced by the WTO among its member countries 
(Papageorgiadis and McDonald 2018). The TRIPs agreement sets the minimum 
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standards for IP law protection among WTO member countries (WTO 2015) but 
did not set obligations regarding the way IP laws should be applied in case of 
violations (Papageorgiadis and McDonald 2018). From 1996, developed 
countries were required to incorporate the TRIPs changes in their legislative 
framework within one year, while developing countries were required to 
implement them within a 5-year period ending on 1st January 2000. The 
additional time was granted because many of the developing countries had 
limited, or in some cases non-existent, IP legal frameworks and proper design 
and restructuring was necessary. Developing countries and emerging 
economies were subsequently offered an extension of this deadline to 2006, 
which was further extended for only least developed countries to the year 2013 
and eventually to the 1st of July 2021 (WTO 2017). Despite the introduction of 
the TRIPs agreement, many emerging economies (such as China) implemented 
the suggested changes in their legal frameworks, but were reluctant to 
strengthen their public IP enforcement (Peng et al. 2017b; WTO 2017).  
The reasons why certain countries resisted the strong IP enforcement could be 
due to:(1) cultural inheritances, and (2) costs-benefit analysis (Peng et al. 
2017). Institutional theory suggests that informal institutions, including society’s 
ideologies, perceptions and beliefs towards fairness and justice, vary among 
countries (North 1992). For instance, Chinese culture, influenced by its 
Confucian past, is conducive to a lack of respect for IPR (Peng et al. 2017). 
Thus, inherit cultural beliefs may influence state enforcement agents (police, 
judiciary, courts) not to fully enforce the legal framework when IPR violations 
occur (North 1992). Moreover when countries decide on the strength of their IP 
systems they often formulate their decision by conducting a cost-benefit 
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analysis that is; a strong IP system should outweigh the costs of a strong IP 
system. The costs of a strong IP system relate to the fact that strong IP law 
protection and enforcement may limit knowledge spillovers from developed to 
developing economies (Kumar 2003). This is because strong IP enforcement 
restricts and penalises the imitative activities of domestic firms and thus the 
production and sale of substitute products, which is a main source of income for 
developing economies, ultimately leading to declining productivity and 
performance (Maskus 2004; Park 2012; Park and Lippoldt 2004). Nevertheless 
when domestic firms start engaging in R&D and the development of intangible 
assets, demand for stronger IP law protection and enforcement increases as 
benefits start to outweigh the costs. This is the case of South Korea, which 
began to change its IP system in the 1980s when they moved from the imitation 
of foreign technologies to the development of valuable patented assets of their 
own, which they had to protect (Kim et al. 2012). For all of these reasons, even 
after the introduction and implementation of the TRIPs agreement by the 
majority of WTO countries, there remain inconsistencies in the enforcement of 
IP law protection (Ostergard 2000).  
1.5. IP systems and FDI spillovers 
While a large body of research has dealt with the impact of heterogeneity 
MNEs’ and domestic firms on FDI spillovers, there has been comparatively little 
interest in the effect of institutions on FDI spillovers. Conceptually, as both 
foreign and domestic ﬁrms operate under a specific institutional setting, 
institutions in the host country could potentially shape the choices, behaviour, 
interaction and performance of ﬁrms and, consequently, inﬂuence the FDI 
spillovers that advantage domestic ﬁrms (Smeets and de Vaal 2016; Yi et 
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al.2015). Empirical evidence supports the theoretical arguments and suggests 
that the institutional development of the host country influences FDI spillovers in 
a curvilinear way (Meyer and Sinani 2009). The importance in economic 
development of IP systems as a form of institution, FDI flows and technology 
transfer havebeen theoretically and empirically researched (see Branstetter et 
al. 2007; Maskus et al. 2003; Maskus 2004; Kashcheeva 2013) its effect on FDI 
spillovers remains the least researched topic (Arora 2009). Recognising the 
importance of IP protection and enforcement and the lack of empirical evidence 
,there has been a call for more research on the role of IP systems in 
international technology transfer (Arora 2009) and that ‘ It would be instructive 
….. to relate the extent of FDI spillovers to IP protection in host countries’ by 
using ‘firm-level panel data for multiple countries’ or a ‘meta-study of existing 
empirical work taking into account host country conditions’ (Javorcik 2009:61). 
Recently four studies investigated the effect of IP systems on FDI spillovers and 
produced mixed results. Irsova and Havranek (2013) and Havranek and Irsova 
(2011) adopted a meta-analysis approach to examine which factors, including 
IP systems, influence the magnitude of FDI horizontal and vertical spillovers 
respectively. To approximate for the effect of IP systems they employed the 
Ginarte and Park (1997) and Park (2008) patent protection index. Their findings 
showed a negative relationship between the strength of IP systems and FDI 
horizontal spillovers and an insignificant relationship between the strength of IP 
systems and FDI vertical spillovers. Alternatively, Smeets and de Vaal (2015) 
employed a large dataset comprising 81,299 firms in 17 countries using the 
Ginarte and Park (1997) patent protection index to approximate for the effect of 
the IPS system, and found that strong IP systems strengthen backward linkage 
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effects, weaken forward linkage effects and have an insignificant effect on 
horizontal productivity spillovers. Yi et al. (2015) employed the ratio of settled 
intellectual property (IP) lawsuits to the total number of IP lawsuits in a region to 
measure the overall strength of an IP system and found that firms operating in 
Chinese provinces with stronger IP systems, were better able to absorb FDI 
spillovers and improve their productivity.  
In this thesis, it is argued that the mixed evidence produced by the 
aforementioned studies may relate to the way the effects of IP systems are 
conceptualised and empirically tested. Conceptually although the 
aforementioned studies intend to investigate the IP systems as a whole i.e. IP 
law protection and public IP enforcement, they only focus on one pillar of the IP 
systems that of the IP law protection and do not consider variation in the way IP 
law protection is actually enforced in practice. However, although countries may 
offer strong IP law protection frameworks (Park 2008; Peng et al. 2017a), the 
levels IP enforcement vary significantly between countries (Brander et al. 2017; 
Papageorgiadis et al. 2014). For this reason it is important to conceptualise and 
account for the IP enforcement element of the IP system, as it is not always the 
case that strong IP law protection will be accompanied by strong enforceability 
of the laws. Empirically, the aforementioned studies employed the index of 
patent protection by Ginarte and Park (1997) and Park (2008) to approximate 
for the strength of the IP systems as a whole. This index however, does not 
include a measurement for patent enforcement (Fosfuri 2004; Javorcick 2004; 
Nichloson 2007; Nunnenkamp and Spatz 2004; Papageorgiadis et al. 2014) as 
it is only ‘designed to provide an indicator of the strength of patent protection 
and not the quality of patent systems’ (Park 2008:761).  Therefore, the Ginarte 
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and Park (1997) and Park (2008) indices can be used as a proxy for the 
strength of patent or IP law protection of a country’s patent/IP systems, but not 
the strength of the enforcement dimension.  Studies using measures that do not 
take IP enforcement into account, may unintentionally overestimate the IP law 
protection in a particular country (Ostergard 2000). Recognising this, Yi et al. 
(2015) employed the ratio of settled intellectual property (IP) lawsuits to the total 
number of IP lawsuits in a region to measure the overall strength of an IP 
system. Although this measure attempts to approximate for the strength of both 
IP law protection and enforcement, it does not enable the differentiation of the 
public IP enforcement from IP law protection. This is problematic for a number 
of reasons. First, it is unclear if the number of lawsuits resulted from weak IP 
law protection or inefficient public IP enforcement or both. Second, the way 
these lawsuits were settled is not specified. In other words for the resolution of 
conflict between the IP owners and the infringers, official enforcement 
procedures may have been followed (court procedures that enforced the IP 
legislation), but also lobbying activities or other informal agreements may have 
taken place. Therefore, the efficiency and effectiveness of the public IP 
enforcement agents is not clearly measured. So far it is evident that the existing 
literature fails to uncover the distinct effect of stronger public IP enforcement, 
though it fully captures the effect of IP law protection on FDI spillovers.  
This thesis aims to responds to Arora’s (2009) and Javorcik’s (2009) call and to 
address the gap in the FDI spillovers’ literature by conceptualising and testing 
for the distinct effect of public IP enforcement. It sets to answer two research 
questions, namely; RQ1: What are the effects of the IP law protection and 
public IP enforcement on FDI horizontal spillovers?; RQ2: What are the effects 
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of the IP law protection and public IP enforcement on FDI vertical spillovers? In 
order to address these research questions the first two empirical studies of this 
thesis conceptualise and test for the distinct direct and moderating effect of 
public IP enforcement on FDI spillovers by employing a meta-analysis of 49 and 
27 published and unpublished studies on FDI horizontal and vertical spillovers 
respectively.  
1.6. IP systems and FDI flows 
In addition to the dearth of research on the effect of IP systems on FDI 
spillovers, there has been limited focus on the FDI determinants in the literature 
to unpack the effect of public IP enforcement on FDI flows from that of IP law 
protection. In respect to the role of IP systems on inward FDI, the majority of 
prior research suggests that MNEs tend to invest in countries with stronger IP 
law protection. For instance, when controlling for the effect of IP law protection 
as IP law protection is strengthened in the host countries, inward FDI also 
increased, was found in studies by Puttitanum (2002)for 62 developed and 
developing countries; Adams (2010) for 75 developing countries; Awokose and 
Yin (2010) for China; Khan and Samad (2010) for 14 developing South and 
Southeast Asian countries; McCalman (2004) for 40 developed and developing 
countries; Bascavusoglu and Zuniga (2005) for 38 developed and developing 
countries;  Kashcheeva (2013) for 103 developed and developing countries; 
and Branstetter et al. (2007) for 16 developing countries, to name a few. 
However, conflicting evidence is presented by Nicholson (2007) for 43 
developed and developing countries, who found evidence that as the IP law 
protection becomes stronger, licensing tends to be preferred over FDI; and 
Fosfuri, (2004) who investigated5,962 firms in the chemical industry across the 
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world and failed to identify a significant relationship between IP law protection 
and inward FDI.  
Although a decisive factor, only  a few studies control for the effect of public IP 
enforcement on inward FDI, employing enforcement indices that use qualitative 
data for their construction, such as the World Economic Forum (WEF) and the 
Institute of Management Development (IMD) index.4 Studies have used such an 
index for the overall IP protection and found that IP protection is positively 
associated with inward FDI, for instance Seyoum (1996) for 27 developed and 
developing countries; Manfield (1994) for 16 developing countries; Nunnenkam 
and Spatz (2004) for 166 developed and developing countries; and Park and 
Lippoldt (2003) for global bilateral FDI. From the discussion so far it is evident 
that the degree of public IP enforcement in the host country has not yet 
received much attention from the FDI determinants literature. Although studies 
capture the direct effect of IP law protection or overall IP protection, they do not 
conceptualise or empirically test for the distinct and direct effect of the public IP 
enforcement element of IP systems. To address this research gap, this thesis 
sets to investigate the distinct effects of the IP law protection and public IP 
enforcement on bilateral FDI flows in OECD countries (research question 3) 
by employing the gravity model and Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood 
(PPML) technique.  
Having investigated the existing theoretical and empirical literature on IP 
systems, bilateral FDI flows and FDI spillovers a major research gap has been 
identified. That is, the absence of conceptualisation and empirical testing of the 
                                                          
4 Qualitative indices are subject to the limitations of qualitative data including the non-
generalisability and reliability of research findings (qualitative data allows for participant bias) 
(Saunders et al. 2003) 
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distinct effect of public IP enforcement on bilateral FDI flows and FDI spillovers. 
In order to address this research gap, this thesis sets out the following research 
questions: RQ1: What are the effects of the IP law protection and Public IP 
enforcement on FDI horizontal spillovers?; RQ2: What are the effects of the IP 
law protection and Public IP enforcement on FDI vertical spillovers?; RQ3: What 
are the effects of the IP law protection and Public IP enforcement on bilateral 
FDI flows in OECD countries?  
To address these research questions two leading IB theories are used to inform 
the research inquiry namely; Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) (Coase 1937; 
Williamson 1981) and institutional theory (North 1990; 1991; 1992). TCT 
attempts to identify the transaction costs present in a transaction and the 
conditions that minimise them (David and Han 2004). TCT is employed in IB 
research extensively to identify the most suitable governance and entry mode 
firms should adopt. Building upon two central assumptions of opportunism and 
bounded rationality, TCT is employed in this thesis to identify the magnitude of 
MNEs’ transaction costs when entering and operating in a specific institutional 
setting. To understand the influence of the host country’s institutional 
environment, institutional theory is employed. Institutional theory emphasises 
the importance of formal and informal institutions and the interplay between 
them, suggesting that in markets with excessive transaction costs institutions 
will govern actors’ transactions (North 1992). This is so because institutions will 
reduce uncertainty for different actors by conditioning the rules of behaviour and 
defining the boundaries of what is legitimate (Peng et al. 2009). The importance 
of institutions in MNEs’ activities stems from TCT’s core assumption of the 
incompleteness of all contracts (as a result of the bounded rationality of 
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humans), where MNEs need to rely on formal and informal institutions and their 
enforcement mechanisms to protect their residuals rights in case of violation. 
This thesis builds on the TCT’s central assumptions by postulating that 
domestic firms driven by opportunism will attempt to access MNEs’ advanced 
technological and managerial know-how in order to benefit and increase their 
productivity. Coupled with the incompleteness of all contracts, MNEs are bound 
to face high contracting, monitoring and enforcement costs when investing in a 
foreign market. This thesis argues that the opportunistic behaviour of actors, the 
incompleteness of all contracts and thus MNEs’ transaction costs can be 
limited,if host countries offer well developed institutions and strong IP systems. 
By exploring the interplay between these two theories the hypotheses in 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are formed with the main argument being that the level of 
IP law protection (formal institutions) and/or IP enforcement (formal and 
informal institutions) in the host country influence MNEs’ transaction costs, 
attractiveness of the host country, diffusion of MNEs’ knowledge and 
consequent spillover benefits. 
By addressing the above research questions this thesis seeks to make the 
following contributions to the literature. First, building upon and extending the 
existing literaturethat suggests, ’any reference to or an examination of an IP 
system should be interpreted in respect of proper enforcement and 
consequently as an interpretation and examination of the content and adequacy 
of IP laws and regulations’ (Maskus 2004:22), by differentiating between the two 
aspects of an IP system i.e. IP law protection and public IP enforcement. 
Specifically, this thesis integrates the established theoretical and empirical 
frameworks with the distinct effect of the public IP enforcement element of IP 
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systems on FDI spillovers and FDI flows. The incorporation of the public 
enforcement element of IP systems allows for the identification of a new IP 
institutional mechanism affecting FDI spillovers and FDI flows, which previous 
literature has ignored or assumed to be identical with the strength of IP law 
protection. Moreover, in respect to the FDI spillovers chapters, this study sheds 
light to another uncharted area in the literature, the moderating effect of the  
public IP enforcement on the relationship between strong IP law protection and 
FDI spillovers. 
Second, for the empirical investigation of the effect of the stronger public IP 
enforcement in FDI spillovers and FDI flows, a new index developed by 
Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) is employed in the meta-analytic model and used 
to approximate for the effect of public IP enforcement. Incorporating 
Papageorgiadis et al.’s (2014) international patent systems strength (IPSS) 
index in the empirical investigation alongside the Park (2008) patent protection 
index, allows for the first time to account for the effect of both IP law protection 
and public IP enforcement on the FDI spillovers and on the FDI flows. 
Compared with the existing available IP enforcement indices (e.g. the index 
developed by the World Economic Forum (WEF) or the Institute of Management 
Development (IMD)), this index has the following strengths. First the composite 
IPSS index captures a number of different enforcement related aspects of 
patent systems. These different dimensions include:(1) the quality of patent 
administration, (2) judicial enforcement, (3) the level of corruption in judiciary, 
(4) the effectiveness of police enforcement, (5) the strength of border controls, 
(6) the perception of patent owners about national patent legislation and 
enforcement levels, (7) the cultural and societal attitudes towards the purchase 
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of infringing goods, and (8) the level of public commitment to patent legislation 
(Papageorgiadis et al. 2014). Other indices, for instance the WEF enforcement 
index, capture the availability of IP law protection and the strength of one 
enforcement related aspect of IP systems in this case the managers’ perception 
towards IP law protection and enforcement in the countries they operate. As 
such the composite IPSS index allows approximating for more than one aspect 
and enables researchers to more holistically capture the strength of public IP 
enforcement. Second, the IPSS index is developed by following a consistent 
methodology recommended by the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) in Constructing Composite Indicators. Third it is fully 
transparent and annually longitudinal. Fourth, it is built on transaction cost 
theory, which is also one of the foundational theories that aid in the 
development of the theoretical arguments in this study.  
The third contribution lies in the methodological approach followed for the meta-
analytic investigation of the FDI spillovers. The majority of meta-analytic studies 
on FDI spillovers, employ either the t-statistics or semi-elasticities as their 
dependent variable.5However, because of the high level of variation in variable 
selection, estimation method and data source in existing studies, it is almost 
impossible to calculate dimension-free parameters such as semi-elasticity with 
a sufficient level of accuracy. The t-statistics (t-stats) is a dimension-free 
parameter but only the significance of the focal variable derived by comparing 
the t-stats from the empirical result with the corresponding critical t from the t 
                                                          
5Given that the dependent variable is rarely measured identically across studies, the differences 
in means need to be standardised in order to be comparable. Due to the lack of information, 
many researchers collect the t-statistic or the semi-elasticity to compare group means. To 
achieve standardisation researchers often use the pooled standard deviation or the pooled 
sample size weighted standard deviation or the control group standard deviation methods. 
However, many studies do not include the necessary information needed for the formulae 
above, so instead researchers collect either the t-statistics or calculate the semi-elasticity.  
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distribution table, has important economic meaning. For example, both a t-stat 
of 3.5 and a t-stat of 4.5 for the FDI presence variable in FDI spillovers studies, 
are seen as evidence of positive FDI spillovers since they are larger than the 
critical t of 1.66 at 5% significance level (assuming the degree of freedom is 
greater than 100 as with most of FDI spillovers studies). The difference between 
the two however, only reveals a very marginal difference regarding the 
presence of positive FDI spillovers. Moreover, the researchers in the field of FDI 
spillovers and policymakers are more interested in the presence of FDI 
spillovers , where even in cases that magnitudes of FDI spillovers variable 
coefficients are small, the magnitude of FDI’s impact on the productivity of host 
country domestic firms is still respectable(Irsova and Havranek 2013),. This 
study employs the ordered probit model regression, in which the significance of 
the FDI presence variable (coded as 0 significantly negative, 1 insignificant and 
2 significantly positive) is used as the dependent variable. Because the 
estimated coefficients from an ordered probit model should not be used for 
inference, the marginal effects are also calculated (Verbeek 2017). Under this 
framework the marginal effects show the change in the probability of finding a 
specific outcome. This means that for each of the independent and control 
variables in the model, the change in the probability of obtaining a significantly 
negative, an insignificant, and a significantly positive estimate is calculated 
(Koetse et al. 2009). This approach has been used in other meta analyses, for 
example De Groot et al. (2015) on agglomeration externalities, Card et al. 
(2010) on the effectiveness of active labour and Koetse et al. (2009) on the 
impact of uncertainty on investment behaviour.  
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The last contribution of this thesis relates to the methodological approach 
employed for the investigation of the role of IP law protection and public IP 
enforcement on bilateral FDI flows.  The Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood 
(PPML) estimation method is introduced which so far has mainly been used to 
estimate bilateral trade flows. This method has the following advantages over 
other methods. First, this method reduces (potential) bias in estimating the 
parameters of a log-linearised model by OLS, or other standard panel data 
estimation methods such as fixed effect model, since it does not impose strict 
assumptions on the independence of an error term and the form of a dependent 
variable (Silva and Tenreyro 2006; Arvis and Shepherd 2013). Second, the 
empirical study of bilateral FDI flows resemble the study of bilateral trade flows 
in terms of both model specification (the gravity model or semi-gravity model is 
commonly used) and data recording (a proportion of bilateral trade or FDI are 
not 0 and recorded as 0 which leads to data truncation errors).  Finally, this 
method can be easily implemented using standard econometrics software such 
as STATA where the results from this method can be easily interpreted (i.e. 
coefficients and elasticities).  
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THESIS OUTLINE 
Chapter two presents a literature review on the key concepts and theories used 
in this thesis. In particular definitions and background research are provided for 
the IP systems, FDI determinants and FDI spillovers. Moreover, the institutional 
theory and the transaction cost theory are discussed in relation to their effect on 
the aforementioned concepts.  
In Chapter 3 this thesis addresses RQ1 and investigates the effect of IP law 
protection, public IP enforcement and the moderating effect of public IP 
enforcement on FDI horizontal spillovers. Specifically, Section 3.2 reviews the 
literature on IP systems while it emphasises the importance of distinguishing 
between the two pillars of an IP system i.e. IP law protection and public IP 
enforcement. Building upon the transaction cost and institutional theory three 
hypotheses are developed and tested with the use of a meta-analysis (section 
3.3). In section 3.4 the methodology and data are described accompanied by a 
description of the variables definitions. The main part of section 3.5 consists of 
the presentationand discussion of the results. Lastly, policy implications and 
direction of future research is provided in section 3.6.  
Chapter 4 addresses RQ2 and examines the effect of IPlaw protection, public IP 
enforcement and the moderating effect of public IP enforcement on FDI vertical 
spillovers and follows a very similar conceptual and empirical approach (meta-
analysis) to Chapter 3.  
While Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the relationship between IP systems and FDI 
spillovers, Chapter 5 takes a more general approach in order to address RQ3 
and investigates the distinct effect of IPlaw protection and public IP enforcement 
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on the bilateral FDI flows in OECD countries. A panel of data for 30 OECD 
countries over the period 2001 to 2012 is used for the empirical study. It begins 
with an assessment of the existing studies while it identifies their major 
limitation (i.e. public IP enforcement is not always accounted for) and moves on 
to the development of two hypotheses. Section 5.3 describes the 
methodological approach of this study; being the employment of the gravity 
model and the Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) technique while it 
is accompanied by a description of the variables definitions. The main part of 
section 5.4 consists of the presentation and discussion of the results. Lastly, 
policy implications and direction of future research is provided in section 5.5. 
Chapter 6 offers overall conclusions of the thesis and discusses the major 
limitations of Chapters 3, 4 and 5.  
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE: THE KEY THEORIES UNDERPINNING THIS 
THESIS 
This thesis aims to empirically investigate the relationships between Intellectual 
Property Rights (IP) systems, FDI flows and FDI spillovers.  
The effect of FDI flows and FDI spillovers on the host countries’ prosperity has 
been at the forefront of International Business (IB) research for decades. 
However, whether inward FDI and its externalities positively or negatively 
influence the host country remains an issue that has not been fully addressed. 
There are varying perspectives and views on this issue, some of which posit a 
positive relationship and others a negative relationship (Crespo and Fontoura 
2009; Gorg and Strobl 2001; Gorg and Greenaway 2003; Meyer and Sinani 
2009). Empirical research provides inconclusive results when the role of 
institutional factors, such as the IP system of the host country, is included in the 
discourse. To shed light on these issues two leading IB theories, transaction 
cost theory (TCT) (Coase 1937; Williamson 1981) and institutional theory (North 
1991), are applied to develop the hypotheses in this study (Chapters 3, 4, and 
5). In particular, transaction cost theory is employed to investigate MNEs’ 
transaction costs when investing in a foreign market. Complementing TCT, 
institutional theory is used to identify how country level factors such as the 
strength of the IP system, can influence MNEs transaction costs and 
consequently attractiveness of the host market, levels of inward FDI (Chapter 5) 
and the possibility of FDI spillovers (Chapters 3 and 4).  
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2.1. Transaction cost theory 
In neo-classical economics the firm is seen as a black box that receives inputs 
in the form of land, capital and labour and yields outputs in the form of 
goods/services with the goal of generating profits (Alchian and Woodward 1988; 
David and Han 2004; Martins et al. 2010). Transaction cost theory (TCT) 
challenged the neo-classical perspective and shed light on this black box by 
suggesting that factors such as the appropriate governance mode could 
maximise firms’ efficiency, by confining their transaction costs (Coase 1937; 
Williamson 1979 1981). Transaction costs relate to the development, monitoring 
and enforcement of contracts between two parties (Alchian and Woodward 
1988; David and Han 2004). TCT, by following the Pareto efficiency principle, 
assesses governance modes’ ability to facilitate transactions up until the point 
where one extra transaction within the firm, will equal the costs of transacting 
with the market (Martins et al. 2010). Resting upon two assumptions of bounded 
rationality and opportunism, TCT recognises the incompleteness of all contracts 
and explicates that transaction costs may occur in the development, monitoring 
and enforcement of contracts between the parties (Alchian and Woodward 
1988; David and Han 2004).  
2.1.1. Assumptions of TCT 
In order to identify the source of transaction costs, TCT introduces two 
fundamental assumptions: i) opportunism, and ii) bounded rationality 
(Williamson 1979,1981). 
Bounded rationality suggests that humans are incapable of assimilating and 
processing excessive amounts of information (Williamson 1981). This attribute 
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makes all contractual agreements incomplete (Alchian and Woodward 1988), as 
humans are not able to predict the occurrence of future events and the 
responses to them beforehand in order to include them into the contracts 
(Alchian and Woodward 1988; Williamson 1981). As such contracting, 
monitoring and enforcement costs are generated, in order to avoid any 
fraudulent activities (Aubert et al. 2004; David and Han 2004; Williamson 1981 
1988).  
Notwithstanding the incompleteness of all contracts, transaction costs could be 
zero if humans were trustworthy and not opportunists (Williamson 1981). 
Opportunism suggests that before or after the two parties agree on a contract, 
they will exhibit some deceitful behaviour (Aubert et al. 2004; David and Han 
2004; Williamson 1981). This assumption is built upon the psychological 
perception that humans will firstly pursue their own interests before acting 
collectively and thus may engage in lurking activities to maximise their benefits 
(Aubert et al. 2004; David and Han 2004; Williamson 1981). As such 
contracting, monitoring and enforcement costs are most likely to occur. 
In the context of this study, foreign affiliates may experience contracting costs 
when investing in the host country via the acquisition of existing firms, or by the 
formation of joint-ventures with the domestic firms. Monitoring costs arise from 
the opportunistic nature of the contracting parties. These costs occur when the 
foreign affiliates scan the marketplace to identify cases of illegal use of their 
proprietary knowledge and when they monitor the contracting parties’ behaviour 
in order to avoid any break down or violations of their agreement (Clegg and 
Cross 2000; Papageorgiadis et al. 2014). Finally, if contravention occurs foreign 
affiliates need to enforce the terms and conditions of the contracts, mainly via 
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the judicial system, resulting in enforcement costs (Clegg and Cross 2000; 
Papageorgiadis et al. 2014). 
2.1.2. Determinants of Transaction Costs 
Williamson (1979) argues that three conditions will impact the magnitude of 
transaction costs: i) asset specificity, ii) uncertainty and iii) frequency of 
transactions.   
Asset specificity describes organisational assets that have added values. 
Specific assets include physical assets (specialised machinery, technology, 
IPR); site assets (appropriate locations convenient for dealing with other 
parties); and human assets (mostly referring to employees’ tacit knowledge and 
know-how) (Aubert et al. 2004; David and Han 2004; Geyskens et al. 2006). 
The classification of an asset as specific, is done by calculating the difference 
between the cost of the asset and the value of its second best use (Aubert et al. 
2004; David and Han 2004; Geyskens et al. 2006).6 In the case where specific 
assets are being transacted, transaction costs increase as both parties have 
incentives either to protect the value adding assets or to act opportunistically 
and take advantage of them (Williamson 1979 1981 1988). Long-term contracts 
with volume guarantees and strict terms and conditions are developed to 
ensure the safety of their investment (David and Han 2004; Geyskens et al. 
2006). Consequently, contracting and monitoring costs increment in the effort of 
capturing and avoiding any potential opportunistic behaviour that may lead to a 
breakdown in their co-operation. 
                                                          
6For instance, patents are classified as specific assets since they have no alternative use and 
can only be exploited in the areas that they are granted.  
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Uncertainty arises from the incompleteness of all contracts due to: (1) the 
bounded rationality of humans, and (2) the imperfect information in the market 
place (Aubert et al. 2004; David and Han 2004; Geyskens et al. 2006; 
Williamson 1981). The incompleteness of contracts gives rise to monitoring and 
enforcement costs (Hart 1988; Weber and Mayer 2014). A newly introduced 
type of uncertainty, interpretive uncertainty, argues that uncertainty thrives from 
the way each individual interprets an unanticipated contingency (Weber and 
Mayer 2014). Because each individual has their own subjective manner in 
perceiving, explaining and reacting to an occurring event, transaction costs will 
vary accordingly. Uncertainty in the terms defined above, is always considered 
present in the firms’ transactions. TCT argues that uncertainty only poses 
problems when specific assets are being transacted (David and Han 2004). 
This is so because uncertainty leaves space for expropriation of assets and in 
the case of specific assets firms may encounter transaction costs in the form of 
contracting, safeguarding and enforcement.   
Frequency of transaction refers to the degree the firm’s transactions recurring 
(Geyskens et al. 2006). Frequent transactions with the market require constant 
monitoring to ensure that all contracting terms are followed, in order to avoid 
any misappropriation of the assets under transaction (David and Han 2004). In 
the case where recurring transactions do not concern specific assets, 
transaction costs are considered negligible and firms make use of the 
advantages of perfect competition. On the other hand, recurrent transactions of 
specific assets increase the possibility and opportunities for the contracting 
party to obtain information about the specific asset, resulting in the rise of 
transaction costs.   
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2.1.3. Transaction cost theory and FDI spillovers 
In the context of this thesis TCT is applied to identified MNEs’ transaction costs 
when their knowledge is willingly (vertical spillovers) or unwillingly (horizontal 
spillovers) diffused to the domestic market (recall the 3 stage model in Chapter 
1).  
When domestic and foreign firms compete in the same industry then, in order to 
preserve their ownership advantage, the latter have an incentive to prevent 
knowledge leakages and thus spillovers from taking place. However MNEs’ 
knowledge still diffuses to the domestic firms via the spillover channels. During 
this process MNEs encounter the following transaction costs. First, MNEs need 
to draw restricting contracts with their employees prohibiting the share of MNEs’ 
know-how, with their new domestic employers. Such processes give rise to 
contracting and monitoring costs, as well as enforcement costs if violations of a 
contract occur. The second source of transaction costs for the MNEs is when 
domestic firms access MNEs’ knowledge via the demonstration channels and 
either invent around or illegally imitate that knowledge. In this case, monitoring 
costs arise when MNEs want to ensure that publicly available knowledge is in 
fact exploited and enforcement costs increase when domestic firms are caught 
engaging in illegal imitative activities. In the case of vertical spillovers, MNEs 
transaction costs are relatively low as MNEs willingly share their knowledge with 
their domestic suppliers in order to gain more advanced and high quality inputs 
in return (Javorcik 2004). Nevertheless, the MNEs’ transaction costs identified 
above are subject to the quality and effectiveness of the host country’s 
institutions. Well-developed institutions in the host country are thought to reduce 
MNEs’ external uncertainty and transaction costs, provide incentives for FDI 
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(Bénassy-Quéret et al. 2007; Bevan et al. 2004; Seyoum 2006) and 
consequently increase the possibility of FDI spillovers. As such, it is argued that 
strong IP law protection and public IP enforcement will reduce MNEs’ 
transaction costs, increase the attractiveness of the host country and the 
willingness of MNEs to transfer knowledge intensive assets to their foreign 
affiliates and thus enhance the possibility for FDI horizontal spillovers.  
2.2. Institutional theory 
‘While transaction cost theory focuses explicitly on intentional and rational 
decisions, institutional theory also takes into account the social construction of 
organizational behaviour, and recognizes the limits imposed by social 
constraints on a purely economic basis’ (Puck et al 2009: 392). In general, 
institutional theory accounts for the role of the institutional environment in MNEs 
decision-making, such as selection of entry mode, selection of host country, 
selection of ownership type. (Puck et al 2009). According to North (1991 1992), 
institutions are the constraints devised by humans that structure political, 
economic and social interactions and consist of: i) formal institutions, ii) informal 
institutions, and iii) the enforcement characteristics of both.  
Formal institutions refer to the laws and regulations (Peng et al. 2009) imposed 
by governments that target legal and economic issues (Hodgson 2006; 
Krammer 2013; North 1991). For instance, constitutional or property rights laws, 
or any other statutory laws imposed by governments. Contravention of a 
country’s’ formal institutions may result in legal penalties, such as fines and 
legal custody imposed by courts (North 1992).  
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Informal institutions are culturally derived unwritten codes of conduct, norms of 
behaviour, and ideologies that individuals possess (Holmes et al. 2013; 
Krammer 2013; North 1992). Culturally inherited institutions include society’s 
taboos, traditions, customs and shared habits of thoughts that have been 
passed down from generation to generation (North 1992). Since ideologies and 
consequently informal institutions are location specific, they tend to differ among 
countries (North 1992). Non-compliance with informal norms bears social 
penalties rather than legal penalites and are imposed by members of the 
society (Hodgson 2006). The degree to which there is an identity between the 
formal institutional constraints and the choices individuals make, on whether or 
not to follow them influenced by the informal institutions, depends on the 
effectiveness of enforcement (North 1992). Enforcement can be carried out by 
individuals self-imposing the codes of conduct (informal institutions), and/or by a 
third party such as state officials, courts, the judiciary, legal systems (formal 
institutions) (North 1992).   
According to North (1990) in a world with perfect information, informal 
institutions would govern everyday life and formal institutions would only make 
up a very small part of the sum of constraints that would shape actors’ choices. 
This is so because transaction costs would be zero, actors would have no 
incentives to act opportunistically and enforcement will be self-imposed based 
on local informal institutions (North 1992).  However this is not the case. Firms 
do not have access to perfect information, and driven by competition often 
engage in opportunistic behaviours resulting in increased transaction costs. 
Formal institutions in this case are necessary as they condition the norms of 
behaviour by defining the boundaries of what is legitimate through legislation 
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and by outlining the legal sanctions imposed if that legislation is contravened 
(Peng et al. 2009). But even with the imposition of formal institutions, informal 
institutions are still shaping the transaction activities since they influence the 
enforcement of the formal institutions. The mental constructs and the inherited 
cultural conditioning of the individuals determine their perceptions towards 
justice and fairness in a society (North 1992). Different countries with different 
informal institutions have conflicting views of the fairness and justice of formal 
institutions. If the enforcement of formal institutions could be done at low cost, 
then it would make little difference whether people believe formal institutions are 
fair or unfair. But because enforcement of the law is costly, society’s ideology 
matters as it increases or decreases such costs (North 1992). Since 
enforcement is undertaken by human state enforcement agents in a particular 
society, enforcement agents’ ideologies will determine the strength and 
effectiveness of formal institutions’ enforcement (North 1990). Therefore, the 
effective enforcement of formal institutions will depend on the ideologies (past 
experiences, cultural influences etc.) of the relevant enforcement agents on 
whether or not an action is illegitimate. In cases where informal institutions are 
not allied with formal institutions and where room for ideological interpretation 
exists, MNEs’ contracting, monitoring and enforcement costs will rise. MNEs 
cannot rely on common perceptions of fairness to write and enforce contractual 
agreements, since they differ from country to country (North 1992). 
Furthermore, because of the high transaction costs involved and the high levels 
of institutional uncertainty as to whether or not formal institutions will be 
enforced, such countries may not attract significant foreign investment 
(Brouthers 2002; North 1991; Yi et al. 2017). To control for such issues, a 
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country needs to create an institutional environment where formal laws, such as 
property rights, are specified precisely and the enforcement of such laws is 
undertaken effectively irrespective of society’s ideology (North 1991 1992). In 
order to achieve this, a country needs to devote significant resources to ensure 
that enforcement agents are impartial in their judgements and that personal 
ideological constrains do not obstruct justice (North 1987).  
At a macro level, the IB discipline has examined the role of institutions on entry 
modes, economic growth, and how national level institutions condition the 
behaviour of domestic and foreign firms (Dunning Lundan 2008; Peng 2002 
2003; Brouthers 2002; Puck et al. 2009). At a micro level, Management 
scholars have focused on exploring the way foreign affiliates seek to gain 
legitimacy in the host country and how they adapt to isomorphic pressures from 
the institutional environment in which they operate (Dunning and Lundna 2008; 
DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Oliver 1999; Kostova and Zaheer 1999). This thesis 
is concerned primarily with the first stream of literature, which will be discussed 
in detail in the following chapters. The second stream of literature and research 
domain is covered briefly below.   
2.2.1. Institutional Isomorphism and MNEs’ strategic responses 
The institutional environment i.e. structure of formal institutions and 
effectiveness of enforcement mechanism, differs among countries. When MNEs 
decide to invest in a host country, they face pressures to conform to the 
institutional environment in order to achieve legitimacy (Puck et al. 2009). In 
other words MNEs will have to become isomorphic, where they will be forced to 
resemble the domestic firms that face the same institutional constraints (Puck et 
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al. 2009; DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and gain the right to do business in the 
host country by conforming to local norms and abiding by local laws(Puck et al 
2009). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identified three types of institutional 
isomorphism that MNEs may encounter: (1) coercive isomorphism, (2) mimetic 
isomorphism, and (3) normative isomorphism (p.150).  
Briefly, coercive isomorphism results from pressures to conform to 
governmental laws and mandates (formal institutions) and from pressures to 
adapt and adopt to the cultural expectations of the society within which the 
MNEs operates (informal institutions) (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Mimetic 
isomorphism stems from the uncertainty experienced by MNEs when operating 
in an unfamiliar institutional environment. To cope, MNEs tend to imitate or 
model themselves on similar domestic and foreign firms in their industry that 
they perceive to have gained legitimacy and are currently successful (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983). Lastly, normative isomorphism is associated with 
professionalisation that is ‘the collective struggle of members of an occupation 
to define the conditions and methods of their work’ (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983:152) in order to achieve legitimacy while complying with local cultural 
norms. To achieve isomorphism IP dependent MNEs will also need to comply 
with the local IP system in force. A strong IP system consisting of strong IP law 
and enforcement, will be positively perceived by the MNEs, as it will ensure that 
their rights will be granted and upheld in case of violation. In such cases, MNEs 
may transfer their IP assets to their foreign affiliates, which could potentially be 
diffused to the local firms via the spillover channels. In the case of a weak IP 
system consisting of strong IP law and weak IP enforcement or weak IP law 
protection and enforcement, MNEs may be relatively reluctant to conform to 
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local practices and achieve isomorphism as their IP assets and ownership 
advantage maybe misappropriated by local firms. MNEs will be exposed to high 
safeguarding, monitoring and enforcement decreasing their willingness to 
transfer advanced knowledge to their foreign affiliates, and subsequently 
decreasing the probability of advanced knowledge diffusion to the market and 
thus spillovers.  
To deal with the aforementioned institutional pressures, MNEs often pursue a 
variety of strategies such as: (i) acquiescence, (ii) compromise, (iii) avoidance, 
(iv) defiance, and (v) manipulation (Oliver 1991). Briefly, following an 
acquiescence strategy MNEs unconsciously take for granted certain norms of 
behaviour, mimic other firms’ institutional models, conform to and incorporate 
the cultural values and regulatory structures of the host country into its own 
practices (Oliver 1991). In a compromise strategy, MNEs tend to accommodate 
the demands of the institutional environment while at the same time negotiating 
with institutional stakeholders to extract some concessions (Oliver 1991). In an 
avoidance strategy MNEs want to avoid conformity with the institutional 
environment. They do so by: (1) attempting to conceal their nonconformity 
engaging for instance in window dressing, (2) manoeuvre around formal and 
informal institutions, (3) escape from external inspections, (4) exit the domain 
within which the institutional pressure is exerted, and/or (4) alter their goals and 
practices that are subject to institutional conformity (Oliver 1991). Employing a 
defiance strategy demonstrates an active form of resistance to institutional 
pressures. Here, MNEs reject the institutional expectations by: (1) dismissing 
local norms and formal rules (the latter is often pursued when enforcement of 
formal laws is rather weak); (2) defying, challenging and not complying with 
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formal laws and local norms (MNEs are prone to do this when their challenge 
can be reinforced by demonstrating organisational probity and rationality); 
and/or (3) by attacking and denouncing the institutional pressures when they 
feel their autonomy, performance, privileges and values are in jeopardy (Oliver 
1991). Lastly the manipulation strategy is intended to change the institutional 
pressures that apply to the MNEs by attempting to: (1) affiliate with the source 
of the institutional pressure (society or government); (2) influence and possibly 
change institutional values and beliefs that do not support their practices; and/or 
(3) establish power and dominance over institutional actors that apply the 
institutional pressures (Oliver 1991).  
In the case of weak IP systems, in order to ensure the safe transfer and 
exploitation of their ownership advantage, MNEs may use a variety of the 
aforementioned strategies to deal with the external institutional pressures to 
conform. In addition whether their advanced IP is transferred or not, will also 
depend on the effectiveness of their internal mechanisms to safeguard and 
retain their knowledge inside the firm (de Faria and Sofka 2010; Zhao 2006).  
Such internal mechanisms can include secrecy measures and constant 
monitoring of the use of the IP inside the affiliate (de Faria and Sofka 2010). 
Moreover the MNEs’ certain IP components can be held in the home country 
and be protected under a strong IP system. The acquisition of MNEs’ 
complementary knowledge developed and protected in other countries with 
effective IP systems, entails high costs that may discourage the domestic firms 
(Zhao 2006). Lastly, MNEs can discourage imitation by developing technologies 
that are relatively complex and require complementary knowledge and 
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resources that is not always available to the domestic firms (de Faria and Sofka 
2010; Zhao 2006).  
2.2.2. Background to IP systems 
The focus of this thesis is on the IP systems, which are part of a country’s 
institutional environment, and their effect on FDI flows and FDI spillovers. In this 
section definitions on IPR and IP systems are presented. 
Intellectual Property (IP) refers to the intangible creations of the mind, such as 
ideas, artistic works, names, designs, software programs and inventions in 
general, that if exploited have a commercial value (World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) 2014). IP may take the form of industrial property, artistic 
and literary property or trade secrets (Maskus 2000, p. 37; WIPO 2014).  
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) are governmental laws and regulations that 
allow the creators of IP to commercially exploit their inventions while excluding 
others from using these inventions without the permission of their creators 
(WIPO 2014). The IP instruments used to protect IPR vary depending on the IP 
in question. Industrial property is protected via patents, trademarks and 
industrial designs, whereas artistic and literary property are protected via 
copyrights. Trade secrets on the other hand are protected by statutory laws 
against fair competition (Maskus 2000: 37-38; International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) and World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 2011).  
Building on North’s (1991; 1992) classification of institutions as formal and 
informal, this thesis conceptualises an IP system as having two elements: a) the 
IP law protection (formal institutions), and b) the public IP enforcement (formal 
and informal institutions) (Khoury et al. 2014; Peng et al. 2017a).This 
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classification is supported by Maskus (2004:22) who suggests that ‘any 
reference to or an examination of an IP system should be interpreted in respect 
of proper enforcement and consequently as an interpretation and examination 
of the content and adequacy of IP law protection’. Although strong IP law 
protection offers a legal framework inside which IP can be granted, ‘the real 
issue is whether a country adequately enforces the laws and regulations it has 
in place’ (Maskus 2004:22) in case of IP violation.  
The IP protection element relates to the availability of IP law, as this appears in 
the statutes of a country’s legislative framework and the enforcement 
mechanism in case of violation (formal institutions). The range of IP law 
availability in a country determines which intellectual assets can receive IP 
protection, the duration of IP protection (e.g. typically 20 years for patents) and 
outlines the suggested legal sanctions related to the misappropriation of IP 
rights (OECD 2014). However the availability of IP law protection may vary 
significantly across countries. For instance, while IP owners may be awarded IP 
protection in one country, they may not be able to register and protect their 
rights in another country. Therefore strong IP protection refers to countries that 
generally provide legislative frameworks that offer IP protection coverage to a 
wide type of IP assets and outline a variety of legal sanctions relevant to the 
degree of IP violation or misappropriation (Ginarte and Park 1997).  
However, the extent to which IP law protection is enforced (or not) in practice, is 
distinct from the existence of enacted laws (Dixit 2009). This issue has been 
highlighted by the WTO arguing that although many countries such as China 
offer a strong IP law protection framework, public IP enforcement is found to be 
weak (Papageorgiadis et al. 2014; Peng et al. 2017b).  
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For this reason, it is important to consider the IP enforcement element of the IP 
system as it relates to the application of IP law protection by the public 
enforcement agents when IP laws are violated (Papageorgiadis et al. 2014; 
WIPO 2014). Enforcement of IP laws is a two dimensional concept involving the 
institutional capacity together with the institutional will to enforce laws 
(Ostergard 2000:358). The former relates to the actual enforcement agents 
needed to enforce the law (the judiciary, state officials such as police and 
customs) (Ostergard 2000; Papageorgiadis et al. 2014) and the latter relates to 
the behavioural component of institutions (informal institutions) (Ostergard 
2000). In the behavioural component public IP enforcement relates to: (1) the 
perceptions of the public enforcement agents on what constitutes an illegitimate 
activity; and (2) the effectiveness of the IP administration systems that are also 
influenced by local ideologies. Such classification is supported by North (1990 
1992), who suggests that since enforcement is undertaken by humans, their 
personal informal beliefs on fairness and justice can influence the outcome. The 
administrative IP enforcement involves the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
governmental bodies that grant IP, administer IP legislation and examine IP 
applications. For instance, if the host country’s informal institutions favour or at 
least do not restrict the production and consumption of infringed goods, public 
IP enforcement agents responsible for enforcing the relevant legislation, may 
have a more tolerant attitude towards IP infringement (Kafouros and Aliyev 
2015).7Similarly, even if an IP law framework in a host country includes laws 
that enable punitive sanctions to IP infringers, these may never be utilised by 
the judiciary or enforced in practice by the customs officials if the enforcement 
                                                          
7 It has been observed that although some countries (such as China) may have strong IP 
protection laws they rarely enforce them (Keupp et al. 2010) 
 49 
 
agents allow their personal ideological constraints to obstruct justice. Since 
ideologies and informal institutions differ among countries, often the same IP 
laws in two different countries may be applied differently, depending on the way 
that the IP law is decoded and interpreted by the IP enforcement agents of the 
country (e.g. punitively in one country and non-punitively in another). Therefore 
strong public IP enforcement implies that the relevant public IP enforcement 
agents effectively seize and prosecute IP infringement, the judiciary 
independently and transparently apply the IP laws in practice awarding fair legal 
sanctions (Butterton 1996; Maskus 2004; Pajunen 2008).To summarise, the 
strength of an IP system is reliant on both the availability of IP laws and their 
effective enforcement by the public enforcement agents.  
2.2.3. IP systems and FDI spillovers 
The institutional pressure applied to MNEs when entering a foreign market and 
the quality of the institutional environment may affect the generation of FDI 
spillovers by: (1) obstructing or enhancing the transfer of specific assets such 
as proprietary knowledge, from the parent firm to the foreign affiliates; and (2) 
by influencing the diffusion of foreign affiliates’ knowledge to the domestic 
market (see 3 stage model in Chapter 1). 
In the cases of weak IP systems external uncertainty increases as domestic 
competitors driven by competition may engage in opportunistic behaviours and 
attempt to illegally acquire information for the specific asset under transaction 
(i.e. foreign affiliates’ IP) (Geyskens et al. 2006). As such foreign affiliates’ 
contracting, monitoring and enforcement costs increase. In this case the 
attractiveness of the host country decreases and parent firms may be reluctant 
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to transfer advanced technological and managerial know-how to their foreign 
affiliates and instead transfer old or soon to be obsolete knowledge. In turn 
domestic competitors will not be exposed to advanced technological and 
managerial know-how and therefore may experience insignificant or negative 
FDI horizontal spillovers, due to a competition effect. Furthermore, since parent 
firms may not transfer high quality knowledge to their foreign affiliates, the 
knowledge that foreign affiliates may share with their domestic suppliers/buyers 
will be of inferior quality and domestic suppliers/buyers may not experience any 
significant changes to their productivity.  
The effect of strong IP systems on FDI spillovers can be positive and negative. 
On the one hand strong IP systems limit external uncertainty as they ensure IP 
owners that their rights will be granted and upheld if necessary. As such 
transaction costs decrease and attractiveness of the host country increases, as 
does the amount and quality of knowledge that is being transferred to the host 
country. In such cases, foreign firms may create more joint-ventures with the 
domestic firms or increase the amount of licensed IP, thus enhancing the legal 
diffusion of their proprietary knowledge. Moreover a strong IP system (i.e. 
availability of IP law protection and effectiveness of public IP enforcement) 
creates incentives for foreign and domestic firms to engage in the development 
of advanced technology/knowledge, by assuring the IP owners that their rights 
will be granted and upheld in case of violation. Making use of the demonstration 
channel, domestic firms with the necessary absorptive capacity can access 
foreign firms’ publicly displayed information (patents), incorporate it into their 
practices and potentially increase their productivity. As suggested by Levin 
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(1988), positive FDI spillovers are observed when domestic firms acquire 
advanced technological know-how through patent disclosures.  
On the other hand, strong IP systems block the labour turnover channel, illegal 
demonstration channel and the competition channel (for more details see 
section 3). Strong IP systems restrict the opportunistic behaviour of domestic 
competitors to illegally acquire assets under transaction, as they allow IP 
owners to take legal action against the infringers and enforce their rights. In this 
case the illegal diffusion of foreign affiliates’ knowledge decreases and domestic 
competitors may experience the adverse effect of competition. While such 
potentially negative effects of strong IP systems on FDI spillovers may well 
exist, the overall net effect still could be positive. Since strong IP systems offer 
incentives to firms to engage in innovative activities, domestic firms could 
engage in R&D and develop their own advanced technologies, in this way 
increasing their productivity (Krammer 2015; Levin 1988; Yi et al. 2015).  
2.3. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Chapter 5 aims to address RQ3 and investigates the distinct effect of IP law 
protection and public IP enforcement on bilateral FDI flows in OECD countries. 
This section provides a brief review on the key FDI determinants focusing on 
the institutional quality of the host country while it identifies areas of 
improvement that this study aims to make.  
According to Dunning (1993) three conditions must be satisfied for FDI to 
occur.8  The firm must possess an ownership and internalization advantage 
                                                          
8 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) refers to an investment made by an enterprise operating in 
one economy with the goal of acquiring controlling interest in an enterprise currently operating 
or soon to operate in another economy (OECD 2018). A threshold of 10 per cent of equity 
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while the host country must offer a location advantage. When MNEs invest 
abroad they are at least initially disadvantaged to local firms whose knowledge 
on local market conditions is excessive (liability of foreignness) (Javorcik 2004). 
Therefore MNEs must possess a form of ownership advantage such as; 
superior production technology, managerial and technological know-how, 
innovatory capacity, reputation, and/or intangible assets such as IPs, to surpass 
their liability of foreignness and compete effectively with domestic firms. 
Internalization refers to the advantage of owning, controlling and coordinating 
ownership advantages within the MNE (Dunning 1993). The decision to 
internalize instead of licensing or exporting has the advantage of lowering 
transaction costs, minimizing technology imitation, and preserving firms’ quality 
standards across management, production and distribution (Faeth 2009; 
Javorcik 2004). Location advantage provides an explanation on where the 
ownership advantages can be best exploited (Dunning 1993) and most often is 
the decisive factor on the country selection process. It includes factors such as 
host country’s wage rate, material prices, access to consumers, market size, 
governmental regulation (such as taxation policies etc.), exchange rates, capital 
flows, financial development, institutional quality and other (Bevan and Estrin 
2004).  
Much research has been done on the effect of the aforementioned factors 
(ownership, location and internalization advantage) on FDI flows however a 
complete specification of which variables are to be included when statistical 
investigation is performed has not been standardised (Blonigen 2005; 
                                                                                                                                                                          
ownership is necessary for an investment to qualify as a foreign direct investment. (OECD 
2018).  
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Faeth2009). Nevertheless the majority of research on the determinants of FDI 
focuses and examines the effect of location factors on FDI flows.  
Because the focus of this thesis is on the IP systems in force in the host country 
the  next section only provides a brief review of the rest FDI determinants 
literature (for a complete review see Blonigen 2005; Faeth 2009; Chakrabari 
2001).  
2.3.1. Foreign direct investment determinants 
The most commonly used variables to explain FDI flows are the following. 
Market size is by far the single most widely used determinant of FDI flows. The 
basic hypothesis states that a larger market size offers more opportunities for 
growth and profit and thus attracts more FDI (Blonigen 2005; Chakrabari 2001; 
Faeth 2009). Indicatively, Swedenborg, (1979), Kravis and Linsey, (1982), 
Schneider and Frey, (1985) and Shams Uddin, (1994) support the above 
hypothesis. Exchange rate is also a very common variable with researchers 
arguing that the weaker the currency of a country the less likely that foreign 
firms will invest due to profitability risks (Blonigen 1997; Blonigen and Feenstra 
1996; Caves 1988; Froot and Stein 1991). Trade barriers and trade openness is 
often a strong FDI determinant as it is argued that inward FDI is a common 
substitute of imports of host countries  from the home country with high trade 
barriers or minimum trade openness (Blonigen 1997; Blonigen and Feenstra 
1996). Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that FDI leads to a decline of 
exports in the home country (Head and Ries 2001; Swenson 2004). Wage rate 
is another influential factor with the most popular hypothesis supporting that 
countries with low wage rates tend to attract significant more FDI (Flamm 1984; 
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Saunders 1982). Economic growth of the host country also plays an important 
role as it suggests that a growing economy provides relatively more and better 
opportunities for firms to expand their market and make profits (Billington 1999; 
Culem 1988; Schneider and Frey 1985). Taxation is also one of variables used 
in existing studies with the researchers arguing that more corporate taxes deter 
FDI flows (Hartman 1984; Hines and Rice 1994; Kemsley 1998; Loree and 
Guisinger 1995).  
Lastly, the quality of institutions is considered to be another important factor as 
weak institutions decrease the legal protection of assets, increase the chance of 
expropriation of foreign firms’ ownership advantage, raise transaction costs for 
foreign firms and thus make the host country less attractive (Blonigen 2005). 
Estimating the magnitude of the effect of institutions on FDI flows has been 
difficult because to date there is no effective measurement to approximate 
institutions as a whole (Blonigen 2005; Walsh and Yo 2010). For this reason, 
researchers in their majority approximate institutions using, for example, the 
country’s level of corruption by employing the commonly accepted corruption 
perception index developed by Transparency International. The few empirical 
evidence by Wei (2000a,b) and Hines (1995) suggests a negative relationship 
between high levels of corruption and FDI flows.  
Others instead of approximating institutions as a whole select one aspect of it, 
the IP system. Empirical evidence on the effect of IP systems on FDI flows 
mostly reveals a positive relationship (Awokose and Yin 2010; Bascavusoglu 
and Zuniga 2005; Branstetter et al. 2007; Khan and Samad 2010; Mc Calman 
2004; Puttitanum 2002), while a few studies indicate a negative insignificant 
relationship (Nicholson 2007; Fosfuri 2004). One omission of the 
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aforementioned studies is that they conceptualize and empirically test the IP 
system as having one pillar –the IP law protection. Empirically these studies 
employ the index of patent protection by Ginarte and Park (1997) and Park 
(2008) to approximate for the strength of the IP systems as a whole (i.e. IP law 
protection and IP enforcement). This index however does not include a 
measurement for patent enforcement (Fosfuri 2004; Javorcick 2004; Nichloson 
2007; Nunnenkamp and Spatz 2004; Papageorgiadis et al. 2014) as it is only 
‘designed to provide an indicator of the strength of patent protection and not the 
quality of patent systems’ (Park 2008:761). Therefore, the Ginarte and Park 
(1997) and Park (2008) indices can be used to proxy for the strength of 
patent/IP law protection but not the strength of the enforcement dimension. In 
Chapter 5 this research gap is addressed by conceptualizing and testing for the 
distinct effect of public IP enforcement on FDI flows.  
2.4. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) spillovers 
In order to address RQ1 and RQ2 Chapters 3 and 4 investigate the distinct 
direct and moderating effect of IP law protection and public IP enforcement on 
FDI horizontal and vertical spillovers (respectively). This section reviews the 
literature on FDI spillovers and identifies the knowledge gaps this study aims to 
address.  
2.4.1. FDI horizontal spillovers 
FDI spillovers refer to the changes in domestic firms’ productivity as a result of 
the foreign presence in the country. FDI spillovers can take the form of 
horizontal or vertical spillovers. FDI horizontal spillovers occur when the 
domestic firms engage in competing activities with the foreign affiliates while 
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both of them operating in the same industry and this interaction brings changes 
to their productivity (Liu et al. 2009). The most common channels through which 
FDI horizontal spillovers can take place are; i) the demonstration channel where 
domestic firms may imitate foreign firms proprietary knowledge ii) the labour 
turnover channel where domestic firms hire employees trained by the foreign 
firms and iii) the competition channel where domestic firms use their own 
capabilities more efficiently to address the severe competition from the foreign 
firms (Liu et al. 2009).  
Nevertheless domestic firms may not always be able to utilize these channels. 
When domestic and foreign firms compete in the same industry, then the latter 
have an incentive to prevent knowledge leakage and thus spillovers from taking 
place. Thereof foreign firms tend to guard their proprietary knowledge via IP, 
trade secrecy, paying higher wages to prevent labour turnover etc. and obstruct 
knowledge from diffusing to the domestic firms (Javorcik 2004; Liu et al. 2009). 
However because the fundamental concept underlying FDI spillovers is the 
concept of externality FDI horizontal spillovers are still possible. Externality 
relates to the public good nature of knowledge that is it can be transferred at 
zero or low marginal cost (Arrow 1962; Magee 1977). This implies that one 
party can benefit from the use of the common good without paying full cost to 
the owner or inventor (Kogut and Zander 1993).  In the context of FDI horizontal 
spillovers, although foreign affiliates make effort safeguarding their proprietary 
knowledge, due to the public good nature of knowledge in most cases it is 
impossible to avoid some degree of knowledge leakage. By accumulating and 
exploiting such knowledge, domestic firms may experience an increase in their 
productivity. As such FDI horizontal spillovers induce positive externality for the 
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domestic firms and the magnitude of such positive externality is dependent on 
the specificity, tacitness and complexity of the knowledge possessed by foreign 
affiliates.  
The effect of foreign presence on domestic firms’ productivity is a widely 
researched topic both theoretically and empirically. In terms of FDI horizontal 
spillovers the empirical literature presents both positive and negative findings. 
For instance, in the context of developing countries, Chuang and Lin (1999) for 
Taiwan, Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1999) and Sjoholm (1999) for Indonesia, 
Aslanoglou (2000) for Turkey, and Zhang et al. (2010) for China, find that 
inward FDI leads to a positive change in the domestic firms’ productivity. 
However, Haddad and Harrison (1993) for Morocco, Aitken and Harrison (1999) 
for Venezuela, and Djankov and Hockman (2000) for Czech Republic, report 
the opposite results. Research on developed countries also reports mixed 
findings. Examples of finding positive spillovers to name but a few include 
Haskel et al., (2007) and Liu et al. (2000) for UK,  Keller and Yeaple(2009) for 
USA, and Barrios et al.(2004) for Greece, Ireland and Spain who report positive 
FDI spillovers. Examples of findings that indicate negative spillovers include 
Barrios and Strobl (2002) for Spain, and Driffield (2004) for UK. 
2.4.2. FDI vertical spillovers 
FDI vertical spillovers occur when domestic firms and foreign affiliates operate 
in different industries and are divided into backward and forward linkage 
spillovers (Liu et al. 2009). FDI backward spillovers arise when domestic firms 
supply the foreign affiliates with goods and services from the upstream 
industries (Liu et al. 2009).  The major channels for FDI backward spillovers to 
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occur are two. First, the direct knowledge transfer from foreign affiliates to 
domestic suppliers. Because foreign affiliates have incentive to transfer their 
advanced practices and knowledge they tend to educate their suppliers by i) 
providing technical assistance to raise the quality of the products/services, ii) 
offering advices and know-how that upgrade their production processes and 
stimulate innovation, and iii) helping with management training (Driffield et al. 
2002; Javorcik 2004; Blalock and Gertler 2007). Second, the arrival of foreign 
affiliates in the host country increases the demand for intermediate goods 
hence the competition among domestic suppliers. Due to the fact that foreign 
affiliates quality and delivery standards are high, domestic suppliers are 
motivated to upgrade their practices in order to win contracts with the foreign 
affiliates leading at the end in increasing their overall performance and 
productivity (Blalock and Simon 2009; Javorcik 2004). In return for the 
knowledge transfer, foreign affiliates benefit from the improved services and 
products developed and offered by the domestic firms (Javorcik 2004).  
FDI forward spillovers arise when foreign affiliates sell goods and services to 
the domestic firms (Liu et al. 2009). FDI forward spillovers may take place via 
two channels. First, it is generally accepted that foreign affiliates are more 
innovative than domestic firms as they most often possess advanced 
technological and managerial know-how (Smeets and de Vaal 2016). As such 
domestic buyers by interacting/ co-operating with the foreign affiliates are 
exposed to superior quality inputs and new practices which if they adopt and 
utilize can improve their sales and overall performance (Driffield et al. 2002). 
Second, as foreign affiliates are more innovative than domestic firms and can 
offer higher quality products, intensify competition in the industry and is likely to 
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crowd out some of the domestic competitors (competition effect see Aitken and 
Harrison 1999). Therefore many domestic firms may end up buying their inputs 
from the foreign affiliates (Smeets and de Vaal 2015). As foreign affiliates can 
utilize the advantages of economies of scale may offer their products at lower 
prices. Domestic buyers by purchasing inputs at lower prices than before may 
increase their profitability or may allocate their monetary surplus in innovative 
activities that could potentially increase their productivity and performance 
(Smeets and de Vaal 2015).  
Empirical evidence on FDI vertical spillovers in their majority shows that the 
foreign presence has a positive effect on the productivity of domestic suppliers 
and buyers or at least an insignificant effect. For example, Driffield et al. (2002) 
and Fu (2012) for UK and Du et al. (2012) for China, find evidence for positive 
FDI forward spillovers while Laenarts and Merlevede (2011) for Romania and 
Xu and Sheng (2012) for China find insignificant effect of foreign presence. 
Regarding FDI backward spillovers, Blalock and Gertler (2003), for Indonesia, 
Kugler (2001) for Colombia, Javorcik (2004), for Lithuania and Du et al. (2012) 
for China find evidence ofpositive FDI backward spillovers while Laenarts and 
Merlevede (2011) for Romania and Xu and Sheng (2012) for China report 
insignificant effect of foreign presence. Such findings are consistent with the 
theoretical expectation: in the absence of competition effect, as in the case of 
FDI vertical spillovers, the presence of foreign affiliates in upstream and 
downstream industries is likely to have a positive effect on domestic suppliers 
and buyers’ productivity.  
Despite the importance of the host country’s IP system in IB research (Arora 
2009; Maskus 2000; Peng et al. 2017a) only but a few studies control for the 
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effect of IP systems in FDI spillovers (Irsova and Havranek 2013; Havranek and 
Irsova 2011; Smeets and de Vaal 2015). However existing studies theorize that 
both the availability of IP law protection and the effectiveness of public IP 
enforcement have a uniform effect on FDI spillovers. However as pointed out by 
the WTO, countries may offer a strong IP law protection framework but may not 
always enforce it in practice (Peng et al. 2017a and b).Moreover these studies 
by employing the Park (2008) patent protection index captures the effect of IP 
law protection on FDI spillovers but do not take into consideration the 
effectiveness of the public IP enforcement element. In Chapters 3 and 4 two 
research gaps in the existing literature are addressed:  the direct distinct effect 
of public IP enforcement on FDI spillovers and the moderating role of the public 
IP enforcement on the relationship between the strength of IP law protection 
and FDI spillovers.  
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CHAPTER 3 
PUBLIC IP ENFORCEMENT AND THE EFFECT ON FDI HORIZONTAL 
SPILLOVERS 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter investigates the role of national Intellectual Property (IP) systems 
and particularly the effectiveness of public IP enforcement (e.g. customs, 
judiciary) in stimulating horizontal productivity spillovers from Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI).  
The strength of a host country’s IP system can determine the level of IP risk that 
Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) face when investing in the country and an 
MNE’s decision to engage (or not) in the transfer of technological assets to a 
local subsidiary, invest in R&D activities, and license its IP to domestic 
companies (Branstetter et al. 2007; de Faria and Sofka 2010; Javorcik 2004). 
MNEs strive to avoid having their IP infringed in a host country since this can 
enable the domestic competitors to upgrade their capabilities while avoiding 
heavy investments in R&D (Capelli et al. 2014; Liang 2017). MNEs therefore 
transfer more high value technological IP assets in countries where they expect 
them to be protected. An MNE’s decision to undertake high value activities in a 
host country can help domestic firms improve their productivity since it provides 
opportunities for domestic firms to access the technological IP assets of the 
MNE legally, via observation and imitation or illegally by gaining access to the 
MNE’s leaked technological innovations (Berry 2017; Pavlinek and Zizalova 
2014). The strength of the IP system of a host country is generally expected to 
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determine the extent to which domestic firms can illegally or legally access and 
exploit the IP assets of MNEs and the degree to which MNEs can efficiently 
appropriate the economic returns from their innovations (de Faria and Sofka 
2010; Teece 1986; Zhao 2006). 
The strength ofIP systems depend on two distinct elements of a country’s 
institutional environment: the availability of IP protection, and the effectiveness 
of public IP enforcement (Peng et al. 2017a). IP protection relates to the 
availability of IP laws that assign exclusive temporary monopoly rights to 
innovators and define the legislative mechanisms (e.g. legal procedures) that 
can enable IP owners to appropriate and protect their rights in a country (de 
Faria and Sofka 2010; Maskus 2004). The availability of comprehensive IP law 
protection in a host country is important for MNEs, as it enables them to register 
and commercialise their IP assets under its legal system. It also provides the 
legal mechanisms available for use by public IP enforcement agents, if an MNE 
seeks to exercise itsIP rights in case of infringement or other opportunistic 
behaviour. IP enforcement relates to the application of IP law protection and 
legal mechanisms in practice, by public enforcement agents such as the 
judiciary and customs (Papageorgiadis et al. 2014; WIPO 2014).However, while 
the onus of seeking to enforce IP is on the private IP owner, the successful 
pursuit of a litigation case depends on the effectiveness of public IP 
enforcement agents whose perspectives and actions may not meet the spirit of 
the expectations set by the letter of the IP law in a country (Peng et al. 2017b).9 
                                                          
9 The importance of the public enforcement element of contemporary IP systems is highlighted 
by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO 2004:207) which suggests that:  ‘…there 
is no point in establishing a detailed and comprehensive system for protecting IP and 
disseminating information concerning them, if it is not possible for the right-owners to enforce 
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This is because although the availability of comprehensive IP law protection is 
necessary in a country, ‘the real issue is whether a country adequately enforces 
the laws and regulations it has in place’ (Maskus 2004:22).Therefore, when 
studying the effects of IP systems on economic activity, it is important to 
consider the effects of both elements of IP systems. 
Extant studies on the effect of national IP systems on FDI horizontal productivity 
spillovers however, focus solely on the availability of the IP law protection 
element when studying the effects of IP systems (Arora 2009). Such studies 
found either a positive (Yi et al. 2015), negative (Irsova and Havranek 2013) or 
insignificant (Smeets and de Vaal 2016) effect on FDI horizontal productivity 
spillovers. Those studies ignoring the effect of public IP enforcement are likely 
to be biased. This is because focusing on only one element of IP systems in 
their modelling, those studies de facto assumed that both the availability of IP 
law protection and the effectiveness of public IP enforcement, have developed 
equally over time and have a uniform effect on FDI productivity spillovers. 
Evidently, both Irsova and Havranek, (2013) and Smeets and de Vaal, (2016) 
only considered the de jure IP protection without recognising the difference and 
interaction between the two elements of IP systems. 
Conversely, the actual contemporary context of IP systems internationally after 
the signing of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs)agreement in 1995is substantially different to what it is theorised in the 
existing literature. Although most countries have significantly increased the 
availability of IP law protection in their IP systems after TRIPs, the effectiveness 
                                                                                                                                                                          
their rights effectively in a world where expanding technologies have facilitated infringement of 
protected rights to a hitherto unprecedented extent’. 
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with which the IP laws and legal mechanisms are enforced in practice by public 
authorities, continues to be questionable for many countries (Peng et al. 2017a 
2017b). This is because although the TRIPs agreement requires signatory 
countries to provide a number of specific legislative procedures in relation to 
enforcement mechanisms, it does not set out any obligations/requirements 
regarding how effectively IP law protection is applied in practice by public 
enforcement agents (WTO 2017). 10  Therefore, while most WTO countries 
nowadays offer IP law protection that is generally comprehensive (Park 2008; 
Peng et al. 2017a), the levels of effectiveness of public IP enforcement continue 
to vary significantly between countries (Brander et al. 2017; Papageorgiadis et 
al. 2014).  
This chapter intends to make two contributions to the literature. First, it 
integrates in the established theoretical and empirical frameworks the distinct 
effect of the public IP enforcement element of IP institutions on horizontal FDI 
productivity spillovers. The incorporation of the public enforcement element of 
IP systems allows for the identification of a new IP institutional mechanism 
affecting FDI horizontal productivity spillovers, which the previous literature 
ignored or assumed to be identical with the strength of IP law protection. The 
finding from this approach indicates that the strength of public IP enforcement in 
a country has a significant positive effect on FDI horizontal productivity 
spillovers. This challenges the findings of existing studies (Yi et al. 2015; Irsova 
and Havranek 2013; Smeets and de Vaal 2016) and highlights the importance 
                                                          
10 According to the WTO (2017): ‘the provisions on enforcement do not create any obligation to 
put in place a judicial system for the enforcement of intellectual property rights distinct from that 
for the enforcement of law in general, nor does it affect the capacity of Members to enforce their 
law in general. In addition, it is stated that nothing in these provisions creates any obligation 
with respect to the distribution of resources as between enforcement of intellectual property 
rights and the enforcement of law in general’.  
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of incorporating the strength of public IP enforcement in analysing the effect of 
IP systems on international business and other phenomena. The first 
contribution also enables this chapter to theorise on the potential of an 
interacting effect of the strength of public IP enforcement on the relationship 
between the strength of IP law protection and FDI horizontal productivity 
spillovers.  
This leads to the second contribution of this chapter, where the moderating role 
of public IP enforcement strength on the effect of the strength of IP law 
protection on FDI horizontal productivity spillovers is examined. Bridging the 
insights from IP systems and FDI spillovers literature, this chapter posits that 
the effectiveness of IP enforcement has a negative moderating effect on the 
relationship between IP law protection and FDI horizontal spillovers. That is, in 
countries where both IP law protection is high and public IP enforcement are 
strong, the domestic firms will experience less horizontal productivity spillovers, 
because foreign firms are able to exercise market power and stifle the 
competition from domestic firms (e.g. Fisher III and Oberholzer-Gee 2013).This 
is an important point since this theoretical reasoning provides a reconciling 
explanation for the diverging empirical findings of the existing studies, which 
only considered the strength of IP law protection to approximate for the overall 
effect of IP systems. The finding of a moderating effect of strong public IP 
enforcement, suggests that the diverging findings of the previous literature 
probably relate to the uncaptured (both direct and moderating) effect of the 
second element of IP systems. Importantly, the direction of moderating effect is 
different compared to the distinct direct effects of both IP elements. Identifying 
this moderating role of the public IP enforcement on the effect of the strength of 
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IP law protection, has important implications for future studies on the influence 
of IP systems on international business. Future studies on the effect of IP 
systems should go beyond the current standard approach of solely focusing on 
the strength of IP law protection by considering both the distinct direct and 
moderating effect of the public IP enforcement element of IP systems. 
3.2. Background to IP systems 
IP systems are comprised of two distinct elements: a) IP protection, and b) 
public IP enforcement (Khoury et al. 2014; Peng et al. 2017a). The IP protection 
element relates to the availability of IP law as it appears in the statutes of a 
country’s legislative framework. The range of IP law availability in a country 
determines which intellectual assets can receive IP protection, the duration of IP 
protection (e.g. typically 20 years for patents), and the legal sanctions that can 
be used by IP enforcement agents (OECD 2014). For example, IP law in a 
country determines the level and range of fines exacted on IP infringers 
convicted of IP violations. Countries offering strong IP protection generally 
provide legislative frameworks that offer IP protection coverage to a wide type 
of IP assets and a broad number of legal enforcement mechanisms for use by 
the IP enforcement agents (Ginarte and Park 1997). In contrast, in weak IP law 
protection countries, protection may not be available for a range of IPs that 
receive protection in other countries. This is because there are differences in 
the availability and range of IP law protection between countries internationally, 
such as country specific legal exemptions or lack of IP law availability for 
specific IP assets (for instance in the patentability of a software or the duration 
of a copyrights) (Park 2008).Therefore, while IP owners may be awarded IP 
protection in one country, they may not be able to register and protect their 
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rights in another country. In addition, the available laws related to the 
enforcement of IP may not provide a range of legal options to IP enforcement 
agents to carry out their operations effectively. This can relate to the potential 
lack of legislation that allows IP enforcement agents to award and enforce 
preliminary injunctions for IP cases.  
The way that law is enforced (or not) in practice is distinct from the existence of 
law on the books, since enforcement depends on the behaviour of public agents 
(Dixit 2009). While IP law in a country is codified and evidenced in writing in the 
legislative books of an IP system, it is subject to the interpretation of the 
judiciary and other public IP enforcement agents such as customs, police and 
trading standards (Khoury et al. 2014). This is because the application of IP law 
in practice is at the discretion of IP enforcement agents (Khoury et al. 2014). 
The extent to which the public IP enforcement agents will effectively engage 
and enforce IPRs will depend on their views and perceptions about IP 
infringement. For example, if they perceive an activity as illegitimate or not. 
Similarly, even if the IP legislative framework in a host country includes laws 
that enable punitive sanctions to IP infringers, these may never be utilised by 
the judiciary or enforced in practice by the customs officials. Therefore the same 
IP laws available in two different countries may be applied differently depending 
on the way that the IP law is decoded and interpreted by the IP enforcement 
agents of the country (e.g. punitively in one country and non-punitively in 
another). Therefore, strong public IP enforcement levels in a country are likely 
to emerge in practice when public IP enforcement agents effectively prosecute 
IP infringement and the judiciary apply IP law independently and transparently 
(Pajunen 2008). In contrast, weak public IP enforcement can arise when 
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opaque, arbitrary and ineffective judiciary and enforcement authorities may be 
receptive to corrupt practices and fail to effectively enforce the IP laws in 
practice (Butterton 1996, Maskus 2004). 
Distinguishing between the strength of IP law protection and the strength of 
public IP enforcement in a country is particularly important in the years after the 
implementation of the TRIPs agreement.11 The TRIPs agreement entered into 
force in 1995 and set the minimum standards for IP law protection among the 
member countries of the WTO (WTO 2017). The implementation of the TRIPs 
agreement brought a significant change to IP law protection in the legislative 
framework of WTO member countries. The TRIPs agreement however did not 
set obligations for WTO countries regarding the effectiveness with which IP law 
is enforced by public enforcement agents (Maskus 2015). The introduction of 
TRIPs and the compliance to a specific IP legislative framework, may have 
introduced IP laws that did not align with the dominant norms in a country but 
was imposed as a result of external political pressure through a multilateral 
negotiation process (Brander et al. 2017). While many WTO signatory countries 
now have legislative frameworks that offer a wide range of IP legislation, there 
is a mismatch between the new TRIPs required IP laws and the dominant 
norms towards IP in a country. This mismatch leads to the ineffective 
enforcement of the law by public IP enforcement agents in practice. This is the 
case for countries like China, where its IP law protection framework is generally 
                                                          
11 Developed countries were required to incorporate the TRIPs required changes in their 
legislative framework within one year (1996), while developing countries were required to 
implement them within a 5 year period (January 1 2000). This is mainly because many of the 
developing countries had very limited (or in some cases non-existent) IP legal frameworks. 
Developing countries were subsequently offered an extension of this deadline to 2006, which 
was further extended for least developed countries only to the year 2013 and eventually to the 
1st of July 2021 (WTO 2017). 
 69 
 
considered to be well crafted, but the actual enforcement of IPRs by public 
agents in the country is weak (Peng et al. 2017b). The mismatch has become 
particularly evident in the years after TRIPs, when a gap between the strength 
of IP protection and the effectiveness of public IP enforcement emerged in 
many WTO countries (Jadhyala 2013).  
3.3. Hypothesis development 
3.3.1. FDI Horizontal spillovers and MNC responses 
FDI activity in a host country is generally expected to generate horizontal 
knowledge spillovers that will benefit the performance of local firms operating in 
the same industry (Javorcik and Spatareanu 2008). One of the reasons that 
enable MNEs to engage in FDI and compete in a foreign market is their 
capability to access, develop, transfer, and exploit advanced knowledge assets 
such as IP (Almeida and Phene 2004). MNEs pool such IP assets from their 
innovation activities at home and abroad (Chang et al. 2012; Gupta and 
Govindarajan 2000; Lee et al. 2008) and use them as the spearheads for 
successfully entering and competing in new host countries internationally. The 
transfer of advanced IP and other knowledge assets, to their foreign affiliate 
entities, enables MNEs to overcome the liability of foreignness in the host 
country through the exploitation of IP assets that are more advanced than those 
of domestic firms. The transfer of MNE knowledge and IP in a host country in 
the form of intangible assets such as patents, trademarks, and know-how 
however, can allow domestic firms to benefit from the potential knowledge 
leakage attached to these assets of foreign firms and help them to enhance 
their productivity and competitiveness. Due to the public good nature of 
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knowledge, once it is accessed, it can be transferred at zero or low marginal 
cost to more recipients. Accessing advanced IP and know-how can, therefore, 
enable domestic firms to benefit from the use of an MNE’s knowledge and avoid 
the monetary liabilities to the legal owners of the IP (Arrow 1962; Kogut and 
Zander 1993; Magee 1977). 
Knowledge spillovers from the FDI of MNEs in a host market can occur directly, 
in terms of knowledge that is leaked from the MNE, or indirectly through the 
exposure of the domestic firms to the products and practices of the MNE. 
Knowledge can directly diffuse in a host country through employee mobility, 
when employees of the MNE in the host country move on to work for domestic 
firms (Berry 2017). This process allows the domestic firms to directly access the 
IP and know-how of the MNE and utilise it to improve their own practices and 
competitive offering (Aitken and Harrison 1999; Gorg and Strobl 2001). 
Domestic firms can also experience direct productivity spillovers by licensing 
the IP assets of the MNEs or by entering in joint venture agreements with them. 
There are two main indirect channels with from which domestic firms benefit 
accessing the IP, knowledge and know-how of MNEs: a) the demonstration 
channel, and b) the competition channel (Gorg and Greenaway 2003; Liu et al. 
2009; Yi et al. 2015). The demonstration channel relates to domestic firms 
reverse engineering innovative products and their attempts to imitate the 
proprietary technology of foreign MNE affiliates (Gorg and Greenaway 2003; 
Meyer and Sinani 2005).The competition channel relates to the presence of 
MNEs in a host country, which leads to the intensification of the competition in 
the industry through the higher number of competitors and by introducing new 
ways of competing (Meyer and Sinani 2009). This helps domestic firms to 
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increase their productivity by attempting to reduce their inefficiency and/or 
increase investment in R&D and knowledge generation/acquisition. A domestic 
firm’s investment in R&D can also aim to invent around and develop similar 
(legally registered or unregistered) IP assets to those of the MNE, while 
avoiding the legal infringement of the MNE’s IP assets. In addition, domestic 
firms can seek to gain a license of the MNEs’ advanced technology in exchange 
for a licensing fee and annual royalties. Licensing can allow a domestic firm to 
increase their productivity by legally accessing IP assets while also benefitting 
the MNE. The extent to which domestic firms can increase their productivity will 
depend on their capability to absorb and reconfigure advanced knowledge and 
know-how (Cantwell 2017; Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Escribano et al. 2009). 
MNEs pursue two different approaches to safeguard against the leakage of their 
proprietary knowledge and reduce the unintended spillovers from the 
unauthorised exploitation of their IP by domestic firms. The first approach 
relates to the development of internal mechanisms in the MNE subsidiary to 
control the extent of IP and know-how leakage (de Faria and Sofka 2010). 
Further to registering the IP assets in the host country, such internal 
mechanisms can include secrecy measures within the subsidiary and the use of 
complex designs that limit the usability of the IP and knowledge, unless it is 
combined with other know-how and expertise held outside the subsidiary (de 
Faria and Sofka 2010). In addition, to retain a tighter grip on the potential 
unintended leakage of parent firm knowledge, MNEs often employ a large 
number of expatriate managers in the host country to implement IP control 
policies by monitoring and managing the use of IP within the subsidiary (Berry 
2017).  
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The second approach relates to MNEs’ attempts to limit the unintended 
spillovers once their proprietary IP knowledge is found to be used by domestic 
firms, either through direct leakage or through the demonstration and 
competition effects. In the process of identifying and fighting again IP 
infringement, MNEs need to engage with the public enforcement agents of the 
host country who are responsible for enforcing IP law in practice such as the 
judiciary, the police and customs agents (Bessen and Meurer 2008; Yanget al. 
2008). The effectiveness of the public enforcement agents can determine the 
extent to which a suspected IP infringement case in a host country (as identified 
by the MNE or by the public enforcement agents) will be prosecuted, and the 
extent to which the judiciary will apply IP law in a timely, non-discriminatory, and 
effective manner to penalise domestic IP infringing firms (Ahammad et al.. 
2017). In countries where the firms can effectively engage with public IP 
enforcement agents and stop or punitively penalise IP infringement cases, the 
MNEs will be able to successfully limit the unintended spillovers from 
unauthorised IP exploitation, even if the proprietary IP and know-how of the 
MNE has leaked to domestic companies.  
While the effectiveness with which public IP enforcement agents enforce IP law 
in a host country can determine the extent to which domestic firms in the same 
industry benefit from spillovers, this element of the institutional fabric of host 
countries has not received much scholarly attention in the FDI horizontal 
spillovers literature to date. Over the past few years, a large number of studies 
have focused on different host country and firm characteristics and examined 
their influence on the knowledge transfer, diffusion and FDI horizontal spillovers 
to domestic firms in a host country (Aitken and Harrison 1999; Audretsch and 
 73 
 
Feldman 1996; Blomstrom and Sjoholm 1999; Brouthers 2002; Chuang and Lin 
1999; Dimelis and Louri 2002; Kinoshita 2001; Meyer and Sinani 2009; Sjöholm 
1999). However, there has been little interest in the role of the effectiveness of 
IP systems in generating FDI horizontal spillovers (Arora 2009).Existing studies 
in the area limited their focus on the role of the strength of IP law in a host 
country in stimulating or discouraging horizontal FDI spillovers and found mixed 
results (Havranek and Irsova 2011; Irsova and Havranek 2013; Smeets and de 
Vaal 2011; Yi et al. 2015).These studies assumed that the effectiveness of 
public IP enforcement was equal (in strength) to the strength of IP law 
protection. Existing research therefore focused on one of the two elements of 
IP: the strength of IP law as it appears in the legislative framework of a country, 
but they did not study the role of the effectiveness of public IP enforcement 
agents, nor the way that public IP enforcement moderates the effect that the 
strength of IP law has on FDI horizontal spillovers. The key theoretical lenses 
used in order to put together the following hypotheses are transaction cost 
theory and institutional theory.  
3.3.2. IP law protection and FDI horizontal spillovers 
Building on the three stage model introduced in Chapter 1 and the institutional 
and transaction cost theories, this section presents the following hypotheses. 
Due to the incompleteness of all contracts, formal institutions such as the level 
of IP law protection in a given country is important for MNEs, as they condition 
the norms of behaviour by defining the boundaries of what is legitimate or not 
(North 1992). In this case, the IP law protection framework allows (or not) MNEs 
to be grant and register heir IP in the host country, which in most cases 
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happens to be their ownership advantage. As such, strong formal institutions 
decrease MNEs’ external uncertainty enabling them to transfer their IP assets 
and advanced technological and managerial know-how to their foreign affiliates 
(Branstetter 2006; Wakasugi and Ito 2009; Yi et al. 2015). In particular, 
Branstetter (2006) examined the effects of IP law protection on technology 
transfer from U.S parent ﬁrms to their foreign affiliates for the period 1982–1999 
in 12 countries and found a signiﬁcant increase in the royalty fee when IP law 
protection is strong in the host countries. Along the same lines Wakasugi and 
Ito’s (2009) study of Japanese MNEs’ foreign affiliates in 33 countries, based on 
ﬁrm-level panel data for the years 1995 and 2001, showed that strong IP law 
protection has a positive effect on the transfer of advanced technology from the 
parent firms to their foreign affiliates. Since MNEs are institutional outsiders 
when entering a host country, they are expected to face high information costs 
due to their unfamiliarity with the local institutional environment and practices 
(Hennart 2012; Khoury et al. 2014). When MNEs find familiar aspects in the IP 
systems of a host country such as the strength of IP law, they perceive it as a 
positive signal that can enable them to register, legally protect, and potentially 
enforce their legal rights against IP infringement (Khoury et al. 2014). This is 
especially the case in host countries with strong location advantages (e.g. large 
market size, low cost or highly skilled labour) where accessing and benefiting 
from these advantages may be considered to be a priority for the overall 
success of the MNE. Therefore, when IP law is strong in a host country, MNEs 
consider it as a positive signal indicating that they could access the location 
advantages of the country, while they also exercise and safeguard their IP 
assets. Moreover, MNEs are positively influenced by increases in the availability 
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of IP law in a host country and respond by increasing their patenting activity 
there (Khoury et al. 2014). The increase in patenting activity by MNEs in a host 
country with strong IP law protection (Khoury et al. 2014), is expected to 
increase the amount and quality of IP assets and know-how transferred to the 
MNE’s subsidiaries (Berry 2017). As such, host countries with strong IP law 
protection offer incentives to IP dependent MNEs to register and develop 
innovative IP in the host country.  
Higher levels of FDI are also expected to boost the quality and quantity of 
technology transferred to the host country in the form of IP assets and know-
how, generating positive spillovers to the domestic firms. Domestic firms 
utilising the spillover channels can directly (labour mobility channel) or indirectly 
(demonstration and competition channel) access the IP of foreign firms. This is 
the case even if the subsidiaries of MNEs utilise internal mechanisms aimed to 
limit knowledge leakage. Although the strength of IP law enables the MNEs to 
position their IP assets in the technological landscape of legally protected IP, 
domestic firms can still illegally access the know-how of foreign firms through IP 
infringement. Regarding the imitation channel Zhao (2006) states that imitation 
has three preconditions: i) the motivation to imitate, ii) the ability to imitate, and 
iii) the legal restrictions against imitation. In respect to motivation, because 
imitation is a costly process it will only take place when imitators (in this case 
domestic firms) expect to profit from it and, as the literature has established, 
advanced IP can offer IP owners a competitive advantage. Thus domestic firms 
driven by opportunistic behaviour may attempt to illegally acquire MNEs’ IP. 
Zhao’s (2006) third precondition for imitation is the legal restrictions against 
imitation. Strong IP law protection in the host country minimises some of the 
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positive externalities of the public good nature of knowledge by imposing 
statutes on what constitutes illegal imitation. However, the strength of IP law in 
a country does not automatically constrain IP infringement activities (Bessen 
and Meurer 2008; Brander et al. 2017).To stop IP infringement, MNEs need to 
become aware of their IP infringement by competing firms, engage with the 
public IP enforcement agents by attempting to gain their support, and rely on 
them to stop and penalise the infringers. In other words, strong IP law protection 
without effective enforcement of these laws still allows domestic firms to access 
and imitate MNEs’ IP.  
Whether or not domestic firms can fully benefit from the MNEs’ leaked 
knowledge relates to Zhao’s (2006) second precondition for imitation i.e. the 
ability of domestic firms to imitate or, as usually stated in the spillover literature, 
domestic firms’ absorptive capacity. Strong IP law protection is said to offer an 
incentive to domestic firms to develop their own innovative IP by engaging in 
R&D activities to ensure that their IPR will be granted. Engaging in R&D allows 
domestic firms to further build their innovative capabilities and enhance their 
absorptive capacity and potentially increase their ability to engage with MNE 
knowledge/IP (Chen and Puttitanun 2005; Yi et al. 2015).  
Therefore, it can be expected that strong IP law protection:(i) enables foreign 
MNE affiliates to transfer and register their IPs in a host country, (ii) does not 
restrict the leakage of MNEs’ knowledge via the spillover channels; and (iii) 
assists domestic firms to build their absorptive capacity, which is necessary if 
they aim to absorb and incorporate MNEs’ knowledge into their own practices.  
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Hypothesis 1: The strength of IP law protection in a country positively affects 
the FDI horizontal productivity spillovers. 
3.3.3. Public IP enforcement and FDI horizontal spillovers 
The enforcement of IP laws is a two dimensional concept involving the 
institutional capacity together with the institutional will to enforce laws 
(Ostergard 2000:358). The former relates to the enforcement agents needed to 
enforce the law (Ostergard 2000; Papageorgiadis et al. 2014), and the latter 
relates to the behavioural component of institutions (informal institutions) 
(Ostergard 2000). The ability of an MNE to effectively defend its IPs that it 
registers and transfers to a host country against IP infringement, will depend on 
the effectiveness of public IP enforcement agents (capacity and behavioural 
attitude). After transferring and actively engaging in the internal or external 
exploitation of their IP assets, MNEs actively monitor the IP landscape of a host 
country to identify the potential infringement of their rights (Oxley 1999). In the 
best case scenario, when a competitor infringes the IP assets of the MNE, the 
firm will engage with the public IP enforcement agents of the host country and 
aim to seize and halt the activities of the infringing party (Yang et al. 2008). The 
MNE can also aim for a preliminary injunction by taking the case to the judiciary 
through IP litigation, as well as engage with other public IP enforcement agents 
to enforce potential legal actions against the infringing parties and stop them 
from continuing their illegal activities (Keupp et al. 2010). In this case it is 
implied that the host country has the capacity to enforce the IP laws and the 
enforcement of such laws is undertaken effectively irrespective of the 
enforcement agents’ ideology (North 1991 1992). In other words the 
enforcement agents are toa substantial degree impartial in their judgements and 
 78 
 
their personal ideological constrains do not obstruct justice (North 1987). In 
countries where public IP enforcement is strong, MNEs can expect that the 
enforcement agents will effectively deter the IP infringement activities and that 
the IP infringers will be effectively prosecuted through the imposition of punitive 
sanctions and penalties (Papageorgiadis et al. 2014). The delivery of such 
sanctions and the effective enforcement of IP by the enforcement agents can 
act as a deterrent for IP infringing activities, discouraging the opportunistic 
behaviour of domestic firms who might consider infringing the IP of an MNE but 
eventually refraining from doing so due to the high risk of being prosecuted and 
penalised. Following Zhao’s (2006) precondition for imitation, it can be argued 
that strong public IP enforcement decreases the motivation of domestic firms to 
imitate as well reinforces the legal restrictions on imitation. As such, this makes 
the host country more attractive allowing MNEs to register, transfer, develop 
and enforce IPR.   
In contrast, in countries where public IP enforcement is weak, even if an MNE 
pursues a litigation case against infringers, the firm will find it difficult and 
problematic to effectively enforce its rights in practice (Yang et al. 2008). This is 
because enforcement agents’ ideologies towards fairness and justice may be 
relatively relaxed or their behavioural attitudes may not condemn illegal 
activities. For instance, the judiciary may delay the delivery of a judgement on 
an IP case and if the defendant is found guilty, may award limited penalties and 
damages that are not punitive and have a limited effect on the operations of the 
infringer (Brander et al. 2017). Furthermore, other public IP enforcement 
agents, may not actively enforce the judiciary’s rulings or do so ineffectively, 
allowing the IP infringers to continue operating in the country. Ineffective public 
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IP enforcement will not deter the infringing firms from continuing to engage in 
similar activities in the future. Thus, weak public IP enforcement does not 
reduce infringers’ (in this case domestic firms) motivation to imitate and does 
not reinforce the legal restrictions on imitation. In such cases, MNEs’ 
contracting, monitoring and enforcement costs will rise. This is because they 
cannot rely on common perceptions of fairness (since they differ from country to 
country) to write and enforce contractual agreements (North 1992). As a 
consequence MNEs may not transfer nor register their IP in the host country.  
Strong public IP enforcement is also expected to limit MNEs’ knowledge 
leakages via the spillover channels. For instance, MNEs can limit the direct 
knowledge spillovers from former MNE employees transferring the newly 
acquired knowledge to a domestic firm, and also reduce the indirect spillovers 
from the demonstration channel (Agarwal et al. 2009).12 While strong public IP 
enforcement can curb the potential positive FDI productivity spillovers to 
domestic firms from the illegal channels, it is expected to boost the positive 
spillovers through the legal direct and indirect channels. With regards to the 
direct channels, strong public IP enforcement levels can allow MNEs to 
confidently and efficiently utilise and monetise higher value IP assets in external 
markets, through the licensing of their IP assets to non-affiliate firms and the 
formation of joint-ventures with domestic firms (Branstetter et al. 2006; Chen 
2013; Ivus et al. 2017; Leahy and Naghavi 2010). Stronger levels of IP 
enforcement can lower the scope of illegal imitation and potential breach of 
                                                          
12According to Agarwal et al., (2009:1353) ‘employees who leave to join or establish other 
companies may not have legal rights to make, use, or build upon patented technologies owned 
by their former employers unless explicit permission to do so has been granted through license 
agreements’. For more information on labour mobility and patent enforcement see Agarwal et 
al., (2009).  
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contractual agreements by competitors and contractual partners, providing 
confidence to the IP owning MNEs that their rights will be effectively defended 
in case of infringement (Arora and Ceccagnoli 2006; Oxley 1998). Therefore, 
domestic firms collaborating with MNEs can increase their productivity by legally 
accessing the IP assets and advanced technological and managerial know-how 
of the MNEs through licensing and establishing joint ventures, leading to 
positive FDI horizontal productivity spillovers (Chen 2013; Javorcik 2004; 
Javorcik and Spatareanu 2008). The legal indirect channels to positive FDI 
productivity spillovers for domestic firms in countries where public IP 
enforcement is strong, occur through the competition effect. The exploitation of 
high value IP assets by MNEs in a host country can offer them a competitive 
advantage against their domestic competitors in terms of cost (lower costs) and 
differentiation (advanced products).This can apply strong competitive pressure 
to the domestic firms who need to react and adapt their strategy in order not to 
be marginalised. Strong public IP enforcement conditions in a country offer an 
incentive to domestic firms to develop their innovative capabilities by engaging 
in R&D activities, which can allow them to enhance their absorptive capacity 
(Chen and Puttitanun 2005; Yi et al. 2015). Domestic firms can continue to 
reverse engineer the more advanced technological assets of MNEs, but are 
expected to engage in more complex innovation activities since they need to 
manoeuvre around the technological landscape and avoid infringing the IP of 
MNEs (Maskus 2005). As a result of the increased competition from the MNEs, 
domestic firms can upgrade their capabilities and IP assets and improve their 
productivity. Overall, domestic competitor firms will benefit from accessing the 
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advanced IP of MNEs through the legal direct and indirect channels and 
improve their productivity.  
Hypothesis 2: The strength of public IP enforcement in a country positively 
affects the FDI horizontal productivity spillovers. 
3.3.4. The role of IP enforcement on the relationship between IP law 
protection and FDI horizontal spillovers 
A limiting factor affecting the FDI horizontal productivity spillovers to domestic 
firms can emerge in countries where MNEs have access to strong IP law 
protection and where the law is strongly enforced by public IP enforcement 
agents. Although the two elements of IP systems individually are expected to 
have a positive impact on the direct and indirect channels of FDI horizontal 
spillovers, strong enforcement of IP rights supported by strong IP law protection 
has the potential to block the spillover channels and thus the diffusion and 
absorption of MNEs knowledge.  In terms of the competition channel, strong IP 
law protection and public IP enforcement provide strong market power to a 
MNE which affects the industry dynamics in a host country. This is because 
MNEs can gain a dominant, near monopolistic position in the host market by 
transferring their entire IP portfolios and seeking to appropriate it by blocking 
competition (Allred and Park 2007; Maskus 2000:87; Smeets and de Vaal 
2016). For example, an MNE that holds a number of interlocking patents 
protecting the development of a technological product can confidently seek to 
halt the exploitation of similar substitute products by domestic competitors, in 
the anticipation that the strong public IP enforcement will support its strategy 
(Grimpe and Hussinger 2013). This specific type of favourable IP appropriate 
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conditions, would not have been possible in other IP systems where IP law 
protection is strong, but public IP enforcement is medium or low (and vice 
versa). The strong market power of MNEs that exploit their IP internally, is 
expected to attract market demand away from domestic firms leading to a 
crowd out effect, and a decline in their profitability and productivity (Aitken and 
Harrison 1999; Smeets and de Vaal 2016). The monopolistic position of the 
MNEs resulting from the accumulated IP and its strong protection and 
enforcement, can limit the ability of domestic firms to respond to competitive 
pressures by investing in research and development, or finding alternative 
approaches to increase their market share (Irsova and Havranek 2013; Smeets 
2011). Moreover, MNEs have the option of licensing their IP to non-affiliate 
domestic parties by charging premium royalty fees (Maskus 2000:168). 
Domestic firms, who will have to pay a premium license for gaining direct 
access to the MNE’s IP assets, will operate with thinner margins that impact 
their productivity. However, both conditions do not enable domestic firms to 
benefit from FDI horizontal spillovers. Strong public IP enforcement will also 
limit the knowledge and know-how spillovers from the opportunistic behaviour of 
former employees of MNEs who are aware that their former employer will seek 
to enforce the restrictive contracts signed when they joined the MNE (Agarwal 
et al. 2009). Lastly, the prospect for domestic firms to illegally acquire MNEs’ IP 
is diminished as domestic firms are aware that under strong public IP 
enforcement, illegal actions will be detected and infringers will be prosecuted 
and penalised.  
Overall, although strong IP law protection can allow MNEs to transfer high value 
IP assets in a host country, strong public IP enforcement is expected to 
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negatively moderate the direct and indirect horizontal FDI productivity spillovers 
to domestic firms. Therefore it can be expected: 
Hypothesis 3: The strength of public IP enforcement in a country negatively 
moderates the relationship between stronger IP law protection and FDI 
horizontal spillovers. 
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3.4. Data and Methods 
3.4.1. Meta-analysis: protocol and method 
This study adopts a meta-analysis approach by aggregating the findings from 
existing primary empirical research and using those findings to assess the effect 
of the strength of IP law protection and the strength of public IP enforcement on 
FDI horizontal productivity spillovers. Meta-analysis provides a systematic 
approach to reviewing an existing body of literature by statistically integrating 
the results of a large set of studies on a particular topic, in one single empirical 
analysis (Lipsey and Wilson 2001; Mayer-Haug et al. 2013; Meyer and Sinani 
2005). This methodology can also provide unique insights in areas where 
multiple studies yield conflicting results as it allows testing of relationships which 
cannot be addressed by individual studies (Mayer-Haug et al. 2013; Meyer and 
Sinani 2005). It can thus play a crucial role in advancing knowledge, finding 
effects or relationships that are obscured in other ways of summarizing 
research and provide directions for theory building and future research (Garcia-
Meca et al. 2006; Mayer-Haug et al. 2013; Reus and Rotting 2009).  
The study builds on and extends the work of the two existing meta-analysis in 
the area of FDI horizontal productivity spillovers, by Meyer and Sinani (2009) 
and Irsova and Havranek (2013). It extends their work by considering the 
separate effect of the second element of IP systems, the strength of public IP 
enforcement, as well as the moderating effect of strong public IP enforcement 
on the relationship between IP law protection and FDI horizontal productivity 
spillovers. 
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3.4.2. Selection of primary literature 
In order to select the most appropriate primary literature and establish a 
comprehensive database for this study a three-step approach is followed. First, 
the selection of primary literature is restricted to studies capturing the years 
1998-2011 and 49 developed and developing countries. This is because the 
scores of the main independent variable that used to approximate for the 
strength of public IP enforcement, the international patent systems strength 
index (IPSS) by Papageorgiadis et al. (2014), is available for this specific time 
period and country range. Second 20 relevant FDI spillover studies (published 
and unpublished) have been identified in the reference lists of the two previous 
meta-analytical studies by Meyer and Sinani (2009) and Irsova and Havranek 
(2013). Third, the search is expanded in three established scientific databases 
(Proquest, Science direct, EconLit databases) and the scientific search engine 
Google Scholar in order to identify relevant FDI horizontal spillover studies. In 
line with the keywords used by Meyer and Sinani (2009), a combination of the 
search terms ‘foreign direct investment/FDI spillover*’, ‘foreign direct 
investment/FDI horizontal spillover*’‘productivityspillover*’, ‘productivity 
horizontal spillover*’‘knowledge spillover*’, ‘technolog*spillover*’, ‘knowledge 
transfer spillover*’, ‘knowledge transfer horizontal spillover*’is used to search in 
the titles and abstracts of studies included in these databases. From this 
process another 29 studies where identified and included in the dataset. 
Following these three steps 49 published and unpublished empirical papers on 
FDI horizontal spillovers were identified and included in the final dataset.13Table 
                                                          
13Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012) highlight that unpublished studies should be routinely 
included in a meta-analysis, unless the meta-analysts can reasonably argue that the 
unpublished studies are of lower quality and may taint the meta-analysis. 
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3.1 below provides a summary of the characteristics of each of the studies that 
are included in the dataset, in terms of the country of focus, the year studied 
and the level of focus of each study. It is important to note that the multiple FDI 
horizontal spillover estimates are reported in each of the 49 studies and 
therefore a panel meta-analysis approach is required.  
Table 3.1.The empirical studies on FDI horizontal spillovers included in the 
meta-analysis 
Study Country Data year Aggregation 
Ben Hamida (2013) Switzerland 2001-2004 Firm  level 
Ben Hamida and Gugler (2009) Switzerland 1998-2001 Firm level 
Blake et al. (2009) China 2000 Firm level 
Buckley et al. (2007). China 2001 Industry 
level 
Buckley et al. (2007b) China 2001 Industry 
level 
Chang and Xu (2008) China 1998-2005 Firm level  
Chang et al. (2007) China 2002-2005 Firm level 
Crespo et al. (2009) Portugal 1996-2000 Firm level 
Du et al. (2012) China 1998-2007 Firm level 
Erdogan (2011) Turkey 2004-2008 Firm level 
Fu (2012) UK 1998-2004 Firm level 
Geršl (2008) Czech Republic 2002-2005 Firm level 
Gersl et al. (2008) 
 
Czech republic,  
Hungary,  
Poland,  
Slovakia,  
Romania 
2000-2005 Industry 
level 
Girma and Gong (2008) China 1999-2002 Firm level 
Gonçalves (2005) Brazil 1997-2000 Firm level 
Hagemejer and Kolasa (2011) Poland 1996-2005 Firm level 
Halpern and Muraközy (2007) Hungary 1996-2003 Firm level 
Javorcik and Spatareanu 
(2008) 
Romania 1998-2003 Firm level 
Javorcik and Spatareanu 
(2011) 
Romania 1998-2003 Firm level 
Javorcik et al. (2004) Romania 1998-2000 Firm level 
Jeon et al. (2013) China 1998-2007 Firm level 
Khalifah and Adam (2009) Malaysia 2000-2004 Firm level 
Kolasa (2008) Poland 1996-2003 Firm level 
Laenarts and Merlevede (2011) Romania 1996-2005 Firm level 
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Liang (2008) China 1998-2005 Firm level 
Lin et al. (2009) China 1998-2005 Firm level 
Liu et al. (2009) China 1998-2001 Firm level 
Lutz and Talavera  (2004) Ukraine 1998-1999 Industry 
level 
Mariotti et al. (2011)  Italy 1999-2005 Firm level 
Mebratie and Arjun (2013) S. Africa 2003 Firm level 
Merlevede and Schoors (2007) Romania 1996-2001 Firm level 
Merlevede and Schoors (2009) Romania 1996-2001 Firm level 
Merlevede et al. (2014) Romania 1996-2005 Industry 
level 
Nicolini and Resmini (2010)  Poland 1998-2003 Firm level 
Qiu et al. (2009) China 2001-2006 Industry 
level 
Reganati and Sica (2007) Italy 1997-2002 Firm level 
Sarkar and Lai (2009) India 2005 Firm level 
Schoors and van der Tol (2002) Hungary 1997-1998 Firm level 
Sun (2011) China 2003 Firm level 
Tang (2008) China 1998-2001 Firm level 
Tian (2007). China 1996-1999 Industry 
level 
Tomohara and Yokota (2006) Thailand 1999-2001 Firm level 
Wang and Yu (2007) China 2001 Industry 
level 
Wang and Zhao (2008) China 2000-2002 Industry 
level 
Wang et al. (2012)  China 1998-2006 Industry 
level 
Wei and Liu (2006) China 1998-2001 Industry 
level 
Xu and Sheng (2012) China 2000-2003 Industry 
level 
Xu and Sheng (2012) China 2000-2003 Industry 
level 
Zhang et al. (2010) China 1998-2003 Firm level 
 
3.4.3. Effect size and estimation method 
With regards to the coding of the effect size, the previous studies used three 
different effect sizes; i) t-statistics extracted from regressions, ii) calculated 
semi-elasticities, iii) coefficients extracted directly from the regressions (Roberts 
and Stanley 2006; Stanley and Doucouliagos 2012). To be included in the 
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meta-analysis, the selected effect size needs to meet two certain criteria. First 
the effect size should measure the effect of one variable on another holding 
other factors constant. Second, the effect size should be comparable within and 
between different studies. The criteria that the effect sizes need to be 
comparable across studies usually rules out the direct use of regression 
coefficients. Regarding the use of semi-elasticities it is important to note that 
only those estimates that use the same scale for the independent variables can 
be combined otherwise the semi-elasticities are not directly comparable 
(Stanley and Doucouliagos 2012). For instance, even though coefficients from 
log-log models can be interpreted as elasticities, it is not possible to do so for 
coefficients from linear models as these need to first be transformed into 
elasticities (if all the necessary information is available) (Koetse et al. 2009).The 
use of the t-statistic also has the advantage of being comparable across studies 
It is most often provided by the spillover studies and unlike semi-elasticities it 
doesn’t require additional data for its calculation. 
In this meta-analysis t-statistics are used for the construction of the dependent 
variable. Specifically, a categorical effect size is coded for the dependent 
variable, using 0, 1, and 2 to represent significantly negative, insignificant and 
significantly positive estimate respectively, adopting a significance level of 5%. 
The model that is generally applied in a meta-analysis with a categorical effect 
size is the ordered probit model (Koetse et al. 2009). This approach has been 
used in other meta analyses, for example De Groot et al. (2015) on 
agglomeration externalities, Card et al. (2010) on the effectiveness of active 
labour and Koetse et al. (2009) on the impact of uncertainty on investment 
behaviour. Because the estimated coefficients from an ordered probit model 
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should not be used for inference, the marginal effects need to be reported 
(Verbeek 2017). The marginal effect shows the change in the probability of 
finding a specific outcome. This means that for each of the independent and 
control variables in the model the changes in the probability of obtaining a 
significantly negative, an insignificant, and a significantly positive estimate are 
to be calculated (Koetse et al. 2009). This leads to the use of a probit meta-
analysis with the inclusion of marginal effects (see Koetse et al. 2009; Card et 
al. 2010; Groot et al. 2015, for recent examples in this setting). Specifically, the 
model assumes of a latent variable
*
ijy can be explained by a set of independent 
variables in the following form, in which lower case i and j stand for ith 
observation (estimate) and jth study respectively.  
𝑦𝑖𝑗
∗ = ∑ βk
22
𝑘=1
Zk,ij +  εij 
Where
*
ijy  is the latent variable and εij is the error term that is assumed normally 
and iid distributed. Zk,ij refers to a vector of K independent variables and βk is 
the corresponding coefficient vector. The latent variable yij* is coded as follows:  
Category A: y=0 if an estimate is negative and statistically significant  
Category B: y=1 if an estimate is statistically insignificant (either negative or 
positive) 
Category C: y=2 if an estimate is positive is statistically significant  
3.4.4. Independent variables 
To approximate for the strength of IP law protection the widely used index of 
patent protection strength developed by Park (2008)is employed. This index 
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measures the strength of patent related legislation in 122 countries for the years 
1960 – 2005 (Park 2008). The scores of the index range from 0 to 5, with higher 
values indicating stronger levels of patent law protection in a country (Ginarte 
and Park 1997). It is important to note that the focus of this index is on the 
availability of patent laws and legal mechanisms (such as the laws that enable 
the enforcement of IP) but it does not capture the effectiveness with which the 
law is enforced in practice by public IP enforcement agents (Arora 2009; 
Brander et al. 2017; Park 2008). 
To approximate for the strength of public IP enforcement the Index of Patent 
Systems Strength (IPSS) developed by Papageorgiadis et al. (2014)is 
employed. The IPSS captures the level of transaction costs that patent owners 
face when engaging with the public patent enforcement agents in an IP system. 
It is an annual longitudinal composite measure that provides annual scores for 
the time period 1998-2011, for 48 countries. The index scores range from 0 to 
10 with high scores indicating to patent systems where public patent 
enforcement agents effectively implement patent law in practice and low scores 
indicate to countries where public patent enforcement levels are weak 
(Papageorgiadis et al. 2014). It is important to note that the IPSS is a composite 
indicator comprising of three constructs informed by the transaction costs 
theory, namely: (i) monitoring costs determined by the effectiveness and 
strength of police and border enforcement agents as well as influenced by the 
societal attitudes and public commitment towards the enforcement of patent 
rights; (ii) property rights protection costs related to the strength, impartiality, 
and effectiveness of judicial aspects of a patent institution as well as to the 
strength of judicial enforcement in a country; and (iii) servicing costs related to 
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the quality and effectiveness of public agencies that are responsible to 
effectively administer patent laws and regulations or private companies that 
enable the administration of patents within a country. The advantage of this 
index is that it captures the effectiveness of multifaceted IP systems.  
3.4.5. Country level variables 
In this meta-analysis, three country level variables are introduced in to control 
for country level financial development, labour quality, and trade openness 
(Diebel 2010; Solow 1999). It is suggested that domestic firms need to have 
access to financing in order to benefit from the foreign advanced technology 
and incorporate it into their production processes (Irsova and Havranek 2013). 
As such domestic firms in countries with well-developed financial systems are 
more likely to experience positive changes in their productivity as a result of the 
foreign presence. On the contrary domestic firms in countries with less 
developed financial system are more likely to experience difficulties in 
accessing financial capital and hence experience negative or insignificant 
changes in their productivity (Irsova and Havranek 2013). In respect to labour 
quality, it is argued that advanced human capital enables domestic firms to 
acquire and develop capabilities that can increase their absorptive capacity and 
shorten the technological gap between the foreign affiliates and the domestic 
firms (Meyer and Sinani 2009). To proxy for the quality of human capital, FDI 
spillover studies often use the number of candidates enrolled in tertiary 
education in a host country (Irsova and Havranek 2013; Meyer and 
Sinani2009). With regards to trade openness, it is commonly expected in the 
literature that domestic firms operating in countries open to international trade, 
are more likely to get exposed to advanced foreign technology and thus acquire 
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knowledge and skills that they can utilise to compete with the foreign affiliates 
and benefit from spillover effects (Irsova and Havranek 2013; Meyer and Sinani 
2009).While there is a possibility that domestic firms operating internationally 
may have little to learn from the foreign affiliates in their country as they have 
already been exposed to advanced technologies through trade, control for the 
effect of trade openness is still warranted (Irsova and Havranek 2013).  
Table 3.2. Definition of variables and sources of data 
Variable Definition Data source 
𝐂𝐬𝐢𝐠 Categorical dependent variable: =0 if 
spillover estimates are negative, =1 if 
spillover estimates are insignificant, =2 if 
spillover estimates are positive.  
 
IP law protection Park (2008) patent protection index 
The index ranges from 0 to 5 with higher 
values indicating stronger levels of patent 
protection. 
Park (2008) 
 
Public IP 
enforcement 
Papageorgiadis et al., (2014) IPSS index 
The index ranges from 0 to 10 with higher 
scores indicating stronger enforcement 
levels  
Papageorgiadis et 
al., (2014)  
 
Country level variables 
Trade openness Trade (%GDP) World bank - World 
Development 
Indicators 
Tertiary 
education  
The tertiary school enrolment rate in the 
country 
World bank - World 
Development 
Indicators 
R&D R&D expenditures (%GDP) World bank - World 
Development 
Indicators 
Financial 
development 
Domestic credit provided by financial 
sector (% of GDP) 
 
World bank - World 
Development 
Indicators 
Data characteristics 
Cross sectional 
data 
= 1 if cross sectional are used, = 0, 
otherwise 
 
Industry level 
data 
= 1 if industry level data are used, = 0, 
otherwise 
 
No. of 
observations 
The number of observations used in each 
study 
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Time span The number of years of the data used  
Specification characteristics 
Foreign presence 
in employment 
=1 if proxy for foreign presence is 
measured in terms of employment share, 
= 0, otherwise 
 
Foreign presence 
in equity 
=1 if proxy for foreign presence is 
measured in terms of equity share, = 0, 
otherwise 
 
Technological 
gap 
=1 if the study controls for technological 
gap, = 0, otherwise 
 
Estimation characteristics 
Olley-Pakes =1 if the Olley-Pakes method is used for 
the estimation of total factor productivity, 
=0 otherwise 
 
OLS =1 if the Ordinary Least Squares method 
is used for the estimation of total factor 
productivity, =0 otherwise 
 
GMM =1 if the system General Method of 
Moments estimator is used for the 
estimation of spillovers, =0 otherwise 
 
Year fixed =1 if year fixed effects are included, =0 
otherwise 
 
Sector fixed =1 if sector fixed effects are included, =0 
otherwise 
 
Publication characteristics 
Amadeus  =1 if the Amadeus database is used, =0 
otherwise 
 
Publication =1 if  
paper published in a peer reviewed 
journal, =0 otherwise 
 
Vertical 
spillovers 
=1 if vertical spillovers are included in the 
regression, =0, otherwise 
 
 
3.4.6. Study specific variables 
It is also common in meta-analysis studies to control for the characteristics of 
the studies as the research design used may have an effect on the size of the 
coefficient found in the spillover studies and the calculated t-statistics (Gorg and 
Strobl 2011). Following Gorg and Strobl (2001) the following set of study 
characteristics are considered: a) data characteristics, b) model specification 
characteristics, c) estimation characteristics and d) publication characteristics.  
 94 
 
With regards to data characteristics, first a dummy variable is created to capture 
if a study is using panel or cross-sectional data. In the literature it is observed 
that cross-section studies report higher coefficients of the effect of foreign 
presence than panel data studies (Gorg and Strobl 2001; Wooster and Diebel 
2010). This can be explained as panel level data allow the researcher to 
observe the productivity growth of domestic firms over a longer time span and 
thus allow for the disentangling of the impact of time invariant firm specific 
factors on domestic firms’ productivity from that of the foreign presence (Gorg 
and Greeanway 2003; Hanousek, et al. 2011). Second, a dummy variable is 
created to capture if a study is using firm or industry level data. It is suggested 
that studies using industry level data find positive significant results whereas 
studies using firm level data find negative or insignificant results (Gorg and 
Greenaway 2003). This is so because industry level data measure the 
aggregated productivity of the industry covering both foreign and domestic 
firms, and because foreign affiliates tend to have higher productivity, industry’s 
productivity may be higher even in the absence of FDI horizontal spillovers 
(Gorg and Greeanaway 2003). Third, the length of the period covered is 
introduced inas a proxy for the distinction between long-run and short run 
effects (de Groot et al. 2015) and the log of the number of observations is 
introduced in to control for sample size of the study (Meyer and Sinani 2009) as 
large sample tend to induce high t-statistics. 
Apart from data characteristics, a set of dummy variables are created for model 
specification characteristics including a) foreign presence measurement, and b) 
technological gap.  
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Foreign presence in FDI horizontal spillover studies is measured by the share in 
industry sales, employment or equity (Gorg and Greenaway 2003; Meyer and 
Sinani 2009). However as Wooster and Diebel (2010) suggest most often the 
selection is made on the ‘basis of data availability and reliability, and the choice 
is not necessarily made on the basis of theory’ (2010: 642); as such results may 
vary based on the measurement used for the foreign presence (Gorg and Strobl 
2001). For instance, if foreign equity capital is applied, then the positive spillover 
effects may indicate that the foreign presence produces positive capital spillover 
and that FDI horizontal spillovers may be closely related to ‘the demonstration 
effect of the suitability of the project, the superiority of machinery or equipment 
embodying updated technologies’(Liu et al. 2009). On the other hand, if foreign 
presence is measured in terms of employment, then the FDI horizontal 
spillovers is likely to be closely associated with the labour turnover channel (Liu 
et al. 2009; Wei and Liu 2006). Lastly, if foreign presence is measured in terms 
of sales then FDI horizontal spillovers are linked with knowledge diffusion of the 
superior product and marketing skills (Liu et al. 2009; Wei and Liu 2006). To 
take into account of measurement differences, two dummies are created and 
introduced in the analysis, one for studies using the share in employment and 
the other for studies using foreign equity share in an industry.  
Most of the FDI spillovers review papers conclude that technological gap is a 
decisive factor of FDI horizontal spillovers (Gorg and Greenaway 2003; Crespo 
and Fontoura 2007). If the technological gap between domestic and foreign 
firms is too large domestic firms are less likely to be able to use the 
demonstration channel to benefit from the foreign presence (Sjöholm 1999; 
Irsova and Havranek 2013). On the other hand if the technological gap is too 
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small domestic firms may have too little to learn from the foreign investors 
(Irsova and Havranek 2013). Therefore a dummy variable is created to capture 
if a study controls for the technological gap.  
Moreover a set of dummy variables are created to control for estimation 
methods used in the FDI horizontal spillover studies such as; a) Olley-Pakes 
method, b) Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS), c) Generalized method of 
moments (GMM) method, d) year-fixed effects model and c) sector-fixed effects 
model. Although most of the studies use the production function and the OLS 
estimation technique there are studies which follow alternative estimation 
techniques such as GMM, Olley-Pakes etc. 14 Therefore five dummies are 
introduced in to control for the effect of estimation characteristics on the FDI 
horizontal spillovers. 
Lastly, following de Groot et al. (2015), Koetse et al. (2009), Gorg and Strobl 
(2001) and Irsova and Havranek (2013) three dummy variables are created to 
control for the effect of publication characteristics on FDI horizontal spillovers 
namely; a) peer reviewed articles, b) FDI vertical spillovers and c) Amadeus 
database. An important concern in meta-analysis is publication selection bias 
(Stanley and Doucouliagos 2012). Publication selection bias could arise 
because researchers may treat statistically significant results that support their 
hypotheses more favourably, and because reviewers and editors of academic 
journals may favour papers with statistically significant results (Gorg and Strobl 
2001; Irsova and Havranek 2013).  To address this issue, a dummy variable is 
                                                          
14 The different estimation methods may allow researchers to overcome certain econometric 
problems and thus influence the final results. For instance Olley-Pakes is said to be remarkably 
robust to different form of measurement and specification errors (Liu et al. 2009) while the GMM 
overcomes issues related with endogenous regressors, measurement error, and weak 
instruments (Kahouli and Maktouf 2015). 
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created for peer reviewed articles to test for publication bias. In some studies, 
both FDI horizontal and vertical productivity spillovers (instead of focusing on 
FDI horizontal spillovers only) are examined. Studies that consider both types of 
spillovers are more likely to be published even if they find insignificant or 
negative horizontal FDI spillovers (Javorcik 2004). To control for this type of 
potential publication bias, a dummy variable is created with a value of 1 
assigned for studies that also include FDI vertical spillovers in their empirical 
models. Another issue in respect to publication characteristics is the incomplete 
nature of datasets used to estimate spillover effects (Eapen 2013). Majority of 
recent studies use datasets of ﬁrms sourced from secondary data sources such 
as Compustat, Amadeus and Prowess (Eapen. 2013:721). A major issue for 
using such secondary datasets is that they tend to over-represent large ﬁrms 
(Eapen 2013). Thereof a dummy variable is created to control for the effect of 
Amadeus database on the FDI horizontal spillovers.  
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3.5. Results 
Findings on whether FDI horizontal spillovers in host countries are present are 
mixed. The majority of existing FDI horizontal spillover studies emphasise 
domestic firms’ heterogeneity in order to explain these mixed results. Taking an 
endogenous growth theory perspective, they suggest that domestic firms with 
higher levels of absorptive capacity stand to benefit most from FDI horizontal 
spillovers (Gorg and Greenaway 2003). This study adopts an institutional theory 
perspective arguing that a host country’s institutions, and more specifically the 
IP system in force, can shed light on the existing mixed research findings. Apart 
from considering the IP system as a country condition affecting FDI spillover 
benefits, this study, through its results, attempts to identify potential links 
between the strength of the IP systems in the host country and its effect on the 
domestic firm’s absorptive capacity.  
Table 3.3 provides the descriptive statistics of all the variables included in the 
empirical estimation and Table 3.4 presents the ordered probit estimates and 
associated marginal effects of the models. The results in general provide clear 
and consistent support for the central thesis of this study, that the strength of 
the public IP enforcement element of IP systems has a direct effect on FDI 
horizontal productivity spillovers. Importantly, it reveals that the strength of 
public IP enforcement negatively moderates the relationship between the 
strength of IP law protection and FDI horizontal productivity spillovers. More 
specifically, and in relation to Hypothesis 1, the strength of IP law protection has 
a positive and statistically significant (4.041, p<0.001 in Model 1) effect on FDI 
horizontal productivity spillovers. This finding therefore supports Hypothesis 1 
regarding the positive impact of IP law protection strength on the impact of FDI 
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to domestic competitors. Strong IP law protection allows for the delimitation of 
the legal boundaries inside which MNEs can register and be granted their IPR. 
Such conditions decrease MNEs’ external uncertainty and thus transaction 
costs, increasing the incentives to invest in such countries and transfer 
innovative IP (Bénassy-Quéret et al. 2007; Bevan et al. 2004; Seyoum 2006). 
This result is not surprising given that the signing of the TRIPs agreement in 
1995 was underpinned by the expectation that improving the strength of IP law 
protection in a country, will boost FDI and technology transfer levels globally. As 
the results related to Hypothesis 1 reveal, domestic firms in the host countries 
are likely to benefit from this boost by gaining access to more advanced IP 
assets via the spillover channels. Although the increased FDI flows is an 
opportunity for domestic firms, the adoption, reconfiguration and exploitation of 
MNEs’ knowledge is a complex process requiring the possession of advanced 
capabilities (Teece 2007). Thus, domestic firms will need to develop the 
necessary dynamic capabilities by practicing innovation if they intend to benefit 
from the foreign presence.  Strong IP law protection in the country can offer 
incentives for domestic firms to engage in R&D activities and develop/improve 
their innovative capabilities and build their absorptive capacity to benefit from 
MNEs’ IP. This result however challenges the findings of the previous meta-
analytic study by Irsova and Havranek (2013), who found that the strength of IP 
law protection had a negative effect on FDI horizontal productivity spillovers, 
and Smeets and de Vaal (2016) who found an insignificant relationship. The 
discrepancy in the results may be due to the theoretical reasoning and empirical 
approach followed by Irsova and Havranek (2013) and Smeets and de Vaal 
(2016). This is because although the authors aimed to identify the effects of the 
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strength of the entire IP system of a host country, they did so without 
incorporating the effect of the second aspect of IP systems, namely the strength 
of public IP enforcement. As it becomes more evident with the testing of 
Hypothesis 2, the difference in the findings may be due to the omitted variable 
bias in Irsova and Havranek’s (2013) and Smeets and de Vaal’s (2016) 
theoretical and empirical approach. 
Table 3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Coefficient 1,567 33.1524
8 
1253.31
9 
-185.29 49606 
t-statistic 1,524 0.41078
2 
2.48539
3 
-8.5 9.70588
2 
Stand.Error 1,322 2.30806
9 
17.8976
2 
-25.148 296.340
2 
Public IP enforcement 1,567 4.26218
9 
1.08441
8 
3.4 8.85 
IP law protection 1,567 3.40756
4 
0.50739
9 
2.12 4.6 
IPSS*Park 1,567 14.733 5.75324
1 
8.904 39.6796 
Trade openness 1,560 61.2330
9 
24.3228
9 
20.0201
9 
205.539
4 
Financial development 1,566 77.2124
9 
53.3578
1 
15.5863
3 
192.660
1 
Tertiary education 1,566 22.8592 14.9497
9 
0 59.7239
6 
R&D 1,566 0.75873
4 
0.35049
4 
0.25708
7 
2.67692 
Cross sectional data 1,567 0.06896
6 
0.25339
6 
0 1 
Industry level data 1,567 0.29885
1 
0.45775
4 
0 1 
Time span 1,567 6.69987
2 
2.85303
5 
1 10 
No.of observations 1,567 201806.
3 
439790.
5 
27 357200
0 
Ln No. of observations 1,566 10.3088
1 
2.55568
2 
3.29583
7 
15.0886
4 
Foreign Presence_ 1,567 0.39080 0.48793 0 1 
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employment 5 1 
Foreign Presence_equity 1,567 0.15581
1 
0.36267
6 
0 1 
Technological gap 1,567 0.09642
4 
0.29517
2 
0 1 
Vertical spillovers 1,567 0.80842
9 
0.39353
7 
0 1 
Olley-Pakes 1,567 0.16858
2 
0.37438
3 
0 1 
OLS 1,567 0.58365
3 
0.49295
3 
0 1 
GMM 1,567 0.21966
8 
0.41402
2 
0 1 
Sector fixed 1,567 0.23818
7 
0.42597
4 
0 1 
Year fixed 1,567 0.47126
4 
0.49917
4 
0 1 
Publication 1,566 0.44699
9 
0.49734
2 
0 1 
Amadeus 1,567 0.33844
2 
0.47318 0 1 
 
Table 3.4 Empirical estimation and associated marginal effects of meta-analysis 
ordered probit model 
   
Marginal effects model (1) 
 Ordered 
Probit Model 
(1) 
Significantly 
Negative 
Insignifica
nt  
Significantly 
Positive 
Public IP 
enforcement 
3.625*** -008212576** -0.3570526 1.17831* 
(5.61) (-2.64) (-1.77) (2.51) 
IP law protection 4.041*** -0.9153762** -0.397972 1.313348** 
(5.45) (-2.65) (-1.83) (2.57) 
IPSS*GP -0.862*** 0.1951998** 0.848657 -0.2800654* 
(-5.61) (2.60) (1.76) (-2.48) 
Trade openness 0.00325 -0.0007354 -0.0003197 0.0010551 
(1.26) (-0.71) (-0.70) (0.71) 
Tertiary education 0.0270*** -0.0061253 -0.0026631 0.0087884 
(4.21) (-1.32) (-1.15) (1.30) 
Financial 
development 
-0.00756*** 0.0017116* 0.0007441 -0.0024558** 
(-3.34) (2.28) (1.50) (-2.08) 
R&D 0.464* -0.105154 -0.0457171 0.1508711 
(2.02) (-1.07) (-0.94) (1.05) 
Cross sectional data -0.308 0.0697335 0.0303176 -0.1000511 
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(-1.27) (0.61) (0.62) (-0.62) 
Industry-level data 1.140*** -0.258263** -0.1122833* 0.3705463** 
(6.20) (-3.02) (-2.08) (3.03) 
No. of observations -0.000000107 2.43e-08 1.06e-08 -3.49e-08 
(-1.01) (0.35) (0.35) (-0.35) 
Time Span -0.122*** 0.258263* 0.0120474 -0.0397577* 
(-4.96) (-3.02) (1.91) (0.62) 
Foreign presence_ 
Employment 
-0.282* 0.0638353 0.0277532 -0.0915885 
(-2.31) (1.22) (1.13) (-1.22) 
Foreign presence_ 
equity 
0.724*** -0.1639706* -0.0712884* 0.235259* 
(6.06) (-2.79) (-2.21) (2.97) 
Technological gap -0.884*** 0.2002845* 0.0870763 -0.2873608* 
(-4.09) 2.21) (1.66) (-2.15) 
Olley-Pakes -0.372** 0.0842593 0.0366328 -0.1208921 
(-2.83) (1.20) (1.22) (-1.24) 
OLS -0.737*** 0.1669559* 0.0725863 0.2395422* 
(-7.05) (2.36) (1.71) (-2.29) 
GMM -1.078*** 0.2442431** 0.1061879** -0.3504311* 
(-6.88) (2.60) (1.82) (-2.52) 
Year fixed -0.779*** 0.1763574*** 0.766737 -0.2530311*** 
(-6.88) (3.59) (2.12) (-3.46) 
Sector fixed 0.346* -0.0782774 -0.0340321 0.1123095 
(2.15) (-0.72) (-0.64) (0.70) 
Publication -0.420** 0.0952413 0.0414074 -0.1366487 
(-3.19) (1.39) 1.13 -1.34 
Amadeus  0.645*** -0.1461442 -0.0635381 0.2096824 
(3.54) (-1.35) (-1.29) (1.38) 
Vertical spillovers -0.0858 0.0194378 0.0084508 -0.0278886 
(-0.56) (0.30) (0.29) (-0.30) 
Number of 
observations 
1560    
t statistics in parentheses *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001 
The testing of Hypothesis 2 reveals an important finding that makes a 
contribution to the existing literature, in that the strength of public IP 
enforcement has a positive and statistically significant (3.625, p<0.001 in Model 
1) impact on FDI horizontal productivity spillovers. While the role of the strength 
of the public IP enforcement element of IP systems in stimulating FDI horizontal 
productivity spillovers has been ignored in the existing literature, the results of 
this study showcase a significant direct positive effect. Strong enforceability of 
IP law protection reduces the opportunistic behaviour of domestic competitors 
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to illegally access and misappropriate MNEs’ IP as they are cognisant that 
illegal actions will be detected and penalised.  As such, it creates incentives for 
MNEs to first invest in such countries and transfer/register/develop advanced 
IP, and second to enter in more collaborative activities with the locals (JV or 
licensing). Since strong public IP enforcement allows for the register and 
development of MNEs’ advanced IP, domestic firms with the necessary 
absorptive capacity can access MNEs’ publicly displayed knowledge via patent 
disclosures. Utilising the demonstration channel, domestic firms can acquire 
valuable information on MNEs’ advanced knowledge enclosed in their patent 
applications, reconfigure it and develop their own advanced knowledge. The 
results also confirm that strong public IP enforcement can significantly support 
the establishment of lawful co-operation and knowledge transfer between MNEs 
and domestic firms, boosting the productivity spillovers of the latter. The fact 
that the meta-analysis results support Hypothesis 2, allows this study to reveal 
a new IP institutional mechanism that affects FDI horizontal productivity 
spillovers, demonstrating the importance for future studies to consider the 
distinct effects of the strength of public IP enforcement. In addition, this result 
provides further support to Brander et al. (2017), who conceptually highlighted 
the differences between the strength of the availability of IP law protection as it 
appears on the books and the actual strength of public IP enforcement, as well 
as the benefits that host countries experience from the strengthening of public 
IP enforcement. 
With regards to Hypothesis 3, the results bring forward a further explanation for 
the conflicting results of the previous empirical studies that did not consider the 
second element of IP systems, the strength of public IP enforcement. This study 
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identifies a second previously unexplored institutional mechanism of the 
functioning of IP systems, in that strong public IP enforcement has a statistically 
significant negative moderating effect on the relationship between strong IP law 
protection and FDI horizontal productivity spillovers (-0.862, p<0.001 in Model 
1).The results therefore support Hypothesis 3. Strong IP law protection and IP 
enforcement decrease the opportunistic behaviour of domestic firms to illegally 
access MNEs’ knowledge and consequently block the illegal and legal diffusion 
of MNEs’ knowledge via the spillover channels. Although in a similar situation 
(see Hypothesis 2) domestic firms managed to utilise the benefits of a strong IP 
enforcement regime and improve their productivity by engaging in collaborative 
activities with the MNEs, now the ‘rules of the game’ have changed. Under 
strong IP law protection and public IP enforcement, MNEs can transfer their 
entire IP portfolios and seek to appropriate it by blocking competition (Allred and 
Park 2007; Maskus 2000:87; Smeets and de Vaal 2016). MNEs are found to 
enjoy strong market power which enables them to out-compete domestic firms. 
The strong market power of MNEs, attracts market demand away from 
domestic firms leading to a crowd out effect, resulting in a decline in their 
profitability and productivity (Aitken and Harrison 1999; Smeets and de Vaal 
2016). The monopolistic position of the MNEs resulting from the accumulated IP 
and its strong protection and enforcement, forces domestic firms competing in a 
tight technological landscape (that does not provide them with sufficient 
technological space), o respond to the competitive pressures, given that 
investment in R&D may be threatened by IP litigation from the MNEs. Moreover, 
in such a setting domestic competitors have less negotiating power when 
attempting to collaborate (JV or licensing) with the MNEs and achieve a suitable 
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licensing rate.. Therefore, the discovery of the direct and moderating role of the 
strength of pubic IP enforcement on FDI horizontal productivity spillovers, 
demonstrates two institutional mechanisms that were previously not accounted 
for in existing studies and had an effect on the competitive functioning of host 
markets, influencing the ability of MNEs and domestic firms to compete. Future 
studies need to consider the differential effects of both elements of an IP 
system and how the strength of IP enforcement can moderate the effects of IP 
law protection on FDI horizontal productivity spillovers and other economic 
phenomena (depending on the study’s focus).  
With regards to the estimations relating the effects of other country level 
variables, the findings are in line with some of the existing studies. The 
coefficient of trade openness, although positive, is statistically insignificant 
suggesting that domestic competitors’ experience or inexperience of 
international trade neither enhances nor inhibits their ability to compete with the 
foreign affiliates. The coefficient of financial development is negative (-0.00756) 
and statistically significant (p<0.001). This finding refutes the argument that 
domestic firms operating in countries with less developed financial systems are 
more likely to experience negative changes to their productivity as a result of 
the foreign presence, mostly due to the competition effect (Irsova and Havranek 
2013).  
The coefficients corresponding to tertiary education and R&D expenditures are 
positive and statistically significant (0.0270, p<0.001 and 0.464, p<0.05 
respectively) supporting the theoretical argument that firms in countries with 
advanced human capital and more R&D investment, are likely to better absorb 
and utilise the foreign advanced technology (Irsova and Havranek 2013). 
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With respect to the control variables, the results show that studies using 
industry-level data find stronger FDI horizontal spillovers effects. This finding is 
in line with Meyer and Sinani (2009), but in contrast with Gorg and Strobl (2001) 
who find an insignificant relationship. However, in contrast with Meyer and 
Sinani (2009) and Gorg and Strobl (2001), this study’s findings also suggest 
that it does not appear to matter whether a study uses cross-sectional or panel 
level data. The results also suggest that the choice of a foreign presence proxy, 
is a determinant of the differences across studies. Most studies use the share of 
employment/sales or equity in foreign-owned firms as a proxy to capture the 
degree of foreign presence in the country. By including separate dummy 
variables for whether a study uses foreign equity or foreign employment share, 
the evidence suggests that the former produces negative results (p<0.05) while 
the latter produces positive results (p<0.001) (Gorg and Strobl 2001). These 
results indicate that the way researchers define and proxy the foreign presence 
does make a difference on their final outcomes. This study also finds evidence 
that whether or not studies control for FDI vertical spillovers, when estimating 
FDI horizontal spillovers, does not seem to matter. Regarding the technological 
gap, the coefficient is negative and statistically significant (p<0.001) suggesting 
that studies controlling for the technological gap between foreign and domestic 
firms tend to find more negative spillover effects. Another important observation, 
concerns the estimation techniques researchers use to estimate FDI horizontal 
spillovers. When researchers use the Olley-Pakes, OLS, GMM and year fixed 
effect estimation techniques, they tend to find more negative significant spillover 
effects, whereas studies using the sector fixed effect estimation technique yield 
positive significant results. The coefficient on the publication variable is negative 
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(-0.420) and statistically significant (p<0.01), indicating the presence of 
publication bias in the meta-regression model. This finding suggests that peer 
reviewed journals also publish papers that find negative spillover effects. This is 
different from the conventional argument that authors are more likely to report 
significantly positive FDI spillovers results, or that academic journals tend to 
publish studies with statistically significant positive results. The difference 
between this study’s results and previous meta-analysis of FDI horizontal 
spillovers, can be attributed to the fact that most of the studies included in this 
meta-analysis also consider FDI vertical spillovers and therefore, are more likely 
to report results in line with that of Javorcik et al. (2004), which arguably is the 
most influential study on FDI vertical spillovers. Moreover, the Amadeus 
database is positive and statistically significant indicating that studies extracting 
their data from this database tend to find positive spillover effects.  
Table 3.4 also reports the marginal effects of the meta-analysis ordered probit 
model. The interpretation of marginal effects differs from the interpretation of the 
ordered probit model because they measure a non-linear relationship. 
Therefore, for continuous variables (such as the IPSS index, Park (2008) index, 
IPSS*Park, trade openness, financial development, R&D and human capital) 
marginal effects show the probability change from increase of the dependent 
variable by 1. With regards to this study’s empirical results, the IPSS index is 
found to have a positive and statistically significant at p<0.05 effect indicating 
that as public IP enforcement levels becomes stronger the probability of 
domestic firms to experience positive changes in their productivity increases. So 
for instance, holding other variables constant at their means, the probability of 
domestic firms experiencing positive changes in their productivity as public IP 
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enforcement is strengthened, is 0.001*1.178=0.00118. Along the same lines, 
the Park (2008) index has a positive and statistically significant (p<0.01) effect, 
suggesting that as IP law protection becomes stronger, the probability of 
domestic firms to experience positive changes in their productivity increases. 
However, the marginal effect for the moderator variable is negative and 
statistically significant (p<0.05) indicating that as public IP enforcement in host 
countries strengthens, it has a negative moderating effect on the relationship 
between high levels of IP law protection and FDI horizontal spillovers and thus 
increases the probability for domestic firms to experience negative changes in 
their productivity. Thus, the marginal effects findings are consistent with the 
ordered probit findings supporting Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. In respect to the 
binary variables (such as industry level data, technological gap, GMM etc.), 
marginal effects are interpreted in respect to how the dependent variable 
changes as the binary variable moves from 0 to 1. Indicative and holding other 
variables constant at their means, the industry level variable is positive and 
statistically significant (p<0.01), showing that there is greater likelihood for 
studies using industry level data to find positive spillover effects compared to 
studies using firm level data. In other words, the predicted probability of finding 
positive spillover effects is 0.37 greater for studies using industry level data than 
those using firm level data. Similarly, the use of the GMM estimation is found to 
be negative and statistically significant (p< 0.05). This suggests that studies 
using the GMM estimation technique tend to have a higher probability of finding 
negative spillover effects. 
One important criticism of meta-analyses is that they include both industry and 
firm level studies in their sample. The inclusion of industry level studies may 
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provide a distorted result for the magnitude of FDI spillovers, as they measure 
the aggregated productivity of the industry and not the domestic firms’ 
productivity exclusively (Gorg and Strobl 2001). Since MNEs tend to have 
higher productivity, industry’s productivity may be even higher in the absence of 
FDI horizontal spillovers (Gorg and Greenaway 2003).  To control for this issue, 
a robustness test was performed in this meta-analysis by dividing the sample 
into firm and industry level studies. It is done as this study intends to show that 
the findings of the original dataset (firm and industry level studies) reveal the 
actual spillover effect (changes in domestic firm’s productivity) and not the 
changes in the industry’s productivity due to the foreign presence. The findings 
of the meta-analysis including firm level studies only (see Table 3.5) support the 
original finding that: strong IP law protection has a statistically positive effect on 
FDI horizontal spillovers; strong public IP enforcement protection has a 
statistically positive effect on FDI horizontal spillovers; and their interplay has a 
statistically negative effect on FDI horizontal spillovers.  
Table 3.5 Empirical estimation and associated marginal effects of firm – level 
meta-analysis ordered probit model 
   
Marginal effects model (1) 
 Ordered Probit 
Model (1) 
Significantly 
Negative 
Insignificant  Significantly 
Positive 
Public IP 
enforcement 
4.099*** -1.019279 -0.2234315 1.242711 
(4.12) (-1.45) (-0.92) (1.41) 
IP law 
protection 
4.763*** -1.184314 -0.2596079 1.443921 
(4.37) (-1.53) (-0.96) (1.50) 
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IPSS*GP -1.005*** 0.2498237 0.0547627 -0.3045864 
(-4.36) (1.52) (0.95) (-1.47) 
Trade openness 0.00591 -0.0014683 -0.0003219 0.0017902 
(1.75) (-0.76) (-0.75) (0.78) 
Tertiary 
education 
0.0293*** -0.007275 -0.0015947 0.0088698 
(3.90) (-1.39) (-0.93) (1.36) 
Financial 
development 
-0.0129*** 0.0032163* 0.000705 -0.0039213* 
(-4.84) (2.36) (1.13) (-2.28) 
R&D 0.855** -0.2126982 -0.0466246 0.2593228 
(3.23) (-1.67) (-1.14) (1.72) 
Cross sectional 
data 
-0.355 0.0882355 0.0193417 -0.1075772 
(-0.95) (0.40) (0.41) (-0.40) 
Ln No. of 
observations 
-0.0155 0.0038507 0.0008441 -0.0046948 
(-0.47) (0.14) (0.15) (-0.14) 
Time Span -0.202*** 0.0501616* 0.0109957 -0.0611572* 
(-5.60) (2.40) (1.16) (-2.35) 
Foreign 
presence_ 
Employment 
-0.481** 0.1194928 0.0261935 -0.1456862 
(-3.27) (1.37) (0.85) (-1.30) 
Foreign 
presence_ 
equity 
1.203*** -0.2991219* -0.0655691 0.364691** 
(7.04) (-2.48) (-1.26) (2.57) 
Technological 
gap 
-0.581 0.1445656 0.0316896 -0.1762552 
(-1.94) (1.02) (0.78) (-1.00) 
Olley-Pakes -0.459** 0.1142123 0.0250359 -0.1392482 
(-2.90) (1.33) (0.97) (-1.34) 
OLS -0.996*** 0.2476675* 0.0542901 -0.3019576 
(-7.06) (2.04) (1.06) (-1.95) 
GMM -0.450 0.111909 0.0245311 -0.1364401 
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(-0.86) (0.36) (0.33) (-0.35) 
Year fixed -0.847*** 0.2106463** 0.0461748 -0.2568211** 
(-6.71) (3.01) (1.23) (-2.96) 
Sector fixed 0.322 -0.0801492 -0.0175691 0.0977183 
(1.68) (-0.52) (-0.43) (0.50) 
Publication -0.521*** 0.1295963 0.0284082 -0.1580045 
(-3.48) (1.58) (1.04) (-1.58) 
Amadeus  0.557** -0.1385485 -0.0303706 0.1689191 
(2.68) (-1.01) (-0.74) (0.98) 
Vertical 
spillovers 
-0.223 0.0554 0.012144 -0.067544 
(1.25) (0.73) (0.58) (-0.70) 
Number of 
observations 
1092 1092   
t statistics in parentheses *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001 
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3.6. Conclusions 
Building on and extending the meta-analytical work of Meyer and Sinani (2009) 
and Irsova and Havranek (2013), this study examines the effect of IP systems 
on FDI horizontal productivity spillovers by incorporating in the theoretical and 
empirical framework the previously neglected element IP systems - the strength 
of public IP enforcement in a host country. Although the public enforcement 
element of IP systems has increased in importance in the years after the 
signing of the TRIPs agreement (Brander et al. 2017; USTR 2017), studies on 
FDI horizontal productivity spillovers have only considered the direct effect of 
the strength of IP law protection which is typically used as a proxy for the 
strength of IP systems overall and reported mixed results (Irsova and Havranek 
2013; Smeets and de Vaal 2016; Yi et al. 2015). This study argues that the 
mixed empirical evidence in the existing literature may be due to overestimating 
the effect of IP law protection in a country and the non-consideration of the 
second element of IP systems, this of the strength of public IP enforcement. 
Both issues can introduce bias to the results of existing studies. 
In this study the effect of the strength of public IP enforcement is introduced and 
is found that it has a direct positive effect on FDI horizontal productivity 
spillovers to domestic firms. Furthermore, this study finds that the levels of 
public IP enforcement negatively moderate the effect of IP law protection on FDI 
horizontal productivity spillovers. This result showcases that in countries where 
MNEs are able to receive strong legal protection for their IP assets and can 
effectively enforce their IP in case of infringement, MNEs are expected to gain 
strong market power in their respective industries and stifle the productivity of 
domestic firms. Therefore the results of the study identify two new institutional 
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mechanisms that were previously unknown in the literature. This has a 
reconciling effect with the mixed results found by previous studies, since 
previous studies focused on only one of the two elements that comprise the 
strength of IP systems, this of the strength of IP law protection. The results of 
the study therefore put forward the argument for the need to recalibrate the 
theoretical and empirical focus of future studies on FDI spillovers by considering 
the direct and indirect of the strength of public IP enforcement. This is especially 
the case for studies focusing on the effect of IP systems in the years after the 
signing and implementation of the TRIPs agreement which significantly altered 
the institutional conditions in the IP systems of WTO countries globally. 
Given that the strengthening of the two elements of IP systems continuous to be 
an important aspect in the international policy making negotiations (e.g. the 
negotiations related to the formation of the Transpacific trade deal) and national 
policies (e.g. such as a country’s IP system strategy), the results of this study 
have important policy implications (FT 2018). The findings in this study suggest 
that the strengthening of both IP law protection and public IP enforcement in a 
country are expected to boost FDI horizontal productivity spillovers to domestic 
firms. Countries such as China, where public IP enforcement is considered to 
be weak (Brander et al. 2017) are expected to benefit from such benefits in 
productivity, especially in relation to spillovers of high technological value which 
can help Chinese firms to legally access and exploit the IP assets of foreign 
MNEs. However, policy makers need to be cognizant of the potential negative 
impact to productivity spillovers in countries where both IP law protection and 
public IP enforcement are strong. It is therefore important that policy makers 
monitor closely the strengthening of public IP enforcement in their country and 
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seek to timely identify when the productivity spillovers start becoming negative 
and potentially intervene to avoid or overcome such problems. This can be 
done through the monitoring of the overall functioning of specific industries by 
e.g. monitoring the conditions described in the licensing contracts between 
MNEs and domestic firms as well as the number of IP litigations taking place 
within an industry and the way that the e.g. the judiciary, customs and police 
enforcement agents behave in cases where an MNE’s allegation that its IP is 
infringed by a domestic firm’s R&D activity is exaggerated.  
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APPENDIX A 
Description of meta-analysis on FDI horizontal spillovers 
Meta-analysis statistically integrates the results of a large set of studies on a 
particular topic, in one single empirical analysis and is particularly useful ‘for 
well-established fields in which there is a high degree of agreement on the 
variable measures and statistical techniques’ (Gaur and Kumar 2018: 281) and 
when multiple studies yield inconclusive or conflicting results (Meyer and Sinani 
2005; Yang and Driffield 2012). The meta-analytic approach has been 
introduced to international business research quite recently and soon became a 
popular method among researchers who wish to identify patterns among 
empirical findings, to summarise and explain variations in results or to correct 
measurement and sampling errors (Meyer and Sinani 2005; Gorg and Strobl 
2001). 
This meta-analysis takes advantage of the extensive empirical evidence on FDI 
horizontal spillovers and attempts to offer an explanation for the mixed research 
findings in this field. Although current meta-analytic papers such as those by 
Gorg and Strobl (2001), Meyer and Sinani (2009), Irsova and Havranek (2013), 
conclude that FDI horizontal spillovers are contingent on host country 
characteristics such as trade openness (e.g. Irsova and Haveranek 2013; 
Meyer and Sinani 2009), financial development (e.g. Irsova and Haveranek 
2013; Meyer and Sinani 2009), and institutional quality like intellectual property 
rights (IPR) (Irsova and Haveranek 2013; Havranek and Irsova 2011; Smeets 
and de Vaal 2011; Yi et al. 2015) only but one controls for the effect of the IP 
system on FDI horizontal spillovers (Irsova and Havranek 2013). Even so, this 
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study although it captures the strength of IP law protection in the host county, it 
fails to take into consideration the degree the laws are actually enforced in 
practise. This meta-analysis builds upon the existing meta-analyses on FDI 
horizontal spillovers and particularly controls for the effect of the IP system 
taking into consideration for the first time the distinct direct and moderating 
effect of the public IP enforcement (in addition to the aforementioned factors).  
To develop a bias free and replicable meta-analysis this study consults the 
meta-analytic protocol introduced by two leading academics Stanley and 
Doucouliagos (2012). Table 3.6 summarizes the meta-analytic protocol 
suggested by Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012) and compares their processes 
with the ones followed for the development this meta-analysis.  
Table 3.6. FDI horizontal spillovers meta-analysis protocol 
Meta-analysis protocol suggested by 
Stanley and Doucouliagos, (2012) 
FDI horizontal spillovers meta-
analysis protocol  
Identifying 
studies 
1. Databases such as 
EconLit, Proquest, 
Science direct, 
Google Scholar 
2. Specify Keywords 
used 
3. Searching in existing 
review articles, key 
primary studies on the 
topic, and their 
reference lists for 
relevant studies 
4. Applied econometric 
studies – regression 
based estimates of an 
effect  
5. Studies that provide 
the following 
information regression 
coefficients, sample 
1. EconLit, Proquest, Science 
direct, Google Scholar 
2. ‘foreign direct investment/FDI 
spillover*’, ‘foreign direct 
investment/FDI horizontal 
spillover*’‘productivityspillover*’,
’productivity horizontal 
spillover*’‘knowledge spillover*’, 
‘technolog*spillover*’, 
‘knowledge transfer spillover*’, 
‘knowledge transfer horizontal 
spillover*’ 
3. Meyer and Sinani (2009) and 
Irsova and Havranek (2013) 
meta-analytic studies. Crespo 
and Fontoura (2009) literature 
review. 
4. Yes 
5. Yes 
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size, standard errors 
and t-statistic.  
Inclusion 
criteria 
1. Researcher’s 
inclusion criteria 
based on the topic 
under investigation 
2. Published studies in 
academic journals 
and unpublished 
papers from the 
NBER working 
papers, doctoral 
dissertation and 
departmental working 
papers. Unpublished 
papers should be 
routinely included in a 
meta-analysis unless 
the researchers can 
make a strong case 
that the unpublished 
studies are materially 
of lower quality.  
1. Studies capturing the years 
1998-2011 and be conducted in 
49 specific developed and 
developing countries 
2. Published studies in academic 
journal and unpublished papers 
from the NBER working papers, 
doctoral dissertation and 
departmental working papers 
have been included 
Data collection  
Essential 
data 
1. Effect sizes 
2. Standard errors 
3. Sample size 
4. Name of authors and 
paper 
All essential data were collected 
Typical 
data 
1. Estimation technique 
(cross-sectional/panel 
data, and firm/industry 
level data) 
2. Country under 
investigation 
3. Time period under 
investigation 
4. Model specification (OLS 
etc.) 
All typical data were collected 
Effect 
size 
1. Direct use of regression 
coefficients 
2. Zero order correlations 
3. Partial correlation 
4. Elasticities 
5. Semi-elasticities 
6. t-statistics 
For this study the t-statistic is selected 
as the effect size 
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A three step approach was followed in the process of selecting the most 
appropriate primary literature and establishing a comprehensive database for 
this study. First, four computerized databases namely Proquest, Science direct, 
EconLit and the scientific search engine Google Scholar are examined. In line 
with the keywords used by Meyer and Sinani (2009), a combination of the 
search terms ‘foreign direct investment/FDI spillover*’, ‘foreign direct 
investment/FDI horizontal spillover*’‘productivityspillover*’,’productivity 
horizontal spillover*’‘knowledge spillover*’, ‘technolog*spillover*’, ‘knowledge 
transfer spillover*’, ‘knowledge transfer horizontal spillover*’ is used to search in 
the titles and abstracts of studies included in these databases.  Second, 
relevant FDI horizontal spillover studies (published and unpublished) are 
identified in the reference lists of the two previous meta-analytical studies by 
Meyer and Sinani (2009) and Irsova and Havranek(2013) and in the review 
paper of Crespo and Fontoura (2009).These two stages yield 112 studies on 
FDI horizontal spillovers. In the third stage the inclusion criteria are set, being; 
(1) the studies on FDI horizontal spillovers should be applied econometric 
studies, (2) empirical studies should report information about regression 
coefficients, sample size, standard errors and t-statistics, (3) studies 
investigation time period should capture the years 1998-2011 and (4) studies 
should investigate 49 specific developed and developing countries. Criteria 3 
and 4 were developed because the scores of the main independent variable 
that used to approximate for the strength of public IP enforcement, the 
international patent systems strength index (IPSS) by Papageorgiadis et al. 
(2014), is available for this specific time period and country range. Having set 
the inclusion criteria the sample reduced to 49 published and unpublished 
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empirical papers on FDI horizontal spillovers. From the 49 studies, 29 studies 
were identified from searching the databases and 20 identified in the reference 
lists of the two previous meta-analytical studies by Meyer and Sinani (2009) and 
Irsova and Havranek(2013).At the last stage the primary researcher (Ph.D 
candidate) read the 49 articles and extracted data on the variables of interest, 
including outcome statistics, sample sizes, statistical artifacts, study 
characteristics and also collected the data for the country level variables such 
as trade openness, tertiary education, R&D expenditures and financial 
development. To ensure an error-free dataset, the other three researchers 
(Ph.D candidate’s supervisors) inspected the final dataset.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC IP ENFORCEMENT ON FDI VERTICAL 
SPILLOVERS 
4.1. Introduction 
This study examines the effect of IP systems on FDI vertical spillovers paying 
particular attention to the role and importance of public IP enforcement. FDI 
vertical spillovers refer to the case where domestic firms and MNEs’ foreign 
affiliates operate in different industries (Liu et al. 2009) and mainly take place 
via the transfer of advanced knowledge from the MNEs’ foreign affiliates to their 
domestic suppliers/buyers (Blalock and Simon 2009). MNEs do this as in the 
long run it allows them to benefit from improved end products/services by their 
suppliers or increased sales and improved distribution networks (Blalock and 
Simon 2009). It is therefore anticipated that domestic suppliers and buyers who 
acquire and effectively utilise MNEs’ advanced technological and managerial 
know-how to experience an increase in their productivity resulting in positive 
FDI vertical spillovers (Gorg and Greenaway 2003). 
As both foreign and domestic ﬁrms are obliged to operate under a specific 
institutional setting, institutions in the host country (among other factors) can 
shape the choices, behaviour, interaction and performance of foreign and 
domestic ﬁrms (Meyer and Sinani 2009; Smeets and de Vaal 2016; Yi et al. 
2015). The IP system of the host country, as one aspect of the institutional 
environment, could influence the FDI vertical spillovers that advantage domestic 
suppliers and buyers. This is because strong IP systems reduce MNEs’ 
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transaction costs (information, monitoring and enforcement) in the host country 
and allow for the safer exploitation of their IP assets (ownership advantage) (Yi 
et al. 2015).  Reduced transaction costs increase the attractiveness of the host 
country and thus the number of foreign affiliates, promote the transfer of 
technologically advanced assets from the MNEs to their foreign affiliates, 
encourage investment in R&D activities and increase the possibility of licensing 
IPs to domestic firms in upstream and downstream industries (Branstetter et al. 
2007; de Faria and Sofka 2010; Javorcik 2004). A MNEs decision to transfer 
high quality knowledge and engage in innovative activities in the host country, 
allows for the authorised transfer or unauthorised leakage, of advanced IPs to 
the domestic suppliers and buyers which could potential increase their 
productivity.   
As discussed extensively in Chapter 3, despite the importance of the host 
country’s public IP enforcement and IP system in IB research (Arora 2009; 
Maskus 2000; Peng et al. 2017a) few studies control for the effect of  IP 
systems on FDI horizontal and vertical spillovers (Havranek and Irsova 2011; 
Smeets and de Vaal 2016).  To date, only two studies examined the effect of IP 
systems on FDI vertical spillovers. Havranek and Irsova (2011) adopting a 
meta-analysis found an insignificant relationship between stronger IP systems 
and FDI vertical spillovers. However, Smeets and de Vaal (2016) found a 
positive relationship between stronger IP systems and FDI backward spillovers 
buta negative one with FDI forward spillovers. However the aforementioned 
studies do not theoretically distinguish nor empirically examine the IP system as 
having two pillars, i.e. IP law protection and public IP enforcement (see 
Havranek and Irsova 2011; Smeets and de Vaal 2016). Rather they assume 
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that countries with strong IP law protection are accompanied by effective public 
IP enforcement (Havranek and Irsova 2011; Smeets and de Vaal 2016), which 
as the WTO points out is not always the case. So, although existing studies 
intend to capture the overall effect of the IP system on FDI vertical spillovers, 
they only capture the effect of IP law protection but not the effect of public IP 
enforcement. From the discussion so far, it is evident that the distinct effect of 
the public IP enforcement has not been accounted for in previous FDI vertical 
spillovers studies. 
This study sets out to address RQ2 and fill the aforementioned research gap. In 
doing so it makes the following two contributions to the existing literature. First 
by taking into consideration the distinct effect of the public IP enforcement it 
becomes the first to conceptualise and test for the overall effect of the IP 
system on FDI vertical spillovers (i.e. IP law protection and public IP 
enforcement). It does so, by building upon and extending Havranek and Irsova’s 
(2011) meta-analytical study on FDI vertical spillovers. To test for the distinct 
effect of the public IP enforcement on FDI vertical spillovers, the newly 
developed international patent systems strength index (IPSS) (Papageorgiadis 
et al. 2014) is employed. The results obtained indicate that the strength of 
public IP enforcement in a country has a direct positive effect on the productivity 
of domestic suppliers and buyers. This finding also potentially explains the 
insignificant relationship found by Havranek and Irsova (2011) as they have not 
taken into consideration the degree to which IP laws are actually enforced.  
Second, this study explores another uncharted area in the literature, the 
moderating effect of the stronger public IP enforcement on the relationship 
between strong IP law protection and FDI vertical spillovers. The results 
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suggest that the public IP enforcement negatively moderates the effect of strong 
IP law protection on FDI vertical spillovers. This means that stronger IP law 
protection and stronger levels of public IP enforcement, come at the expense of 
domestic suppliers and buyers as they allow MNEs to improve and consolidate 
their monopolistic power resulting in blocking competition, attracting market 
demand, and being able to charge premium prices (Aitken and Harrison 1999; 
Smeets and de Vaal 2016). This result supports the view of those scholars who 
assert it is imperative to consider the effects of both IP law protection and IP 
enforcement element of IP systems systematically (Arora 2009; Maskus 2000; 
Peng et al. 2017a).   
4.2. Hypotheses development 
To date, much research has been done on the positive externalities of inward 
FDI suggesting that it benefits the host country by generating spillovers to the 
rest of the domestic firms (Crespo and Fontoura 2009; Gorg and Greenaway 
2003; Meyer and Sinani 2009; Liu et al. 2009). Such research implies that there 
is potential for domestic firms’ productivity to be affected by the foreign 
presence in the host country and generate positive FDI horizontal and vertical 
spillovers. In this study, the focus is on the FDI vertical spillovers which refer to 
the case where domestic firms and MNEs’ foreign affiliates operate in different 
industries and are divided into backward and forward spillovers (Liu et al. 2009). 
FDI backward spillovers arise when domestic firms supply the foreign affiliates 
with goods and services from the upstream industries and FDI forward 
spillovers arise when foreign affiliates sell goods and services to the domestic 
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firms (Liu et al. 2009).15This chapter aims to investigate the effect of IP law 
protection, public IP enforcement and the moderating effect of public IP 
enforcement on the productivity of domestic suppliers and buyers. First a brief 
background on the different channels through which MNEs’ foreign affiliates 
affect domestic suppliers and buyers is presented followed by the hypotheses 
development section. 
4.2.1. FDI backward spillovers 
Regarding the FDI backward spillovers, Javorcik (2004) argues that MNEs have 
no incentive to prevent knowledge and technology transfer to their suppliers as 
they may benefit from improved quality and performance of intermediate inputs. 
Knowledge transfer from MNEs’ foreign affiliates to domestic suppliers can take 
place in the following ways: (1) by providing technical assistance to raise the 
quality of the products/services and facilitate innovation; (2) by offering advice 
and help on how to build or upgrade production capabilities and processes; (3) 
by providing managerial training (Lin et al. 2009; Javorcik 2004; Blalock and 
Gertler 2007).  Apart from the direct knowledge transfer, domestic suppliers can 
also indirectly benefit from the foreign presence. The arrival of foreign affiliates 
in the host country increases the demand for downstream industry products, 
hence the competition among domestic suppliers. Due to the fact that the 
quality and delivery standards of foreign affiliates are high, domestic suppliers 
are motivated to upgrade their practices in order to win contracts with the 
foreign affiliates (Blalock and Simon 2009; Javorcik 2004). The upgrade of their 
production and delivery processes in order to match the demanding needs of 
                                                          
15The upstream stage of the production process involves searching for and extracting raw 
materials. For instance firms operating in the upstream stage of the petroleum industry locate 
and extract oil reserves which they later sell on to other companies.  
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the MNEs can result, first in winning more contracts with the MNEs and second 
becoming more efficient, all together leading to experiencing positive changes 
in their productivity (Blalock and Simon 2009; Javorcik 2004).  
So far the majority of empirical studies point to a positive relationship between 
the foreign presence and FDI backward spillovers. For instance, Blalock and 
Gertler (2003) for Indonesia, Kugler (2001) for Colombia, Javorcik (2004) for 
Lithuania and Du et al. (2012) for China all find evidence for positive FDI 
backward spillovers, but Laenarts and Merlevede (2011) for Romania and Xu 
and Sheng (2012) for China find this relationship insignificant.  
There are growing suspicions regarding the positive effects of backward 
linkages (Liu et al. 2009; Lin and Saggi 2005). First, MNEs foreign affiliates may 
have incentives to minimise the direct knowledge transfer to their domestic 
suppliers (Lin et al. 2009). This is so because domestic suppliers in the host 
country co-operate with a number of foreign and domestic firms, and potentially 
act as mediators by intentionally or unintentionally transferring knowledge from 
one firm (foreign affiliates) to another (foreign affiliates’ competitors) (Spencer 
2008). Domestic suppliers that have been educated by the foreign affiliates 
(training of employees, management practices, production processes etc.) and 
have been exposed to foreign affiliates’ high quality standards and processes, 
can pass their newfound knowledge onto other clients i.e. domestic firms that 
can be foreign affiliates’ direct competitors (Spencer 2008). In such cases 
MNEs respond in two ways. MNEs may require their domestic suppliers to 
cease supplying other downstream firms in order to minimise any intentional or 
unintentional knowledge leakages, as a condition of transferring their advanced 
knowledge (Lin et al. 2009). Alternatively, MNEs may develop binding contracts 
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specifying the legal boundaries inside which domestic suppliers can legally use 
and exploit MNEs advanced knowledge, restricting the transfer of their 
knowledge to unauthorised parties. In such cases domestic suppliers are 
dependent upon MNEs’ purchases and alternative means of obtaining profit 
may be limited resulting in a potential decline in performance. Second, 
competition among domestic suppliers on who will win a contract with the MNEs 
may also have an adverse effect. Domestic suppliers that are more innovative 
or possess greater capabilities and better match MNEs’ high quality standards, 
may attract demand away from relatively less knowledge intensive domestic 
suppliers resulting for the later to experience a decrease in their performance 
and productivity.  
4.2.2. FDI forward spillovers 
FDI forward spillovers may take place via two channels. First, it is generally 
accepted that foreign affiliates are more innovative than domestic firms as they 
most often possess advanced technological and managerial know-how (Smeets 
and de Vaal 2016). Domestic buyers by interacting/co-operating with the foreign 
affiliates, or by just using their superior quality outputs, are exposed to 
advanced knowledge and practices. For domestic buyers with sufficient 
absorptive capacity, the incorporation of MNEs’ products/knowledge into their 
practices can help increase their products’ quality, processes, efficiency 
resulting altogether in improved productivity (Driffield et al. 2002; Smeets and 
de Vaal 2016). Second, as foreign affiliates are more innovative than domestic 
firms they can offer higher quality products and intensify competition in the 
industry, which is likely to crowd out some of the domestic competitors 
(competition effect see Aitken and Harrison (1999)) resulting in more domestic 
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firms in downstream industries buying their inputs (Smeets and de Vaal 2016). 
As foreign affiliates can utilise the advantages of economies of scale, they may 
offer their products at lower prices. By purchasing inputs at lower prices than 
before, domestic buyers may increase their profitability and may allocate their 
monetary surplus to innovative activities that could potentially increase their 
productivity and performance (Smeets and de Vaal 2016).  
Research on the effect of foreign presence on FDI vertical spillovers, although 
relatively limited in comparison to horizontal spillovers, points to a positive 
relationship. For example, Driffield et al. (2002) and Fu (2012) for the UK and 
Du et al. (2012) for China, find evidence for positive FDI forward spillovers, 
while Laenarts and Merlevede (2011) for Romania and Xu and Sheng (2012) for 
China find this relationship insignificant.  
Despite the importance of the host country’s public IP enforcement and IP 
system in IB research (Arora 2009; Maskus 2000; Peng et al. 2017a) only a few 
studies control for the effect of the IP system in FDI vertical spillovers 
(Havranek and Irsova 2011; Smeets and de Vaal 2016). Havranek and Irsova 
(2011) adopt a meta-analysis approach covering 57 empirical studies to 
examine which factors, including IP systems, influence the magnitude of FDI 
vertical spillovers. Their findings show an insignificant relationship between the 
strength of IP systems and FDI vertical spillovers. Smeets and de Vaal (2016) 
employ a large dataset comprising 81,299 firms in 17 countries and find that 
strong IP systems strengthen backward linkage effects but weaken forward 
linkage effects. However, it is possible the results of these aforementioned 
studies lack reliability. This is so because although these studies intended to 
capture the overall effect of the IP system on FDI vertical spillovers, they 
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conceptualised and tested only for the strength of the IP law protection without 
controlling for the effectiveness of the public IP enforcement element. To be 
exact these studies employed the index of patent protection by Ginarte and 
Park (1997) and Park (2008) to approximate for the strength of the IP systems 
as a whole. This index though, does not include a measurement for patent 
enforcement (Fosfuri 2004; Javorcick 2004; Nicholson 2007; Nunnenkamp and 
Spatz 2004; Papageorgiadis et al. 2014) as it is only ‘designed to provide an 
indicator of the strength of patent protection and not the quality of patent 
systems (Park 2008:761). However, as has been pointed out in respect to the 
strength of an IP system, ‘the real issue is whether a country adequately 
enforces the laws and regulations it has in place’ (Maskus 2004:22); as it is the 
strong public IP enforcement that ensures IP dependent MNEs that their rights 
will not only be granted but upheld in case of violation. This reassurance 
motivates MNEs to invest in FDI, transfer knowledge-intensive assets to their 
foreign affiliates and domestic suppliers and buyers, which can potentially 
increase domestic firms’ productivity. From the discussion so far, it is evident 
that the distinct effect of the public IP enforcement has not yet been accounted 
for in previous FDI vertical spillovers studies regardless of its paramount 
importance. 
4.2.3. IP law protection and FDI vertical spillovers 
It is established in the literature that strong IP law protection opens up countries 
to receive more inflows of technologically intensive FDI (Awokose and Yin 2010; 
Berry 2017; Branstetter et al. 2007). According to institutional theory, strong 
formal institutions clearly specify the legal boundaries inside which MNEs and 
domestic firms can pursue their activities (North 1992). Strong IP law protection 
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in the host country is positively perceived by the MNEs as it provides the legal 
boundaries inside which MNEs can register, legally protect and potentially 
enforce their IP assets and advanced technological and managerial know-how 
(Khoury et al. 2014; Yi et al. 2015). As such, under strong IP law protection, the 
amount of inward FDI increases and consequently the number of foreign firms 
in the market. Moreover, since strong IP law allows MNEs to register their IP in 
the host country, MNEs incorporate advanced codified knowledge in their 
practice and products used/sold in the host market. Based on these conditions, 
domestic suppliers can benefit from stronger IP law protection using legal but 
also illegal means.  
First the high volume of foreign affiliates increases the opportunities for 
domestic suppliers to co-operate with the foreign affiliates. The increased 
number of foreign affiliates in the market increases the demand for downstream 
industry products and as such domestic suppliers may gain more customers 
(MNEs), increase their sales and thus experience improved performance. In 
addition domestic suppliers by co-operating with the MNEs, are exposed to a 
variety of advanced practices and knowledge that if adopted and incorporated 
into their own practices could increase the quality of their processes/products 
resulting in increasing their productivity. However as transaction cost theory 
posits, when specific assets are transacted frequently, MNEs’ monitoring and 
enforcement costs may increase as they need to be constantly aware of the 
other contracting party’s activities. Although strong IP law protection allows 
MNEs to draw strict contracts with their suppliers forbidding them any 
unauthorised transfer of their shared IP, it does not restrict the opportunistic 
behaviour of domestic suppliers to illegally share or sell the knowledge acquired 
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through their co-operation with the MNEs to other firms which may be the 
foreign affiliates’ competitors (Lin et al. 2009), if the public IP enforcement is 
absent or low. Even if MNEs become more reluctant in directly sharing their 
knowledge with their domestic suppliers, due to the public good nature of 
knowledge domestic suppliers can still get access to MNEs’ advanced practices 
and products.   
Second, as stronger IP law protection allows MNEs to register their IPs in the 
host country, MNEs will be more likely to use IPs in production of their products. 
Also, MNEs will require high quality inputs that can be used in conjunction with 
their advanced IP. Domestic suppliers aiming to outdo domestic competition will 
need to offer high quality outputs that meet MNEs standards. Thus, domestic 
suppliers may attempt to increase the quality of their outputs by taking 
advantage of the strong IP law protection in the country and engaging in R&D 
activities. The benefit here is twofold. First by engaging in R&D activities they 
can improve their own processes, practices and capabilities resulting in 
becoming more efficient and effective and increasing their performance. 
Second, high quality products will be preferred and purchased by the MNEs 
resulting in increased sales and thus productivity.  
Third, it is generally accepted that foreign affiliates are more innovative than 
domestic firms as they most often possess advanced technological and 
managerial know-how (Smeets and de Vaal 2016). A strong IP law protection 
framework in the host country that allows MNEs to register and protect their IP, 
may reinforce their competitive position resulting in crowding out of some of the 
domestic competitors (see competition effect in Aitken and Harrison (1999)). As 
such some domestic buyers may end up being supplied by MNEs’ affiliates 
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rather than domestic firms (Smeets and de Vaal 2016). As foreign affiliates can 
utilise the advantages of economies of scale and offer their products at lower 
prices, domestic buyers’ expenses decrease and can invest their surplus to 
improve the quality of their outputs, satisfy their customers’ needs and increase 
their sales and thus productivity. In addition, since strong IP law protection 
allows for the register of MNEs’ IP in the host country, their outputs will be of 
better quality than those produced by domestic firms. As such, domestic buyers 
purchasing MNEs’ products will be exposed to higher quality inputs which, if 
incorporated into their practices and processes, could improve their efficiency 
and quality resulting in better productivity.  
Hypothesis 1: The strength of IP law protection in a country positively affects 
the FDI backward productivity spillovers 
Hypothesis 2: The strength of IP law protection in a country positively affects 
the FDI forward productivity spillovers.  
4.2.4. Public IP enforcement and FDI vertical spillovers 
Apart from increasing the attractiveness of the host country, strong public IP 
enforcement in a host country can influence the direct knowledge transfer 
channels influencing FDI vertical spillovers. The literature suggests that strong 
public IP enforcement promotes the transfer of high quality knowledge from the 
MNEs to their foreign affiliates, increases the patenting activity of foreign 
affiliates and increasing investment in high value MNE activities, such as the 
establishment of R&D centres (Branstetter et al. 2007; Berry 2017; Maskus et 
al. 2003). This is because high levels of public IP enforcement reinforce the 
location advantage of the host country and reduce MNEs’ transaction costs by 
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allowing them to effectively defend their IP in case of violation. In such cases 
strong public IP enforcement allows MNEs to engage with the relevant public 
enforcement agents (police, customs, judiciary) seize and prosecute the 
infringers and halt the unauthorised exploitation of their IP assets, preserving 
their ownership advantage (Keupp et al. 2010; Yang et al. 2008).  
As aforementioned, foreign affiliates have incentives to promote direct 
knowledge transfer to their domestic suppliers as they can benefit from 
improved quality of inputs purchased. However, foreign affiliates also have 
incentives to minimise the direct knowledge transfer to their domestic suppliers 
(Lin et al. 2009), as these domestic suppliers may intentionally or unintentionally 
transfer a proportion of their acquired knowledge to their other buyers, who may 
also be the foreign affiliates’ competitors (Lin et al. 2009). Strong public IP 
enforcement minimises the opportunistic behaviour of domestic suppliers to 
share MNEs’ knowledge by allowing for the enforcement of binding contracts 
that prevent domestic suppliers from sharing the accumulated knowledge with 
unauthorised third parties or applying the knowledge in forward relationships 
with other buyers (Smeets and de Vaal 2016). Most importantly stronger levels 
of public IP enforcement allow foreign affiliates to enforce IP laws where 
expropriation occurs. In the case of contract violation, MNEs engaging with the 
public enforcement agents can seize the infringers, halt the unauthorised use of 
their knowledge and take the case to the judiciary through IP litigation 
(Papageorgiadis et al. 2014). Moreover, the fact that domestic suppliers may 
find themselves involved in protracted and costly court trials ending up in losing 
market opportunities and brand reputation, may discourage them from the 
unauthorised use or diffusion of foreign affiliates’ knowledge and IP. Thus, 
 133 
 
strong public IP enforcement decreases MNEs’ monitoring and enforcement 
and increases the incentives of MNEs to enter into more contractual 
agreements with the domestic suppliers and directly transfer advanced 
technological and managerial know-how. As strong public IP enforcement also 
increases the amount and quality of IP assets and know-how transferred from 
MNEs to their foreign affiliates (Berry 2017), the knowledge transferred to 
MNEs’ domestic suppliers is expected to be of higher quality achieved, for 
example, through technical assistance, production processes advises and 
managerial training. Therefore domestic suppliers with sufficient absorptive 
capacity that are able to adopt and effectively utilise foreign affiliates’ advanced 
knowledge, can improve the quality and efficiency of their products and 
processes resulting in increased sales, improved performance, processes and 
thus productivity.  
Similarly, since strong public IP enforcement increases the quality of knowledge 
transferred from the MNEs to foreign affiliates and the patenting activity of 
foreign affiliates, the end products developed by the foreign affiliates are 
expected to incorporate advanced technological and managerial know-how. The 
purchase of such inputs by the domestic buyers for use in their 
processes/products can result in becoming more effective and efficient (costs 
reduction) and/or increasing the attractiveness of their products (increase in 
sales) (Smeets and de Vaal 2016).   
Hypothesis 3: The strength of public IP enforcement in a country positively 
affects the FDI backward productivity spillovers 
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Hypothesis 4: The strength of public IP enforcement in a country positively 
affects the FDI forward productivity spillovers.  
4.2.5. The effect of IP enforcement on the relationship between IP law 
protection and FDI vertical spillovers 
While strong IP law protection and strong public IP enforcement individually are 
expected to benefit the productivity of domestic suppliers and buyers, their joint 
effect   has the potential to provide strong market power to foreign affiliates and 
negatively impact FDI vertical spillovers.  
Strong IP law protection accompanied by strong enforceability of the laws in the 
host country minimises MNEs contracting, monitoring and enforcement costs by 
allowing them to register and also enforce their rights if a violating act occurs. 
This reduces the opportunistic behaviour of domestic suppliers and buyers to 
misappropriate the asset under transaction. A strong IP system gives incentives 
to MNEs to develop more innovative IP in the host country or transfer it from 
their home country, as it assures them that their rights will not only be granted 
but also upheld in case of violation. The development/transfer of state of the art 
technology/IP improves and consolidates MNEs monopolistic power (ownership 
advantage) in the host market, resulting in blocking competition, attracting 
market demand away from domestic competitors, while allowing them to charge 
premium prices (Aitken and Harrison 1999; Smeets and de Vaal 2016). 
Domestic competitors that do not possess similar capabilities or competitive 
power, may be forced out of the market or confined to market segments that 
foreign affiliates are not interested in serving. Accordingly, as the number of 
MNEs’ domestic competitors reduces, domestic suppliers lose potential 
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customers making them increasingly reliant on the foreign affiliates. As the 
bargaining power of domestic suppliers decreases, foreign affiliates capitalising 
on their monopolistic position may apply pressure on the domestic suppliers to 
reduce their prices. As such profitability and consequently productivity of 
domestic suppliers may decline. 
Similarly, as the number of MNEs’ domestic competitors decrease as a result of 
the strengthening of the IP system, the number of alternative input suppliers 
decreases for the domestic buyers. Therefore domestic buyers become more 
dependent on the foreign affiliates to purchase their inputs. The high quality of 
their products coupled with the increased bargaining power over domestic 
buyers, allow MNEs to charge higher prices for their outputs (Smeets and de 
Vaal 2016) resulting in a decrease in domestic buyers’ productivity. 
Hypothesis 5: The strength of public IP enforcement in a country   negatively 
moderates the relationship between stronger IP law protection and FDI 
backward spillovers. 
Hypothesis 6: The strength of public IP enforcement in a country   negatively 
moderates the relationship between stronger IP law protection and FDI forward 
spillovers. 
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4.3. Data and Methods  
To investigate the effect of strong IP law protection and strong public IP 
enforcement on FDI backward and forward spillovers, the same methodological 
approach as in Chapter 3 i.e. a meta-analysis and the ordered probit model is 
adopted (see Chapter 3, section 4 for more information and Appendix A). 
4.3.1. Selection of primary literature 
In order to identify the most appropriate primary literature and establish a 
comprehensive database for this study a three step approach was followed. 
Similar to Chapter 3, FDI vertical spillover studies should capture the years 
1998-2011 and been conducted in 49 specific developed and developing 
countries. This is because the scores of the main independent variable used to 
approximate for the strength of public IP enforcement, the international patent 
systems strength index (IPSS) by Papageorgiadis et al. (2014), is available for 
this specific time period and country range. Second, 16 relevant FDI spillover 
studies (published and unpublished) identified in the reference list of the 
previous meta-analytical study by Havranek and Irsova (2011). Third, with the 
use of keywords three established scientific databases (Proquest, Science 
direct, EconLit databases) and the scientific search engine Google Scholar 
were searched. In line with the keywords used by Meyer and Sinani (2009), a 
combination of the search terms ‘foreign direct investment/FDI spillovers’, 
‘foreign direct investment/FDI vertical spillovers’, ‘foreign direct investment/FDI 
backward spillovers’, ‘foreign direct investment/FDI forward spillovers’, 
‘productivity spillovers’, ‘productivity vertical spillovers’, ‘productivity backward 
spillovers’, ‘productivity forward spillovers’, ‘knowledge spillovers’ and 
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‘technolog* spillovers’ was used to search in the titles and abstracts of studies 
included in these databases. This search allowed for identification of 11 
additional studies. Therefore, the final dataset encompasses 27 published and 
unpublished empirical papers on FDI vertical spillovers. Table 4.1 provides a 
summary of the characteristics of each of the studies that are included in the 
dataset, in terms of the country of focus, the year studied and the level of focus 
of each study. It is important to note that this dataset takes into consideration 
the multiple FDI vertical spillover estimates the 27 studies report, which enables 
the analysis of the data as a panel.16 
Table 4.1 The empirical studies on FDI vertical spillovers included in the meta-
analysis 
Study Country Data year Aggregation 
Du et al. (2012) 
 
China 1998-2007 Firmlevel 
Jordaan (2013) Mexico 
 
2000-2001 Firm level 
Fu (2012) 
 
UK 1998-2004 Firm level 
Javorcik and 
Spatareanu (2011) 
 
Romania 
 
1998-2003 Firm level 
Jeon et al. (2013) China 1998-2007 Firm level 
 
 
Liu et al. (2009) China 
 
1998-2001 Firm level 
Reganati and Sica 
(2007) 
 
Italy 
 
1997-2002 Firm level 
Merlevede et al. 
(2014) 
 
Romania 
 
1996-2005 Industry level 
Kolasa (2008) Poland 1996-2003 Firm level 
                                                          
16 An identical meta-analytic protocol to the one followed in Chapter 3 was used in the 
development of the FDI vertical spillover meta-analysis (see Chapter 3 Appendix A for more 
information).  
 138 
 
  
Merlevede and 
Schoors (2007) 
Romania 
 
 
1996-2001 Firm level 
Merlevede and 
Schoors (2009) 
 
Romania 
 
1996-2001 Firm level 
Gersl et al. (2008) 
 
Czech republic,  
Hungary,  
Poland,  
Slovakia,  
Romania 
2000-2005 Industry level 
Laenarts and 
Merlevede (2011) 
 
Romania 
 
1996-2005 
 
Firm level 
Mariotti et al. 
(2011)  
 
Italy 
 
1999-2005 Firm level 
Nicolini and 
Resmini (2010) 
 
Poland 
 
1998-2003 Firm level 
Xu and Sheng 
(2012) 
 
China 
 
2000-2003 Industry level 
Tomohara and 
Yokota (2006) 
 
Thailand 
 
1999-2001 Firm level 
Blake et al. (2009) China 
 
2000 Firm level 
Crespo et al. 
(2009) 
 
Portugal 
 
1996-2000 Firm level 
Geršl (2008) Czech Republic 
 
2002-2005 Firm level 
Girma and Gong 
(2008) 
 
China 
 
1999-2002 Firm level 
Halpern and 
Muraközy (2007) 
 
Hungary 
 
1996-2003 
 
Firm level 
Javorcik and 
Spatareanu (2008) 
 
Romania 
 
1998-2003 
 
Firm level 
Lin et al. (2009) China 
 
1998-2005 Firm level 
Qiu et al. (2009) China 
 
2001-2006 Industry level 
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Wang and Zhao 
(2008) 
 
China 
 
2000-2002 Industry level 
Chang et al. 
(2007) 
 
China 
 
2002-2005 Firm level 
Schoors and van 
der Tol (2002) 
 
Hungary 
 
1997-1998 Firm level 
 
4.3.2. Effect size and estimation method 
As in Chapter 3 in this meta-analysis t-statistics are used for the construction of 
the dependent variable and used to calculate the p values (statistical 
significance) of study estimates, distinguishing between backward and forward 
FDI spillovers to avoid violating the first property of the effect sizes (i.e. the 
effect size should measure the effect of one variable on another holding other 
factors constant (Stanley and Doucouliagos 2012). As such backward FDI 
spillovers are distinguished between significantly negative, insignificant and 
significantly positive estimates using a categorical effect size as the dependent 
variables. The classes are labelled 0, 1, 2 respectively adopting a significance 
level of 5%. The same classification applies for the forward FDI spillovers. As in 
Chapter 3 the ordered probit model is applied but because the estimated 
coefficients from an ordered probit model should not be used for inference the 
marginal effects are also calculated (Verbeek 2017).17 
Specifically, the model assumes the presence of a latent variable 𝑦𝑏𝑖𝑗
∗  
(backward spillovers) and 𝑦𝑓𝑖𝑗
∗  (forward spillovers) that is explained by the 
                                                          
17 For more information see Chapter 3, section 3. 
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moderators explained below. The model for backward and forward spillovers 
respectively is as follows: 
𝑦𝑏𝑖𝑗
∗ = ∑ β
k
22
𝑘=1
Zk,ij +  εij 
𝑦𝑓𝑖𝑗
∗ = ∑ β
k
22
𝑘=1
Zk,ij +  εij 
Where𝑦𝑏𝑖𝑗
∗  and 𝑦𝑓𝑖𝑗
∗  are unobservable and εij is the error term that is normally 
and iid distributed. Zk,ij refer to the independent variables and the proxy for 𝑦𝑏𝑖𝑗
∗  
and 𝑦𝑓𝑖𝑗
∗ is the latent variable yij, constructed as follows:   
 
Category A: y=0 if estimate is statistically significant negative 
Category B: y=1 if estimate is insignificant (either negative or positive) 
Category C: y=2 if estimate is statistically significant positive 
4.3.3. Independent variables 
The two variables of interests are the IPSS index as a proxy of the public IP 
enforcement and Park (2008) index as a proxy of the IP law protection, and a 
detailed description can be found in Chapter 3 (section 3.4.).  
4.3.4. Country level variables 
Three country level variables that are theoretically expected to have a positive 
effect on the productivity of domestic suppliers and buyers are included, 
namely: i) financial development, ii) labour quality, and iii) trade openness (as 
an indicator of technological inflows in host country) (Wooster and Diebel 2010; 
Solow 1999).  
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In terms of the host country’s financial development, domestic suppliers that 
have access to financial capital can invest in the development of technologically 
advanced intermediate goods that will be preferred and purchased by the 
foreign affiliates (Havranek and Irsove 2011; Smeets and de Vaal 2016). 
Thereof domestic suppliers in countries with well-developed financial system 
are more likely to experience positive changes in their productivity. Along the 
same lines, domestic buyers that have access to financial capital are able to 
purchase technologically advanced goods by the foreign affiliates become 
exposed to the advanced and high-quality end products and experience positive 
changes in productivity (Havranek and Irsova 2011; Smeets and de Vaal 2016). 
Advanced human capital enables domestic suppliers to acquire and develop 
capabilities that can increase their absorptive capacity (Meyer and Sinani 2009) 
and thus produce technologically advanced intermediate goods that can be 
purchased by the foreign affiliates. Moreover, advanced human capital also 
increases the absorptive capacity of the domestic buyers and enables them to 
successfully utilize intermediate goods purchased by the foreign affiliates. As in 
the majority of the FDI spillover studies the level of tertiary education in host 
country and the R&D expenditures of the private sector to proxy for the human 
capital are included in this model (Irsova and Havranek 2013; Meyer and Sinani 
2009). 
In respect to the trade openness of the host country, domestic suppliers that are 
exposed to international trade and thus to international competition are more 
likely to have the knowledge and the skills to produce technologically advanced 
intermediate goods that foreign affiliates in the host country most often require 
(Havranek and Irsova 2011). However, there is the possibility that such 
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technologically advanced intermediate goods to be relatively expensive. A 
country open to trade provides the opportunity to foreign affiliates to import their 
necessary intermediate goods from other countries at lower prices (Havranek 
and Irsova 2011). As such domestic suppliers may be found in a competitive 
disadvantaged position and experience negative changes in their productivity. 
This study therefore controls for the effect of trade openness on backward FDI 
spillover. Regarding the domestic buyers that trade internationally, they are 
exposed to advanced knowledge and technology which can adopt and adapt in 
their own practices and processes (Havranek and Irsova 2011). As such they 
can adequately exploit the technologically advanced inputs purchased by the 
foreign affiliates and produce high quality end products increasing their 
productivity.  Table 4.2 below provides the definition of all the variables included 
in the study and the data sources used to measure them.  
Table 4.2 Definition of variables and sources of data 
Variable Definition Data source 
𝐂𝐁𝐬𝐢𝐠 Categorical backward 
dependent variable: =0 if 
spillover estimates are 
negative, =1 if spillover 
estimates are insignificant, 
=2 if spillover estimates are 
positive 
 
𝐂𝐅𝐬𝐢𝐠 Categorical forward 
dependent variable: =0 if 
spillover estimates are 
negative, =1 if spillover 
estimates are insignificant, 
=2 if spillover estimates are 
positive 
 
IP law protection Park (2008) patent 
protection index 
The index ranges from 0 to 
5 with higher values 
Park (2008) 
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indicating stronger levels of 
patent protection. 
Public IP enforcement Papageorgiadis et al., 
(2014) IPSS index 
The index ranges from 0 to 
10 with higher scores 
indicating stronger 
enforcement levels  
Papageorgiadis et al., 
(2014)  
 
Country level variables 
Trade openness Trade (%GDP) World bank -  World 
Development Indicators 
Tertiary education  The tertiary school 
enrolment rate in the 
country 
World bank -  World 
Development Indicators 
R&D R&D expenditures (%GDP) World bank -  World 
Development Indicators 
Financial development Domestic credit provided 
by financial sector (% of 
GDP) 
 
World bank -  World 
Development Indicators 
Data characteristics 
Cross sectional data = 1 if cross sectional are 
used,         = 0, otherwise 
 
Industry level data = 1 if industry level data 
are used, = 0, otherwise 
 
No. of observations The number of 
observations used in each 
study 
 
Time span The number of years of the 
data used 
 
Specification characteristics 
Foreign presence in 
employment 
=1 if proxy for foreign 
presence is measured in 
terms of employment 
share, = 0, otherwise 
 
Foreign presence in 
equity 
=1 if proxy for foreign 
presence is measured in 
terms of equity share, = 0, 
otherwise 
 
Technological gap =1 if the study controls for 
technological gap, = 0, 
otherwise 
 
Horizontal spillovers =1 if horizontal spillovers 
are included in the 
regression, =0, otherwise 
 
Estimation characteristics 
Olley-Pakes =1 if the Olley-Pakes  
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method is used for the 
estimation of total factor 
productivity, =0 otherwise 
OLS =1 if the Ordinary Least 
Squares method is used for 
the estimation of total 
factor productivity, =0 
otherwise 
 
GMM =1 if the system General 
Method of Moments 
estimator is used for the 
estimation of spillovers, =0 
otherwise 
 
Year fixed =1 if year fixed effects are 
included, =0 otherwise 
 
Sector fixed =1 if sector fixed effects 
are included, =0 otherwise 
 
Publication characteristics 
Amadeus  =1 if the Amadeus 
database is used, =0 
otherwise 
 
Publication =1 if  
paper published in a peer 
reviewed journal, =0 
otherwise 
 
 
4.3.5. Control variables 
As explained extensively in Chapter 3 (section 4) this meta-analytic model 
creates a number of dummy variables to control for study, model specification, 
estimation and publication characteristics. The only different variable in this 
model is the FDI horizontal spillovers variable. This study creates a dummy 
variable for studies that measure FDI horizontal spillovers in the same 
regression with FDI vertical spillovers.  
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4.4. Results and Discussion 
Table 4.3 provides the descriptive statistics of all the variables included in the 
empirical estimation and Tables 4.4 and 4.5 presents the ordered probit 
estimates and associated marginal effects for the FDI backward and forward 
spillovers respectively. 
The majority of existing empirical evidence on FDI vertical spillover concludes 
that in the absence of a competition effect, the presence of foreign affiliates in 
upstream and downstream industries is likely to have a positive effect on 
domestic suppliers and buyers’ productivity. The findings of this study support 
the theoretical predictions as they identify how in cases where only one pillar of 
the IP system is strong (either IP law protection or public IP enforcement) MNEs 
do not outcompete domestic firms and domestic suppliers and buyers are 
positively influenced by the foreign presence. However, when the IP system 
becomes stronger and both IP law protection and enforcement are strong, 
MNEs gain a near monopolistic position in the market resulting in the 
occurrence of negative FDI vertical spillovers.  
The results of this analysis provide support for the central proposition of this 
study that the strength of public IP enforcement element of IP systems has a 
direct separate effect on FDI backward and forward spillovers.  Specifically, and 
in relation to Hypotheses 1 and 2, the coefficient of the IP law protection is 
positive and statistically significant for FDI backward (0.1444, p<0.001) and 
forward spillovers (0.148, p<0.001) suggesting that stronger IP law protection 
has a positive impact on the productivity of domestic suppliers and buyers. The 
finding of Hypothesis 1 is in line with Smeets and de Vaal (2016) who find a 
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positive relationship between stronger IP law protection and FDI backward 
spillovers, but in contrast to Havranek and Irsova (2011) who find an 
insignificant relationship. This result suggests that stronger IP law creates more 
opportunities for the domestic suppliers and buyers to co-operate with a foreign 
affiliate to increase sales. Moreover, as domestic suppliers co-operate more 
with the foreign affiliates, they are exposed to advanced knowledge and 
practices that if incorporated into their own practices could increase the quality 
of their processes/products resulting in increased productivity. The results also 
support Hypothesis 2 but are not in line with Smeets and de Vaal (2016) who 
identified a negative relationship between stronger IP law protection and the 
productivity of domestic buyers and Havranek and Irsova (2011) who found an 
insignificant one. This study’s results suggest that stronger IP law protection 
increases the number of foreign affiliates in the market, creating alternatives for 
domestic buyers to obtain their inputs at lower prices. Moreover, since strong IP 
law protection allows MNEs to register their IP in the host country, their end 
products will encompass advance knowledge and practices that can improve 
the efficiency and quality of domestic buyers’ processes/products. The 
ambiguity between this study’s research findings and those of Havranek and 
Irsova (2011) and Smeets and de Vaal (2016) might have arisen because of 
their incomplete conceptualisation and testing of the IP system. Although the 
authors intended to capture the effect of the strength of the overall IP system in 
a host country, both failed to take into consideration the strength of public IP 
enforcement. However, as it becomes evident in the testing of Hypotheses 5 
and 6 where the whole IP system is conceptualised, public IP enforcement has 
a distinct and direct effect on FDI backward and forward spillovers.  
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Scholars have suggested that any reference to, or examination of, an IP system 
should be interpreted in respect to proper IP enforcement and consequently as 
an interpretation of the content and adequacy of IP law protection (Maskus 
2004:22) controlling for the effect of public IP enforcement on FDI vertical 
spillovers has been neglected. However, the results of this study indicate a 
significant direct positive effect. In respect to Hypotheses 3 and 4 the coefficient 
of the public IP enforcement on FDI backward (0.225, p<0.001), and forward 
(0.280, p<0.001) spillovers is positive and statistically significant, indicating that 
the strength of public IP enforcement has a positive impact on the productivity 
of domestic suppliers and buyers. This finding is consistent with the expectation 
in Hypothesis 3 indicating that stronger levels of public IP enforcement increase 
the transfer of high quality knowledge from the foreign affiliates to the domestic 
suppliers who update their practices and performance in this way. This is so 
because, it decreases the opportunistic behaviour of domestic suppliers to 
intentionally or unintentionally share the knowledge acquired by the foreign 
affiliates, as it assures them that in such cases legal action will be taken against 
them. Moreover, it allows MNEs to enforce their contracts in case of violation 
and as such it increases the incentives of MNEs to enter into more contractual 
agreements with the domestic suppliers and aid in the upgrade of their 
knowledge and sales.  The results also support Hypothesis 4 and suggest that 
stronger levels of public IP enforcement increase the quality of foreign affiliates’ 
outputs that, when purchased by the domestic buyers, could be utilised 
accordingly to improve their practices and performance. The fact that this 
study’s results support Hypotheses 3 and 4 allows for the first time to have 
empirical evidence on the impact of public IP enforcement on FDI vertical 
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spillovers. Therefore, it is of imperative importance for future studies to consider 
the distinct theoretical effects of the strength of public IP enforcement and 
empirically test its effect on FDI spillover and other IB related topics. In addition, 
this result gives empirical support to scholars who conceptually highlighted the 
different aspects of an IP system (IP law protection and IP enforcement) and 
advocated in favour of the investigation of IP enforcement in future studies 
(Arora 2009; Maskus 2000; Peng et al. 2017a).  
With regards to Hypotheses 5 and 6, the results explore another uncharted area 
in the literature; the moderating effect of stronger public IP enforcement on the 
relationship between strong IP law protection and FDI vertical spillovers. The 
coefficient of the moderating effect of the stronger public IP enforcement on the 
relationship between strong IP law protection and FDI backward spillovers was 
found to be negative and statistically significant (-0.0400, p<0.001) indicating 
that as public IP enforcement moves from weak to strong, it negatively impacts 
the positive relationship between strong IP law protection and FDI backward 
spillovers, supporting Hypothesis 5. Along the same lines, the coefficient of the 
moderating effect of the stronger public IP enforcement on the relationship 
between strong IP law protection and FDI backward spillovers was found to be 
negative and statistically significant (-0.0596, p<0.001). This indicates that as 
public IP enforcement moves from weak to strong negatively it impacts the 
positive relationship between strong IP law protection and FDI forward 
spillovers, supporting Hypothesis 6.  
These results suggest that in countries where both IP law protection and public 
IP enforcement are strong, IP dependent MNEs are able to improve and 
consolidate their monopolistic power over domestic firms (suppliers and buyers) 
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resulting in blocking competition, attracting market demand away from domestic 
firms, and charging premium prices (Aitken and Harrison 1999; Smeets and de 
Vaal 2016). Since MNEs’ bargaining power increases, domestic suppliers and 
buyers have less negotiating power when attempting to collaborate with them, 
resulting in experiencing negative changes to their productivity. By testing for 
the effect of the second (neglected) pillar of the IP system i.e the public IP 
enforcement, this study demonstrates that public IP enforcement is equally as 
important as IP law protection in influencing FDI vertical spillovers.  By only 
conceptualising and testing for the effect of IP law protection, existing studies 
may have overestimated the effect IP law protection resulting the contradictory 
findings (see Havranek and Irsova 2011; Smeets and deVaal 2016). The results 
of this study support the theoretical predictions on FDI vertical spillovers and 
provide a well-established explanation on why IP enforcement matters. This 
study demonstrates the need for future research to consider the differential 
effects of both elements of an IP system i.e. IP law protection and public IP 
enforcement on FDI vertical productivity spillovers and other IB related topics 
(depending on the focus of a study). 
Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Coefficient 
backward 
747 7.876314 31.19133 -74.172 290.3 
t-statistics 
backward 
712 1.325009 2.248718 -9.12903 15 
Stand. Error 
backward 
627 7.420387 13.87982 0 83.335 
Coefficient 
forward 
423 1.792778 30.40951 -59.44 615.3 
t-statistics 
forward 
386 1.222198 2.432358 -5.90476 13.6575 
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Stand. Error 
forward 
331 0.475226 0.762134 0 9.643 
Public IP 
enforcement 
1,019 400.2463 89.93421 350 874 
IP law 
protection 
1,019 353.3297 44.8214 249 460 
IPSS*Park 1,019 1426.826 476.7846 1020.9 3967.96 
Trade 
openness 
1,021 6432.001 1958.94 3559.899 12868.7 
Tertiary 
education 
1,031 2800.679 1072.775 0 5972.396 
Financial 
development 
1,019 5559.574 4987.854 1591.053 13698.84 
R&D 1,019 63.07097 31.32455 25.70867 169.8507 
Cross 
sectional data 
1,031 0.581959 7.610087 0 1 
Industry level 
data 
1,031 34.2386 47.47383 0 1 
Time span 1,031 724.0543 266.5556 1 10 
No. of 
observations 
1,012 188925.7 396241.4 35 1552557 
Ln No. of 
observations 
1,012 10.37067 2.315074 3.555348 14.25541 
Foreign 
Presence_ 
employment 
1,031 40.15519 49.04501 0 1 
Foreign 
Presence_ 
equity 
1,031 21.92047 41.39084 0 1 
Technological 
gap 
1,031 7.759457 26.76624 0 1 
Horizontal 1,031 96.31426 18.85031 0 1 
Olley-Pakes 1,032 21.92047 41.37076 0 1 
OLS 1,032 76.13967 42.62297 0 1 
GMM 1,032 31.91077 46.61308 0 1 
Year fixed 1,032 43.84093 49.61921 0 1 
Sector fixed 1,032 33.17168 47.08299 0 1 
Publication  1,032 38.40931 48.63801 0 1 
Amadeus  1,032 60.52376 48.87996 0 1 
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Table 4.4 Empirical estimation and associated marginal effects of meta-analysis 
ordered probit model – FDI backward spillovers 
  Marginal effects model_ Backward (1) 
 
 Ordered Probit 
Model_Backward(1) 
Significantly 
Negative 
Insignificant  Significantly 
Positive 
     
Public IP 
enforcement 
0.225*** -0.0001607 -0.1743785*** 0.1745392*** 
(65.591) (-1.29) (-7.91) (7.94) 
IP law protection 0.1444*** -0.0001032 -0.1119937*** 0.112097*** 
(81.96) (-1.27) (-7.60) (7.62) 
IPSS*GP -0.0400*** 0.0000285 0.0309548*** -0.0309833*** 
(-56.34) (1.28) (7.70) (-7.72) 
Trade openness -0.00215*** 1.60e-06 0.0017357*** -0.0017373*** 
(-17.80) (1.24) (7.38) (-7.39) 
Tertiary 
education 
0.00612*** -4.39e-06 -0.0047641*** 0.0047685*** 
(39.80) (-1.28) (-7.84) (7.87) 
Financial 
development 
0.00351*** -2.61e-06 -0.0028316*** 0.0028342*** 
(18.22) (-1.24) (-7.60) (7.62) 
R&D -0.253*** 0.0001807 0.1960542*** -0.196235*** 
(-31.23) (1.30) (8.21) (-8.25) 
Cross sectional 
data 
0.363*** -0.0002618 -0.2840403*** 0.2843021*** 
(48.78) (-1.28) (-7.82) (7.85) 
Industry-level 
data 
0.119*** -0.0000864 0.0937014*** 0.937878*** 
(37.99) (-1.27) (-7.84) (7.87) 
Ln Number of 
observations 
0.0945* -6.45e-07 -0.0006999* 0.0007006* 
(2.18) (-1.15) (-2.12) (2.12) 
Time Span 0.0608*** -0.000044 -0.0476892*** 0.0477332*** 
(42.92) (-1.28) (-7.80) (7.83) 
Foreign 
presence_ 
Employment 
0.131*** -0.0000952 -0.1032835*** 0.1033787*** 
(36.42) (-1.27) (-7.70) (7.73) 
Foreign 
presence_ 
equity 
-0.122*** 0.0000893 0.0968926*** -0.0969819*** 
(-31.17) (1.26) (8.14) (-8.17) 
Technological 
gap 
-0.0835*** 0.000061 0.0661711*** -0.0662321*** 
(-15.92) (1.26) (8.33) (-8.37) 
Horizontal -0.637*** 0.0004603 0.4992877*** -0.499748*** 
(-44.46) (1.28) (7.94) (-7.98) 
Olley-Pakes 0.0788*** -0.0000582 -0.0631381*** 0.0631963*** 
(19.11) (-1.25) (-8.19) (8.22) 
OLS -0.0277*** 0.0000185 0.0200421*** -0.0200605*** 
(-9.4) (1.40) (5.70) (-5.72) 
GMM -0.376*** 0.0002732 0.2963941*** -0.2966673*** 
(-36.39) (1.27) (7.87) (-7.90) 
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Year fixed 0.127*** -0.0000925 -0.1003195*** 0.100412*** 
(39.59) (-1.27) (-7.77) (7.80) 
Sector fixed 0.112*** -0.0000786 -0.0852158*** 0.0852943*** 
(25.61) (-1.31) (-7.72) (7.76) 
Publication 0.0391*** -0.0000279 -0.0302187*** 0.0302465*** 
(26.95) (-1.30) (-8.55) (8.59) 
Amadeus  0.299*** -0.0002169 -0.2353463*** 0.2355632*** 
(39.90) (-1.27) (-8.24) (8.28) 
No of 
observations 
1000    
t statistics in parentheses *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001 
Table 4.5 Empirical estimation and associated marginal effects of meta-analysis 
ordered probit model – FDI forward spillovers 
  Marginal effects model_ Forward (1) 
 Ordered Probit 
Model_Forward (1) 
Significantly 
Negative 
Insignificant  Significantly 
Positive 
     
Public IP 
enforcement 
0.280*** -1.26e-11 -0.0002287 0.0002287 
(22.91) (-0.28) (-1.13) (1.13) 
IP law 
protection 
0.148*** -6.62e-12 -0.0001204 0.0001204 
(26.97) (-0.28) (-1.15) (1.15) 
IPSS*GP -0.0596*** 2.67e-12 0.0000487 -0.0000487 
(-28.15) (0.28) (1.14) (-1.14) 
Trade 
openness 
0.00564*** -2.53e-13 -4.61e-06 4.61e-06 
(18.98) (-0.29) (-1.21) (1.21) 
Tertiary 
education 
0.000470** -2.11e-14 -3.84e-07 3.84e-07 
(2.69) (-0.28) (-0.91) (0.91) 
Financial 
development 
-0.00706*** 3.17e-13 5.77e-06 -5.77e-06 
(-19.14) (0.29) (1.20) (-1.20) 
R&D -0.303*** 1.36e-11 0.0002471 -0.0002471 
(-20.77) (0.29) (1.17) (-1.17) 
Cross 
sectional data 
-0.253*** 1.13e-11 0.0002064 -0.0002064 
(-19.87) (0.29) (1.15) (-1.15) 
Industry-level 
data 
0.0369*** -1.65e-12 -0.0000301 0.0000301 
(9.64) (-0.29) (-1.20) (1.20) 
Ln Number of 
observations 
0.396* -1.78e-13 -3.24e-06 3.24e-06 
(2.39) (-0.31) (-1.95) (1.95) 
Time Span -0.0604*** 2.71e-12 0.0000493 -0.0000493 
(-27.53) (0.29) (1.19) (-1.19) 
Foreign 
presence_ 
Employment 
-0.105*** 4.72e-12 0.0000859 -0.0000859 
(-22.03) (0.29) (1.18) (-1.18) 
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Foreign 
presence_ 
equity 
0.102*** -4.58e-12 -0.0000834 0.0000834 
(21.01) (-0.29) (-1.21) (1.21) 
Technological 
gap 
0.196*** -8.78e-12 -0.0001599 0.0001599 
(10.85) (-0.29) (-1.31) (1.31) 
Horizontal 0.523*** -2.35e-11 -0.0004271 0.0004271 
(27.74) (-0.29) (-1.20) (1.20) 
Olley-Pakes -0.00285 1.28e-13 2.33e-06 -2.33e-06 
(-0.48) (0.32) (0.60) (-0.60) 
OLS -0.0431*** 1.93e-12 0.0000352 -0.0000352 
(-10.03) (0.29) (1.27) (-1.27) 
GMM 0.258*** -1.16e-11 -0.0002109 0.0002109 
(21.08) (-0.29) (-1.22) (1.22) 
Year fixed -0.117*** 5.23e-12 0.0000953 -0.0000953 
(-19.69) (0.29) (1.15) (-1.15) 
Sector fixed -0.0241** 1.08e-12 0.0000197 -0.0000197 
(-3.15) (0.27) (0.92) (-0.92) 
Publication 0.108*** -4.83e-12 -0.0000879 0.0000879 
(34.10) (-0.29) (-1.19) (1.19) 
Amadeus  -0.0564*** 2.53e-12 0.000046 -0.000046 
(-6.90) (0.29) (1.29) (-1.29) 
Number of 
observations 
1000    
t statistics in parentheses *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001 
With regards to the estimations relating to the effects of other country level 
variables, the findings regarding the FDI backward spillovers are mainly in line 
with the existing literature. Specifically, the coefficient of trade openness is 
negative (-0.00215) and statistically significant (p<0.001) suggesting that 
foreign affiliates may use the advantages of an open to trade country to import 
intermediate goods at lower prices and not purchase them through domestic 
suppliers. As such, due to the competition effect, domestic suppliers may 
experience negative changes in their productivity. Next, the coefficient of 
financial development is positive (0.00351) and statistically significant 
(p<0.001). This finding supports the arguments that domestic suppliers who 
have access to financial capital can develop technologically advanced goods 
that will be purchased by the foreign affiliates resulting in their increased 
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productivity. Lastly the coefficients corresponding to human capital (i.e. tertiary 
education and R&D expenditures) are contradictory. Tertiary education is 
positive and statistically significant (0.00612, p<0.001), supporting the view that 
a skilled labour force has the capabilities to produce technologically advanced 
goods that can be purchased by the foreign affiliates; but R&D expenditures is 
negative (-0.253, p<0.001) suggesting that R&D oriented domestic suppliers 
experience negative changes in their productivity. An explanation could be that 
R&D oriented suppliers may sell the intermediate goods at relatively high prices 
and foreign affiliates making use of the advantages of an open to trade country, 
import from other countries’ equally advanced intermediate goods at lower 
prices. With respect to the control variables the results show that studies using 
industry-level data find stronger FDI backward spillovers, in line with Havranek 
and Irsova (2011), and studies using cross sectional data also tend to find 
stronger FDI backward spillovers. The results also suggest that the choice of a 
foreign presence proxy is a determinant of differences across studies. Most 
studies use the share of employment/sales or equity in foreign-owned firms as a 
proxy to capture the degree of foreign presence in the country. Studies that 
include separate dummy variables for foreign equity or foreign employment 
share, found that the former produces negative spillover effects (p<0.001), but 
the latter produces positive results (p<0.001), in contrast to Havranek and 
Irsova (2011). These results indicate that the way researchers define and proxy 
for foreign presence does make a difference to their final outcomes. Moreover, 
the results suggest that studies controlling for FDI horizontal spillovers, when 
estimating FDI backward spillovers, tend to find less significant positive spillover 
effects. Regarding the technological gap, the coefficient is negative and 
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statistically significant (p<0.001) suggesting that studies controlling for the 
technological gap between foreign affiliates and domestic suppliers, tend to find 
more negative backward spillover effects. Another important observation 
concerns the estimation techniques researchers use to estimate FDI backward 
spillovers. When researchers use the Olley-Pakes year fixed and sector fixed 
estimation techniques, they tend to find more positive significant backward 
spillovers effects whereas studies using the OLS and GMM estimation 
techniques yield negative significant results. The coefficient of the publication 
variable is positive (0.0391) and statistically significant (p<0.001) indicating the 
presence of publication bias in this meta-regression model, suggesting that peer 
reviewed journals tend to publish studies that find positive FDI backward 
spillovers. Lastly the Amadeus database is positive and statistically significant 
indicating that studies extracting their data from this database tend to find 
positive FDI backward spillover effects. 
In this section the results regarding the FDI forward spillovers are presented. 
The positive (0.00564) and statistically significant (p<0.001) coefficient of trade 
openness, indicates that domestic buyers operating in an open to trade country 
can exploit the advanced inputs purchased by the foreign affiliates and 
experience positive productivity changes. Turning to the coefficient of financial 
development, this is negative (-0.00706) and statistically significant (p<0.001) 
suggesting that domestic buyers operating in less developed financial systems 
have limited access to capital and thus cannot purchase advanced 
technological inputs which will aid them to increase their productivity. Lastly the 
coefficients corresponding to human capital (i.e. tertiary education and R&D 
expenditures) are contradictory. Tertiary education is positive and statistically 
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significant (0.000470, p<0.001) supporting the view that skilled labour force has 
the capabilities to use and adapt the technologically advanced purchased inputs 
by the foreign affiliates in order to increase their productivity. However, R&D 
expenditure is negative and statistically significant (-0.303, p<0.001) suggesting 
that R&D intensive buyers may experience a decrease in their productivity due 
to the foreign presence. This is because as the monopolistic power of MNEs 
increases (with the strengthening of the host country’s IP system), the price of 
MNEs’ technologically advanced outputs increase making it difficult for R&D 
intensive buyers to purchase the necessary inputs required when undertaking 
R&D.   
With respect to the control variables, the results show that studies using 
industry-level data find stronger FDI forward spillovers, in line with Havranek 
and Irsova (2011), while studies using cross-sectional data tend to find negative 
FDI forward spillovers.  The results also suggest that the choice of a foreign 
presence proxy is a determinant of differences across studies. Most studies use 
the share of employment/sales or equity in foreign owned firms as a proxy to 
capture the degree of foreign presence in the country. In studies that include 
separate dummy variables for foreign equity or foreign employment share, it is 
found that the former produces negative spillover effects results (p<0.001), but 
the latter produces positive results (p<0.001) in contrast with Havranek and 
Irsova (2011). Moreover, the results suggest that studies controlling for FDI 
horizontal spillovers when estimating FDI forward spillovers, tend to find positive 
spillover effects. Regarding the technological gap, the coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant (p<0.001) suggesting that studies controlling for the 
technological gap between foreign affiliates and domestic suppliers tend to find 
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more positive forward spillover effects. Turning to the estimation techniques 
researchers used to estimate FDI forward spillovers, the results suggest that 
studies using the Olley-Pakes (OLS) year fixed and sector fixed estimation 
techniques tend to find negative spillover effects whereas studies using the 
GMM estimation technique tend to find positive ones. Regarding the potential 
for publication bias in this meta-analysis, the coefficient on the publication 
variable is positive (0.108) and statistically significant (p<0.001) indicating the 
presence of publication bias in this meta-regression model, again suggesting 
that peer reviewed journals tend to publish studies that find positive FDI forward 
spillovers. In contrast with the FDI backward spillovers, the Amadeus database 
is negative and statistically significant suggesting that studies extracting their 
data from this database tend to find more negative FDI forward spillover effects. 
4.4.1. Marginal effects of FDI vertical spillovers 
Table 4.4 and 4.5 also report the marginal effects of the meta-analysis ordered 
probit model for the FDI backward and forward spillovers. The marginal effects 
findings for the FDI backward spillovers are consistent with the ordered probit 
findings supporting Hypotheses 1, 3 and 5. Specifically, public IP enforcement 
is positive and statistically significant (p<0.001) for FDI backward spillovers, 
indicating that as public IP enforcement becomes stronger, the probability of 
domestic suppliers experiencing positive changes in their productivity increases. 
Similarly, IP law protection is positive and statistically significant (p<0.001) 
suggesting that as IP law protection is strengthened the probability of domestic 
suppliers experiencing positive changes in their productivity increases. The 
marginal effect for the moderator variable is negative and statistically significant 
(p<0.001) indicating that as public IP enforcement is strengthened, it negatively 
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impacts the positive relationship between strong IP law protection and FDI 
backward spillovers, increasing the probability of domestic suppliers 
experiencing negative changes in their productivity. In respect to the dummy 
variables, the marginal effects findings are also consistent with the ordered 
probit findings. Indicative and holding other variables constant at their means, 
cross-sectional data and industry level variables are positive and statistically 
significant (p<0.001), showing how studies using industry level data and cross-
sectional data are much more likely to find positive FDI backward spillover 
effects than studies using firm level data and panel data. Similarly OLS and 
GMM variables are negative and statistically significant (p< 0.001), suggesting 
that for studies using the OLS and GMM estimation technique the probability of 
finding negative FDI backward spillover effects is greater. Lastly the publication 
variable is positive and statistically significant (p<0.001), suggesting that studies 
published in peer reviewed journals are more likely to present positive FDI 
backward spillovers results.  
The marginal effects for the FDI forward spillovers are statistically insignificant 
and thus the economic effects of the effect size on the FDI forward spillovers 
cannot be identified.  
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4.5. Conclusions 
This paper builds on and extends the meta-analytical work of Havranek and 
Irsova (2011) on the effect of stronger IP systems on FDI vertical spillovers. 
This study theoretically and empirically addresses a research gap in the 
literature concerning the distinct direct and moderating effect of the strength of 
public IP enforcement in a host country. Although theory suggests that ‘the real 
issue is whether a country adequately enforces the laws and regulations it has 
in place’ (Maskus 2004:22) existing studies on FDI vertical spillovers have only 
considered the direct effect of the strength of IP law protection to proxy for the 
effect of IP systems overall, finding mixed results (Havranek and Irsova 2011; 
Smeets and de Vaal 2016). In this study it is argued that the mixed evidence 
produced by the aforementioned studies may relate to the way IP systems are 
conceptualized and empirically tested. Although the aforementioned studies 
intend to capture the overall effect of IP systems empirically test only for one 
element of the IP system that of the strength of the IP law protection and do not 
consider variation in the way IP law protection is actually enforced in practice. 
Such omission could arguable result in biased research findings. This study 
conceptually uncovers and empirically tests for two neglected areas in the 
literature, the direct and moderating role of the strength of pubic IP enforcement 
on FDI vertical spillovers.   
This study introduced for the first time the effect of the strength of public IP 
enforcement on the investigation of FDI vertical spillovers and finds that it has a 
direct positive effect on the productivity of domestic suppliers and buyers. 
Furthermore, it is suggested that stronger levels of public IP enforcement 
negatively moderate the effect of strong IP law protection on FDI vertical 
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spillovers. The results suggest that when either IP law protection or public IP 
enforcement is strengthened in a country, it increases the incentives for direct 
knowledge transfer (from foreign affiliates to domestic suppliers and buyers) 
and promotes the development of better quality processes/products by the 
domestic suppliers and buyers, leading to positive changes in their productivity. 
However, the overall impact of increased IP strength (moderating effect of 
public IP enforcement on the relationship between stronger IP law protection 
and FDI vertical spillovers) comes at the expense of domestic suppliers and 
buyers as it allows MNEs to improve and consolidate their monopolistic power 
over them resulting in blocking competition, attracting market demand away 
from domestic firms, and being able to charge premium prices (Aitken and 
Harrison 1999; Smeets and de Vaal 2016). These findings bring to the 
foreground an ongoing debate among scholars regarding the degree IP 
systems need to be protected and enforced. On one hand proponents of 
stronger IP systems argue that it will enhance MNEs innovative activities, 
stimulate the production of high edge technological knowledge, promote cross-
border knowledge transfer and through spillover effects positively influence 
domestic firms’ productivity (Maskus 2000). On the other hand, opponents point 
out that strengthening countries’ IP system will shift the rents of innovation 
towards MNEs and enhance their monopolistic power resulting in negatively 
impacting domestic firms’ productivity (Maskus 2000). Indeed, this trade-off is 
present in the results of this study suggesting that governments and policy 
makers need to be aware of the potential negative impact to FDI vertical 
spillovers in countries where both IP law protection and public IP enforcement 
are strong. It is therefore important that governments and policy makers monitor 
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closely the effect of stronger IP systems on FDI vertical spillovers and intervene 
when appropriate to avoid or overcome such problems. 
Based on this study’s findings it is suggested that as a response to the 
strengthening of their IP systems, governments in order to increase the 
probability of benefiting from FDI vertical spillovers could make adjustments to 
the following areas; i) market structure, ii) pricing regulations such as clawback 
policy and iii) competition policies. For an extensive discussion on policy and 
managerial implications see Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE EFFECT OF IP SYSTEMS ON BILATERAL FDI FLOWS IN OECD 
COUNTRIES 
5.1. Introduction 
Chapter 5 investigates the role of national Intellectual Property (IP) systems and 
particularly the effectiveness of public IP enforcement (e.g. customs, judiciary) 
on bilateral Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows in OECD countries. Since the 
mid-1990s FDI has been a key strategy implemented by developed and 
developing countries when investing abroad (Villaverde and Maza 2015). Home 
countries can benefit from an expanding market, lower cost factors (such as raw 
materials, labour etc.) and other tariff measures, while host countries with good 
factor endowments, high potential markets, adequate infrastructure (such as 
institutions) can attract significant levels of FDI that brings with it capital, 
technology and managerial know-how (Kahouli and Maktouf 2015). With the 
rise of FDI, scholars paid particular attention in identifying the key FDI 
determinants that increase host countries’ attractiveness. One emerging finding 
from existing studies is that FDI flows are contingent on: (1) market size, (2) 
labour costs, (3) exchange rates, (4) trade openness, (5) inflation rates, (6) 
human capital, (7) a host country’s factor endowments, (8) a host country’s 
institutions such as taxation system, corruption levels, intellectual property 
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rights (IP) system, (9) a host country’s geographical position (Blonigen 2005; 
Feath 2009).18 
Building on the overall consensus in IB research that ’institutions matter’ (North 
1991), the effect of IP systems (as part of a country’s institutional setting) on 
FDI flows has been researched extensively suggesting that stronger IP systems 
act as a location advantage for MNEs and increase levels of inward FDI (e.g. 
Puttitanum 2002; Awokose and Yin 2010; Khan and Samad 2010; Branstetter et 
al. 2007; Seyoum 1996; Mansfield 1994; Javorcik 2004; Nunnenkam and Spatz 
2004; Park and Lippoldt 2003). However the existing research findings evince 
two limitations.  
First, in the majority of the existing studies an IP index is used as a single 
variable to proxy for the effect of the IP system in force. This approach assumes 
that both IP law protection and public IP enforcement are captured by the IP 
index in use (Papageorgiadis and McDonald 2018f). The most commonly 
employed index in these studies is the Ginarte and Park (1997) or Park (2008) 
patent protection index (Puttitanum 2002; Awokose and Yin 2010; Khan and 
Samad 2010; McCalman 2004; Bascavusoglu and Zuniga 2005; Branstetter et 
al. 2007). However this index is ‘designed to provide an indicator of the strength 
of patent protection and not the quality of patent systems’ (Park 2008:761), and 
therefore does not capture the enforcement element of an IP system (Fosfuri 
2004; Javorcick 2004; Nicholson 2007; Nunnenkamp and Spatz 2004; 
Papageorgiadis et al. 2014). Studies using measures that do not take public IP 
enforcement into account, may unintentionally overestimate the effect of IP law 
                                                          
18Because the focus of this paper is the IP systems as a determinant of FDI, a complete 
summary of the FDI determinants is beyond its scope. As a short reference it is worthy of 
mention the existence of two surveys on the issue by Blonigen (2005) and Faeth (2009). 
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protection in a particular country (Ostergard 2000) and thus suffer from biased 
and non-reliable results. The omission of public IP enforcement in the empirical 
investigation of the effect of IP systems on bilateral FDI flows constitutes the 
first research gap that this Chapter aims to address.  
A few studies acknowledging the importance of the public enforcement element 
of an IP system, have made attempts to capture its effect using either, (i) survey 
data to capture the perceptions of business practitioners regarding the quality of 
public IP enforcement, or (ii) by developing their own enforcement index. For 
instance, researchers in the first category using surveys include: Seyoum 
(1996) used a questionnaire administered to IP experts and practitioners, to 
proxy for the effect of both IP law  protection and public IP enforcement; 
Mansfield (1994) employed a survey administered to 94 US firms capturing the 
importance of IP system on FDI decision; Nunnenkam and Spatz (2004) and 
Park and Lippoldt (2003) employed the Ginarte and Park (1997) index, to proxy 
for the effect of IP law protection, and the WEF index to proxy for the effect of 
public IP enforcement. 19  Instances of researchers in the second category 
include Javorcik (2004) who developed an index that measures the quality of 
public IP enforcement by quantifying reports and other secondary data on IP 
enforcement effectiveness. In fact, Javorcik (2004) used the Ginarte and Park 
(1997) index to proxy for the availability of IP law protection and ‘then 
implemented a quantiﬁed version of the qualitative descriptions of the strength 
of IP systems provided by the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) 
                                                          
19 The World Economic Forum (WEF) index attempts to capture the availability of IP law 
protection and effectiveness of public IP enforcement by collecting data through a survey 
administered to MNEs’ executives operating in multiple countries. The executives were asked to 
rate IP law protection and enforcement in the countries they operate with their responses 
ranging from 1 (very weak) to 7 (very strong).  The WEF index includes data from 131 countries 
and is published annually from 1971. 
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in their recommendations for countries to be placed on the USTR's 301 Watch 
List’ (Papageorgiadis and McDonald 2018).  
Although both categories of studies, to some extent, capture the effect of both 
IP law protection and public IP enforcement on FDI flows, they suffer from the 
following limitations. First, the survey-based studies in the literature receive a 
low number of responses which limits the usability and meaningfulness of the 
ﬁnal index scores (Papageorgiadis and McDonald 2018). Second, it is not clear 
what aspects of the public IP enforcement measurements are captured. As 
explained in Chapter 2 enforcement relates to the enforcement agents’ 
perceptions/ideologies towards fairness and justice and the effectiveness of the 
IP administration systems to fairly enforce the IP law. As such, the enforcement 
agents’ ideologies and culturally inherited norms of behaviour and IP 
administration systems’ actions need to be adequately defined and measured. 
This is a very difficult and demanding process that has not been sufficiently 
explained or justified in the previous studies mentioned. Third, these studies 
were conducted either before the TRIPs agreement or during its implementation 
period. This means that their conclusions are not applicable today since most of 
the included countries have now changed their respective IP legal frameworks 
in accordance with the TRIPs agreement mandates. Thus, the availability of IP 
law protection and the effectiveness of public IP enforcement may have since 
altered, making the conclusions drawn from these studies applicable only for a 
particular time-period (before 2006). Lastly, many studies employ or develop a 
different measure for public IP enforcement, any meaningful comparison and 
generalisation of existing studies’ research findings is difficult.  These four 
limitations outlined above constitute the second research gap that this Chapter 
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aims to address by employing a composite IP enforcement index - the 
International Patent System Strength (IPSS) – which captures a variety of public 
IP enforcement aspects during and after the TRIPs agreement.   
To address the aforementioned research gaps, I posit the following research 
question: RQ3: what are the distinct effects of the IP law protection and public 
IP enforcement on bilateral FDI flows in OECD countries ?  
By addressing the above research question, this study seeks to make the 
following contributions to the literature. First, this study conceptualises IP 
systems as having two pillars - the IP law protection and the public IP 
enforcement - in contrast to the majority of existing studies, which do not 
differentiate between these two elements of an IP system and assume that IP 
law protection and IP enforcement have a unified outcome. This study also 
makes an empirical contribution as it employs a newly developed IP 
enforcement index; the Papageorgiadis et al., (2014) international patent 
systems strength index (IPSS). This index allows for the proxy of the effect of 
public IP enforcement by overcoming the limitations identified in extant studies. 
This is achieved as the IPSS index is developed by following a consistent 
methodology recommended by the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) in Constructing Composite Indicators, and captures 
a variety of IP enforcement dimensions. Namely, (1) the quality of patent 
administration, (2) judicial enforcement, (3) the level of corruption in judiciary, 
(4) the effectiveness of police enforcement, (5) the strength of border controls, 
(6) the perception of patent owners about national patent legislation and 
enforcement levels, (7) the cultural and societal attitudes towards the purchase 
 167 
 
of infringing goods, and (8) the level of public commitment to patent legislation 
(Papageorgiadis et al. 2014). 
Second, following the global changes in the IP systems this study is the first to 
investigate the effect of effective public IP enforcement in bilateral FDI flows in 
OECD countries after the TRIPs agreement. As has already been highlighted, 
all countries that have signed the TRIPs agreement have implemented 
significant changes to their IP legal framework leading to a stronger IP law 
protection framework (Peng et al. 2017). This implies that the levels of IP law 
protection in WTO countries are high and approximately the same. However, 
this is not the case for the degree to which IP law protection is enforced, as in 
many emerging and developing countries, such as China, public IP enforcement 
remains relatively weak and subject to local ideologies or political decisions 
(Peng et al. 2017). In such cases strong IP law protection is considered to be 
‘window dressing’. Building on these facts, this study moves away from the 
current research conclusions that hold IP law protection as a key FDI 
determinant and suggests that in the post-TRIPs agreement era, the 
effectiveness of public IP enforcement alone will influence the levels of bilateral 
FDI. As such, this study puts forward a new FDI determinant, that of the public 
IP enforcement.    
The last contribution lies in the chosen methodological approach, the use of the 
Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) technique, in estimating the 
gravity model of bilateral FDI determinants.  With the use of the gravity model 
this study attempts to investigate the impact of IP systems on inward FDI from a 
host country’s perspective. Given the fact that bilateral FDI between country-
pairs could be zero (0), the existence of observations for which the dependent 
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variable is zero makes the estimation of gravity model in the log-linearised form 
infeasible (Silva and Tenreyro 2006). To address this issue the PPML technique 
introduced by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) is employed. This technique, unlike the 
standard panel data estimation techniques such as fixed/random effects model, 
does not require the dependent variable be expressed in a log-linearised form 
and thus zero values for the dependent variable can be included. To date, five 
empirical studies on bilateral FDI flows using the PPML technique have been 
identified, but no studies have been found on the effect of IP systems’ bilateral 
FDI flows (Benassy-Quere et al. 2007; Desbordes and Vicard 2009; Julio et al. 
2013; Busse et al. 2010; Head and Ries 2008).  
5.2. Related literature and hypotheses 
5.2.1. Eclectic paradigm 
The decision of MNEs to invest abroad is best summarised in Dunning’s (1993) 
Eclectic paradigm. The Eclectic paradigm considers that FDI is determined by 
the benefits of ownership, location and internalisation that MNEs have in foreign 
markets (Dunning 1993; Javorcik 2004; Kahouli and Maktouf 2015). When 
MNEs invest in a foreign market, they are at least initially disadvantaged 
because domestic firms have better knowledge of local market conditions 
(Javorcik 2004). In order to compete successfully in a foreign market,  MNEs 
need to possess some forms of ownership advantage that confer market power 
and cost efficiencies, such as superior production technology, managerial and 
technological know-how, innovation capability, reputation, and/or intangible 
assets such as IP (Dunning 1993; Javorcik 2004; Villaverde and Maza 2015).  
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Location provides an explanation on where the ownership advantage can be 
best exploited and where it is more profitable to locate the business (Dunning 
1993). Host countries that offer, high quality endowments, low transportation, 
communication and labour costs, favourable political and economic conditions, 
and well-developed institutions (such as strong IP systems) often attract greater 
inflows of FDI (Javorcik 2004; Yi et al. 2015). In particular, a plethora of 
evidence suggests that for IP dependent MNEs, the availability of IP law 
protection is a strong location advantage attracting inward FDI (Puttitanum 
2002; Awokose and Yin 2010; Khan and Samad 2010; McCalman 2004; 
Bascavusoglu and Zuniga 2005; Branstetter et al. 2007). In the pre-TRIPs and 
TRIPs implementation period where IP legislation differ among countries, IP law 
protection was a key determinant of FDI as it allowed (or not) IP dependent 
MNEs to register their IP and potentially gain an ownership advantage in the 
host country. At that time IP enforcement was treated as an afterthought as the 
main concern of MNEs was to ensure not only the register and granting of their 
IPR, but also the right to exploit their IP in the host country.20 However in the 
post-TRIPs agreement era, the majority of WTO countries have now 
harmonised the level of IP law protection, adopting a strong IP legal framework. 
Because of these changes much of the attention is now turned to the degree to 
which IP law protection is actually enforced in case of violation (Peng et al. 
2017). In today’s world, with the majority of MNEs basing their profitability on 
the development and exploitation of intangible assets, transaction costs 
stemming from the strong/weak IP enforcement in the host country can also 
                                                          
20 Recall that especially in the pre-TRIPs agreement era (before 1995) many countries like 
Canada granted IPR only to domestic inventors and not to foreigners (Peng et al. 2017). 
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impact the flows of FDI.21 In the case of weak public IP enforcement, MNEs’ 
monitoring and enforcement is increased because of institutional uncertainty in 
situations where domestic competitors driven by competition may engage in 
opportunistic behaviours and attempt to illegally acquire information for the 
specific asset under transaction (i.e. MNEs’ IP) (Geyskens et al. 2006). In the 
case where a country offers effective public IP enforcement, this reduces MNEs’ 
transaction costs by restricting the competitors’ opportunistic behaviours and 
thus reducing MNEs’ institutional uncertainty (Bevan and Estrin. 2004; Kafouros 
and Aliyev 2016; Krammer 2015).  Therefore, it can be argued that public IP 
enforcement is now a strong location advantage for IP dependent MNEs as it 
increases or decreases a host country’s attractiveness.  
Lastly, internalisation refers to the advantage of owning, controlling and 
coordinating the use of specific assets within the MNE (Dunning 1993). 
Applying the insights from TCT (Williamson 1981), it is suggested that in the 
absence of opportunism and in a world with access to perfect information, the 
most low-cost governance mechanism would be a simple contract with the 
market (Fosfuri 2004), for instance licensing. However, due to the opportunistic 
nature of humans, bounded rationality and incompleteness of all contracts, 
writing and executing a contract for the use of a specific asset (such as IP), 
generates transaction costs in the form of monitoring and enforcement (North 
1992; Williamson 1981). Internalisation through FDI, instead of licensing or 
exporting, has the advantage of lowering MNEs’ transaction costs since it 
minimises the possibility of misappropriation of their assets under transactions 
                                                          
21 According to the WEF (2016) the following MNEs belong to the top 10 list of the most 
profitable companies in the world: Apple, Google, Microsoft, Facebook, Johnson & Johnson, 
General Electric, China Mobile, who all base their success on the possession and exploitation of 
a series of IPR. 
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and hence preserves their ownership advantage (Faeth 2009; Javorcik 2004). 
Under strong public IP enforcement in the host country, MNEs will have the 
opportunity to make full use of both internalisation advantages and licensing 
agreements since transaction costs associated with the misappropriation of 
MNEs’ IP will be kept low (Maskus et al. 2013; Smith 2001). Research however 
also suggests that MNEs may engage in affiliate licensing instead of unaffiliated 
licensing to minimise the positive externalities or spillovers, due to the public 
good nature of knowledge. In other words, strong public IP enforcement 
ensures IP owners that their rights will be upheld in case of violation. However, 
if no violation of contracts occurred for the asset under transaction and the 
contracting party legally acquired additional information other than the ones 
specified in the contract, due to the public good nature of knowledge, MNEs 
may stand to lose their ownership advantage in the host country. Internalising 
their activities via FDI in countries with strong public IP enforcement, allows 
MNEs to restrict their IP inside the firm and enforce their rights in cases where 
competitors access and misappropriate them.  
To sum up, in this study it is argued that weak public IP enforcement increases 
the opportunistic nature of humans and consequently the probability of imitation 
and increased MNEs transaction costs. In turn misappropriation of MNEs’ IP 
assets may erode its ownership advantage in the host country. Moreover weak 
public IP enforcement reduces a host country’s attractiveness and thus location 
advantage (Javorcik 2004) making MNEs reluctant to invest. Conversely, strong 
public IP enforcement, restricts competitors’ opportunistic behaviours, reducing 
the probability of imitation and MNEs’ transaction costs. As such it acts as a 
strong location advantage, allowing MNEs to preserve and exploit their 
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ownership advantage in the given country (Bénassy-Quéret et al. 2007; Bevan 
and Estrin 2004; Seyoum 2006).  
5.2.2. IP law protection and bilateral FDI flows 
Research into the effects of IP law protection on FDI flows is extensive and has 
overall produced mainly consistent findings; as IP laws become stronger in the 
host countries, inward FDI increases. For instance: Puttitanum (2002) in 62 
developed and developing countries; Awokose and Yin (2010) in China; Khan 
and Samad (2010) in 14 developing South and Southeast Asian countries; Mc 
Calman (2004) in 40 developed and developing countries; Bascavusoglu and 
Zuniga (2005) in 38 developed and developing countries; Kashcheeva (2013) in 
103 developed and developing countries; and Branstetter et al. (2007) in 16 
developing countries. To approximate for the strength of IP law protection these 
studies employed the patent protection indices by Ginarte and Park (1997) and 
Park (2008) that account for and measure the level of patent law protection in 
122 countries.22 
In light of the empirical studies cited above it can be argued that strong IP law 
protection in the host countries increases FDI flows. However, the existence of 
strong IP law protection does not mean that IP laws will be enforced in practice. 
In some instances, IP laws are merely used as ‘window dressing’ by host 
countries which offer strong IP law protection either as part of the TRIPs 
agreement or their own legal infrastructure, but then have no strong public IP 
enforcement (Peng et al. 2017a,b). Those countries increase their IP law 
                                                          
22Note that these two indices do not include a measurement for patent enforcement (Fosfuri 
2004; Javorcick 2004; Nichloson 2007; Nunnenkamp and Spatz 2004; Papageorgiadis et al. 
2014). 
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protection levels in order to attract technologically intensive FDI, but may still 
maintain weak or moderate public IP enforcement levels to allow domestic firms 
to benefit from FDI spillovers, through demonstration effect, labour turnover 
channel and illegal imitation (Peng et al. 2017a,b). This is particularly the case 
in countries with low levels of economic development, where benefits from the 
protection of foreign IP simply accrue to foreign firms, while domestic 
consumers and firms have to bear the costs for acquiring the IP protected 
goods (Peng et al. 2017b). Nevertheless, when MNEs see a strong IP law 
protection framework enacted by a legislature, they perceive it as a positive 
signal regardless of the level of IP enforcement in a host country (Khoury et al. 
2014). To summarise, strong IP law protection can work as either a quality 
institution or as ‘window dressing’ for host countries to attract FDI. .  
Hypothesis 1: The strength of IP law protection in a country has a positive 
effect on bilateral FDI flows in OECD countries 
5.2.3. Public IP enforcement and bilateral FDI flows 
It has long been argued that strong public IP enforcement assures IP 
dependent MNEs that theirs rights will be granted and more importantly upheld 
in case of violation. The strength of public IP enforcement can influence FDI 
flows in two ways: (1) decrease MNEs’ transaction costs and (2) attract skills-
based resource seeking FDI and strategic asset seeking FDI.  
In respect to MNEs transaction costs, TCT suggests that the level of transaction 
costs depends upon the specificity of the assets under transaction and the 
uncertainty in the environment where transactions are taking place (Williamson 
1981). Weak public IP enforcement increases institutional uncertainty as 
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competitors engaging in imitative activities may produce substitutes for the 
MNEs’ IP protected products, consequently attracting demand away from the 
MNEs by offering substitute products at lower prices, and decreasing their 
returns on investment. In such cases, IP owners (MNEs) are faced with 
excessive enforcement costs of the following nature. First, costs may arise if the 
infringer is not seized and taken to court by the relevant public enforcement 
agents. Second, even if the infringer is taken to court, firms still need bear the 
costs of the resolutions process (for instance legal fees) but might not receive 
appropriate levels of compensation (Pinkham and Peng 2017). Third, the 
ineffectiveness of the public enforcement authorities and judicial system and the 
delays in detecting and seizing the infringers, allow the infringers to continue 
profiting from the sale of the disputed IP embedded goods, at the expense of 
the IP owners. Fourth, IP owners may find themselves implicated in protracted 
and costly court trials which finally conclude with the IP owners losing brand 
reputation impacting their customers, suppliers and other business partners 
(Pinkham and Peng 2017; Khanna and Palepu 1997). With strong public IP 
enforcement, MNEs’ transaction costs are reduced by: (1) confining 
competitors’ opportunistic behaviours; and (2) reducing MNEs’ institutional 
uncertainty (Bevan and Estrin 2004; Kafouros and Aliyev 2016; Krammer 
2015).23 
Apart from the location advantages outlined in the Eclectic paradigm, the 
decision of MNEs for selecting specific locations in which to invest are also 
associated with MNEs FDI motivation and include: (1) natural-resource seeking, 
(2) strategic asset seeking, (3) market seeking, and (4) efficiency seeking 
                                                          
23 See review paper by Geyskens et al. (2006) for an extensive explanation of transaction cost 
theory. 
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(Dunning 1993). Countries where MNEs can pursue one or more of the 
aforementioned motives are hypothesised to be able to attract higher levels of 
inward FDI. In respect to the resource and strategic asset seeking FDI motives, 
Dunning (1993) suggests that MNEs pursuing FDI are driven by four motives: 
resource seeking, strategic asset seeking, market seeking and efficiency 
seeking. 24  Resource seeking FDI includes physical, labour and skills-based 
resource seeking FDI. The skills-based resource seeking FDI refers to FDI 
seeking to acquire technological capabilities, management or marketing 
expertise and organisational skills through collaborations with a domestic 
partner or the establishment of a foreign affiliate in a technologically intensive 
region (Dunning 1993). Strategic asset seeking FDI refers to FDI seeking to 
acquire tangible and intangible assets (equipment, human resource, patents, 
suppliers and consumers databases), in order to more effectively achieve their 
strategic objectives, expand their global portfolio, sustain or strengthen their 
ownership advantage or even build an ownership advantage that will support 
their long-term expansion at home and in foreign countries (Dunning 1993).  
The literature on location choice has recognised the technological capabilities of 
the host location as an important factor for attracting technologically intensive 
FDI (Meyer 2015). In relation to public IP enforcement, it is suggested that 
countries offering strong public IP enforcement create incentives for domestic 
firms to engage in R&D activities and develop advanced technological outputs, 
as it assures them that their rights will not only be granted but will also be 
upheld in case of violation. Such technologies are valued by MNEs pursuing 
resource and strategic asset seeking aiming to upgrade their asset portfolio by 
                                                          
24Further discussion on the efficiency seeking and market seeking motives of FDI will not take 
place as this is beyond the scope of this study (see Dunning (1993) for a complete review). 
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acquiring advanced technologies. This means that MNEs may see opportunities 
in engaging in contractual agreements with domestic firms (for instance from 
JVs). Indeed, evidence suggests that a significant proportion of FDI is directed 
to countries with a relatively well developed science base (Walter 1998) 
underpinned by strong IP law protection and more importantly, strong public IP 
enforcement. Moreover, investing in a R&D intensive country MNEs can obtain 
information about the latest technologies via public patent disclosures and 
upgrade their own technological capabilities accordingly. For instance, MNEs 
investing in China will have access to 1.2 million domestic and foreign patent 
disclosures (based on 2005 figures) (Peng et al. 2017). 
Although studies on the effect of public IP enforcement on FDI flows are scarce, 
the majority reveals a positive relationship. For instance Seyoum (1996) with 
the use of a questionnaire administered to IP experts and practitioners (to proxy 
for the effect of both IP protection laws and IP enforcement) in 27 developed 
and developing countries, between 1975-1990, identified that stronger IP law 
protection and public IP enforcement increase inward FDI. Similarly, Mansfield 
(1994) with a survey administered to 94 US firms capturing the importance of IP 
on FDI decisions for the year 1991 identifies a positive relationship between IP 
law protection, public IP enforcement and inward FDI. Along the same lines, 
Nunnenkam and Spatz (2004) for 166 developed and developing countries 
between 1995 and 2000, and Park and Lippoldt (2003) between 1990-2000, by 
employing the Ginarte and Park (1997) index (to proxy for the effect of IP law 
protection) and the WEF index (to proxy for the effect of public IP enforcement) 
revealed that the level of inward FDI increases with the strengthening of IP law 
protection and enforcement. 
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Based on these theoretical arguments and empirical evidence, the second 
hypothesis is specified as:   
Hypothesis 2: The strength of public IP enforcement in a country has a positive 
effect on bilateral FDI flows in OECD countries 
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5.3. Methodology 
5.3.1. The Gravity model 
Initially the gravity model used an analogy to Newton’s universal laws of 
gravitation to explain patterns of bilateral trade (Eaton and Tamura 1994).25 In 
its simplest form the gravity equation for trade states that trade flows from home 
(i) to host countries (j) are proportional to the countries’ market size 
( 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖  , 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗 ) and inversely proportional to their distance ( 𝐷𝑖𝑗 ) (Silvia and 
Tenreyo 2006). More generally, 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑗 =  𝑎0 ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖
𝑎1 ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖
𝑎2 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝑎3             (1) 
where 𝑎0 , is a constant and𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3 , are parameters for each perspective 
variable. 
In trade literature there is a long tradition of estimating the log- linearized form 
of equation (1) and estimating the parameters of interest by least squares, using 
the equation26: 
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑗 =  𝑎0 +  𝑎1𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 + 𝑎2𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗 + 𝑎3𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗         (2) 
Although the gravity model was ﬁrst developed in the context of international 
trade (Eaton and Tamura 1995), recently it has been extensively used to 
examine and explain the FDI determinants between countries (Kahouli and 
Maktouf 2015; Bevan and Estrin 2004; Buch et al. 2003; Blonigen et al. 2007) 
and has been characterised as ‘arguable the most widely used empirical 
                                                          
25Newton defined the laws of universal gravitation by suggesting that two particles of matter are 
subject to a force (gravity) that attracts each other and is proportional to the product of their 
masses and inversely proportional to their distance. 
26 For more information on the use of the log- linearizing equation see Silva and Tenreyro 
(2006). 
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specification of FDI determinants (Blonigen et al. 2007:1309). In the present 
context the gravity model relates the volume of bilateral FDI to the GDPs of the 
home and host countries and the geographical distance between them 
(Desbordes and Vicard 2009). It is expected that the larger the market sizes of 
home and host countries the greater the inward FDI will be, while the greater 
distance between the home and host country the less inward FDI to the host 
country will be. It should also be noted the relationship between FDI and 
geographical distance is not that straightforward (Kahouli and Maktouf 2015). 
On one hand, if countries are distant from each other, higher transportation 
costs and less control over the exporting activities would make FDI more 
appealing (Kahouli and Maktouf 2015). On the other hand, when countries are 
far away from each other, there can also be differences in institutional settings 
such as the legal system, differences on cultural characteristics such as 
language or informal norms, making companies unwilling to commit FDI 
(Kahouli and Maktouf 2015). Nevertheless, in the study of bilateral FDI flows the 
geographical distance often is used as a control variable -proxy for the costs 
related to institutional distance costs, cultural distance costs, as well as the 
geographical distance (Desbordes and Vicard 2009). In the majority of the 
empirical studies on bilateral FDI flows the gravity equation in its basic form is 
specified as the following:  
𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾𝐹 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗(3) 
In which𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑗 representing either the investment flows or stocks of country i to 
country j, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖  , 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗  the market size of home country i and host country j 
respectively, 𝐷𝑖𝑗the distance in Km between country i to j and 𝑢𝑖𝑗an error term. 
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𝐹𝑖𝑗 is a vector that represents the variables of interest. Such variables of interest 
may include host countries’: wages, trade openness, real exchange rates, 
taxation, R&D expenditures, inflation, institutional setting, language etc and vary 
across studies depending on their focus. 
5.3.2. Estimation technique: Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood 
(PPML) 
For estimations of gravity model, an important fact about the bilateral FDI data 
requires careful consideration - FDI between pairs of countries can be zero. In 
many cases, these zeros occur simply because some pairs of countries do not 
have bilateral FDI in a given period. These zero observations pose no problem 
for the estimation of gravity equations in linear form. In contrast, the existence 
of observations for which the dependent variable is zero makes the estimation 
of gravity model in the log-linearized form infeasible (Silva and Tenreyro 2006). 
To deal with this issue researchers most often drop the pairs with zero FDI from 
the data set and estimate the log linear form by OLS, or occasionally use tobit 
estimators or specify the dependent variable as ln(1+FDI) instead of the natural 
logarithm of FDI. Those approaches however, may lead to estimation bias 
sinceit is possible that for pairs of countries that bilateral FDI did not reach 
certain minimum values the values of FDI between them are recorded as zero. 
Moreover zeros may sometimes represent missing observations that have 
falsely been recorded as zero. Given the standard approaches do not offer 
appropriate treatment of zero observation, this study applies the PPML 
technique introduced by Silva and Tenreyro (2006). The PPML technique 
doesn’t require the dependent variables be expressed in log-linearised form and 
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is effective in mitigating the bias resulted from zero observations in the sample 
and robust to different forms of heteroscedasticity (Silva and Tenreyro 2006). 
The focus of this study is to develop a gravity model using the PPML estimation 
technique to identify the determinants of FDI and more specifically the effect of 
IP law protection and public IP enforcement in OECD countries (a complete list 
of countries covered can be found in Table 5.1 below). As such, it builds on the 
basic gravity equation (equation 3) and expands it to take into account some 
widely used economic factors as well institutional factors such as the IP law 
protection and public IP enforcement that affect bilateral FDI flows. To observe 
the effect in the long-run a set of panel data from 2001 to 2012 is used. The 
time period selected is based on data availability: Bilateral FDI flows data in 
OECD countries in earlier time periods is only available for a small number of 
countries and the IP enforcement measure is unavailable after 2012. The 
database for FDI flows in OECD countries is obtained from the United Nations 
conference on trade and development (UNCTAD).27 A complete list of countries 
can be found in Table 5.1 below. Data for the variables of interest are all 
obtained from the World Bank’s world development indicators dataset. 
Variables’ definition and data sources can be found in Table 5.2.  Denoting by i 
the home country and by j the host country, we develop the following 
augmented FDI gravity equation.  
𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝. 𝑐𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝. 𝑐𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑅𝐷𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝑙𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑗         
(4) 
                                                          
27The phenomenon is investigated in the OECD countries because data on the values of 
bilateral FDI flows/stocks are available only for selected countries and mostly for developed 
nations inside the EU and for OECD countries. 
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Where 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑗 represents the flow of FDI from country i to host country j in year t, 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖  , 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗  the gross domestic product of country i and j in year t, 𝐷𝑖𝑗  the 
geographical distance in Km between country i’s and country j’s capitals, 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝. 𝑐𝑖 , 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝. 𝑐𝑗 the labour quality of workers in home and host countries, 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑗the trade openness of the host country as a percentage of GDP,  𝑅𝐷𝑗 the 
R&D expenditures of the host country as a percentage of GDP, 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 is the 
dummy capturing if a common language is used in home and host countries, 
𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑗  refers to the Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) International Patent System 
Strength (IPSS) index and is used to proxy the effect of IP enforcement, 
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑗refers to the Park (2008) patent protection index and is used to proxy the 
effect of IP legislation and 𝑢𝑖𝑗 the error term. 
Table 5.1 List of OECD countries included in this study 
List of OECD countries 
Australia Greece New Zealand 
Austria Hungary Norway 
Belgium Iceland Poland 
Canada Ireland Portugal 
Chile Israel Slovak Republic 
Czech republic Italy Spain 
Denmark Japan Sweden 
Finland Korea Switzerland 
France Mexico Turkey 
Germany Netherlands UK 
 
Table 5.2 Definition of variables and sources of data 
Variable Definition Source 
   
Dependent variable 
 
FDI flows Inward FDI flows (US 
million $) 
United nations conference 
on trade and development 
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Independent variables 
   
Ln (GDP of home 
country) 
Gross Domestic Product 
(current US $) 
World development 
indicators 
Ln (GDP of host country) Gross Domestic Product 
(current US $) 
World development 
indicators 
Ln (GDP per capita of 
home country) 
Gross Domestic Product  
per capita (current US $) 
World development 
indicators 
Ln (GDP per capita of 
host country) 
Gross Domestic Product  
per capita (current US $) 
World development 
indicators 
Trade openness of host 
country 
Trade openness of host 
country (% of GDP) 
World development 
indicators 
R&D expenditures of  
host country 
R&D expenditures (% of 
GDP) 
World development 
indicators 
Human capital of host 
country 
Labour force with tertiary 
education (% of total) 
 
World development 
indicators 
Common language Dummy for countries 
sharing common language 
Chelem 
Ln (Distance) Distance in Km between 
home and host countries - 
the flight distance between 
capitals 
 
Chelem 
Public IP enforcement of 
host country 
International patent 
systems strength index 
(IPSS). Proxy for public IP 
enforcement 
Papageorgiadis et al. 
(2014) 
IP law protection of host 
country 
International patent 
protection index. Proxy for 
IP law protection 
Park (2008) 
 
5.3.3. Dependent variable and variables of interest 
The dependent variable employed in this study is the FDI flows. Flows are used 
rather than stocks as the later is more problematic because one is confronted 
with the question how to value assets of a multinational firm that were acquired 
in the past (Wacker 2013).28 Inward FDI flow is explained according to the 
                                                          
28Simply speaking, FDI stocks are the (revalue) accumulation of past flows, while flows are the 
current transactions taking place in a certain period t, most importantly within a year. For a large 
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augmented gravity model (equation 4), using the basic explanatory variables 
included in the majority of studies such as GDP, GDP per capita and Distance 
(Bénassy-Quére et al. 2007; Busse et al. 2010; Faeth 2009; Kahouli and 
Maktouf 2015) as well as some economic and institutional variables.  
The key economic variables used in the gravity model are the home’s and host 
country’s GDP a proxy for market size, host country’s GDP per capital as a 
proxy for the labour costs, trade openness as a percentage of GDP, R&D 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP and the human capital. It is expected that 
home and host country’s GDP to be positive as a larger market size attract 
more inward FDI. This study also controls for the host country’s trade openness 
and expects that a host country open to trade will attract more FDI as found by 
Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero (1994) and Culem (1988). Lastly host country’s 
R&D intensity is expected to attract more inward FDI as suggested by Barrell 
and Pain (1996) and Devereux and Griffith (1998).  
To approximate for the institutional environment in the host country two indices 
are employed capturing the strength of IP law protection and the strength of 
public IP enforcement. The Park (2008) patent protection index measures the 
patent protection strength in 122 developed and developing countries from 1960 
to 2005 and it ranges from 0 to 5, with higher values indicating stronger levels of 
patent protection (Ginarte and Park 1997). However although the Park (2008) 
                                                                                                                                                                          
number of economies, FDI stocks are estimated by either cumulating FDI flows over a period of 
time or adding flows to an FDI stock that has been obtained for a particular year from national 
official sources or the IMF data series on assets and liabilities of direct investment (UNCTAD 
2018) 
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index quantifies the strength of patent law protection, it does not capture the 
patent enforcement strength (Fosfuri 2004; Javorcick 2004; Nichloson 2007; 
Nunnenkamp and Spatz 2004).  
To approximate for the strength of the public IP enforcement the 
Papageorgiadis et al., (2014) International Patent Systems Strength (IPSS) 
index is employed. The IPSS index extends the Park (2008) index by capturing 
the degree to which the de jure laws are enforced in 48 developing and 
developed countries for the period 1998-2011. The IPSS index takes into 
account three types of transaction costs namely; i) servicing costs, iii) property 
rights protection costs and iii) monitoring costs and uses 10 secondary variables 
to measure them (Papageorgiadis et al. 2014). Compared with other available 
IP enforcement indices the IPSS index has the following advantages. First the 
composite IPSS index captures a number of different enforcement related 
aspects of patent systems. These different dimensions include; (1) the quality of 
patent administration, (2) judicial enforcement, (3) the level of corruption in 
judiciary, (4) the effectiveness of police enforcement, (5) the strength of border 
controls, (6) the perception of patent owners about national patent legislation 
and enforcement levels, (7) the cultural and societal attitudes towards the 
purchase of infringing goods and (8) the level of public commitment to patent 
legislation (Papageorgiadis et al. 2014). Other indices for instance the World 
Economic Forum (WEF) enforcement index captures the strength of IP law 
protection and the strength of one enforcement related aspect of IP systems in 
this case the managers perception towards IP law protection and enforcement 
in the countries they operate. As such the composite IPSS index allows 
approximating for more than one aspect of the enforcement dimension and 
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enables researchers to more holistically capture the strength of IP enforcement. 
Second, the IPSS index is developed by following a consistent methodology 
recommended by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) in Constructing Composite Indicators. Third, it is fully 
transparent and quantitative in nature. Fourth it is built upon the transaction cost 
theory which is also one of the foundational theories that aid in the development 
of the theoretical arguments in this study. Thereof Park (2008) index is used as 
a proxy of the strength of IP law protection and IPSS index is used as a proxy of 
the strength of public IP enforcement. 
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5.4. Results and Discussion 
The following tables present the descriptive statistics of all the variables 
included in the empirical estimation (Table 5.3), the correlation matrix of main 
variables (Table 5.4 and Appendix B), and the results for 5 models (Table 5.5). 
In Model 1 only the control variables excluding the variables of interest are 
included. In Model 2 all the variables except time dummies are included. The 
first two models’ results are presented mainly to show consistency of the 
results.  The discussion will be based on the results of Model 3 since it is the full 
model. In order to test the robustness of the results, the main sample is divided 
to capture the effect of the control variables and the variables of interest (i.e. 
public IP enforcement and IP law protection) before 2008. Models 4 and 5 
include all the control variables and variables of interest but the latter also 
includes time dummy variables. The year 2008 was selected as the cut-off point 
for two reasons. First, as previously mentioned, due to the time limit (2006) 
given to implement the mandated TRIPS agreement changes, it is anticipated 
that IP law protection is likely to have had less of an effect after 2006. Second, 
the global economic crisis of 2008 affected many developed and developing 
economies and distorted the pattern of FDI flows between countries from this 
year onwards.  
It can be seen in Table 5.5, the results across models are generally consistent 
with each other and most of the estimated coefficients have the expected signs 
and are statistically significant. In addition, the Model’s explanatory power 
(𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑑𝑜 𝑅2) is respectable across these models. The results of Model 3 provide 
support to the central propositions of this study, that both the IP law protection 
and public IP enforcement element of IP systems have a positive effect on 
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bilateral FDI flows in OECD countries. Specifically in relation to Hypothesis 1, 
the coefficient of the IP law protection is positive though statistically insignificant 
(0.307) (Model 3) for the whole period (2001-2011). It is positive and statistically 
significant for the period before 2008 (0.467, p<0.05) in Model 5. The reason for 
the discrepancy between the two model results are due to the higher level of 
harmonisation of IP law protection in the sample countries after 2006 and the 
effect of the financial crisis. Before 2008, countries had not yet finalised 
changes to achieve the TRIPS level of IP law protection and therefore there 
was high variation across countries. After 2008, because of the higher level of 
harmonisation of IP law protection and the financial crisis, the effect of IP law 
protection became less significant though the effect is still positive.  
In respect to Hypotheses 2 the coefficient of the public IP enforcement is 
positive and statistically significant (0.248, p<0.01), suggesting that stronger 
public IP enforcement leads to more bilateral FDI flows in OECD countries in 
the period 2001-2012. This result suggests that stronger public IP enforcement 
decreases MNEs’ transaction costs, arising from the opportunistic nature of 
competitors to illegally acquire knowledge from the IP assets embedded in 
MNEs practices and products in the host country. Moreover, it increases the 
incentives for resource and strategic asset seeking FDI. Public IP enforcement 
is also positive and statistically significant (0.278, p<0.01) in Model 5 (pre-
2008). This result implies that the strength of public IP enforcement is an 
important FDI determinant both before and after the initiation of the TRIPs 
agreement. This is so because although the TRIPs agreement sets the 
minimum standards on the level of IP law protection across countries, which are 
straightforward to assess if they have been integrated in the existing IP system, 
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the variation in public IP enforcement remains. In contrast with the strength of 
IP law protection that is now more consistent across WTO countries, the 
strength of public IP enforcement can vary according to the public IP 
enforcement agents’ perceptions on what constitutes IP infringement and 
informal norms that are captured by the IPSS index. The fact that this study’s 
results support Hypothesis 2 suggests it is imperative for future studies to 
conceptualise and test for the distinct effect of the strength of public IP 
enforcement on bilateral FDI flows and other IB related topics. 
Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
FDI flows 5,236 977.53 3,475.89 0.00 93,103.77 
Ln (Distance) 7,404 7.84 1.16 4.09 9.87 
Language 7,404 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Ln (GDP for home 
country)  
7,404 26.90 1.30 22.82 29.42 
Ln (GDP per capita 
for home country)  
7,404 10.35 0.97 7.03 23.58 
Ln (GDP for host 
country)  
7,404 26.92 1.21 22.82 29.42 
Ln (GDP per capita 
for host country) 
7,404 10.18 0.70 6.52 13.28 
Trade Openness of 
host country 
7,404 80.30 33.70 20.26 197.22 
Tertiary education of 
host country 
6,724 26.88 8.84 9.60 50.60 
R&D expenditure of 
host country 
6,767 1.82 1.00 0.31 4.48 
Public IP 
enforcement of host 
country 
7,241 7.25 1.77 3.70 9.80 
IP law protection of 
host country 
7,241 4.34 0.34 2.76 4.67 
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Table 5.5 The estimation results of the gravity equation 
 Full Sample Before 2008 
FDI Flow 
(1) 
FDI Flow 
(2) 
FDI Flow 
(3) 
FDI Flow 
(4) 
FDI Flow 
(5) 
 
Ln (Distance) -0.705*** -0.691*** -0.656*** -0.708*** -0.674*** 
 [0.0425] [0.0415] [0.0422] [0.0730] [0.0828] 
      
Language 0.409*** 0.483*** 0.515*** 0.361** 0.427*** 
 [0.129] [0.126] [0.121] [0.168] [0.159] 
      
Ln (GDP for 
home country 
0.673*** 0.681*** 0.690*** 0.613*** 0.634*** 
 [0.0365] [0.0368] [0.0367] [0.0485] [0.0514] 
      
Ln (GDP per 
capita for home 
country) 
-0.0428 -0.0250 -0.0203 -0.0143 0.00608 
 [0.0369] [0.0367] [0.0367] [0.0591] [0.0516] 
      
Ln (GDP for 
host country) 
0.549*** 0.517*** 0.556*** 0.591*** 0.601*** 
 [0.0402] [0.0459] [0.0468] [0.0649] [0.0600] 
      
Ln (GDP per 
capita for host 
country) 
0.131 -0.265* -0.152 -0.876*** -0.708*** 
 [0.101] [0.147] [0.181] [0.219] [0.260] 
      
Trade 
Openness of 
host country 
0.00346** 0.00221 0.00335* 0.00270 0.00271 
 [0.00145] [0.00158] [0.00184] [0.00235] [0.00315] 
      
Tertiary 
education of 
host country 
0.0440*** 0.0352*** 0.0251*** 0.0378*** 0.0252*** 
 [0.00540] [0.00591] [0.00597] [0.00890] [0.00792] 
      
R&D 
expenditure of 
host country 
-0.177*** -0.311*** -0.342*** -0.122 -0.102 
 [0.0584] [0.0734] [0.0703] [0.0999] [0.0948] 
      
Public IP 
enforcement of 
 0.224*** 0.248*** 0.293*** 0.278*** 
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host country 
  [0.0548] [0.0624] [0.0648] [0.0889] 
      
IP law 
protection of 
host country 
 0.449* 0.307 0.551* 0.467** 
  [0.245] [0.242] [0.285] [0.233] 
      
Intercept -23.51*** -22.15*** -24.52*** -17.53*** -19.54*** 
 [1.708] [1.712] [2.070] [1.895] [3.050] 
      
Time dummies Not 
included 
Not 
included 
Included Not 
Included 
Included  
N 4424 4321 4321 2449 2449 
Pseudo R2 0.4735 0.4845 0.5162 0.4554   0.4753 
Standard errors in brackets * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01 
With regards to the estimates of the control variables, the positive and 
significant coefficients for common language, home and host country GDP, and 
the negative and significant coefficient for distance indicate that FDI is 
determined by gravity factors (Bevan and Estrin 2004). These results are 
consistent with those of previous studies (Kahouli and Maktouf 2015; Hejazi 
2009; Bénassy-Quére et al. 2007; Bevan and Estrin 2004),which argue that the 
common language between home and host country positively affects FDI, larger 
market sizes attract more FDI, but the gains from overseas production may 
diminish with increasing distance between the home and host country. The 
GDP per capita is a proxy for the host country’s labour costs and the negative 
coefficient implies the countries with lower labour costs are more likely to attract 
a higher level of FDI, particularly FDI in labour-intensive sectors(Bevan and 
Estrin 2004; Kahouli and Maktouf 2015). The estimated coefficient of the trade 
openness is positive and statistically significant across all tested models, 
supporting the view that FDI and trade are complementary to each other rather 
than substitutive(Bevan and Estrin 2004; Chakrabarti 2001; Kahouli and 
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Maktouf 2015). This is so because the majority of investment projects are 
directed towards the tradable sectors and thus the host country’s degree of 
trade openness could be an important determining factor of FDI (Chakrabarti 
2001).Human capital (proxied by a host country’s level of tertiary education) is 
positive and statistically significant in all models. This result suggests that MNEs 
will assess a host country’s educational level and select countries where 
potential employees have the skills and capabilities to utilise MNEs’ advanced 
technological and managerial know-how (Kahouli and Maktouf 2015; Hejazi 
2009). Lastly, the estimated coefficients of the R&D expenditures are negative 
and significant in Model 3. The negative coefficient may be caused by the fact 
that the R&D expenditure variable only includes government’s R&D 
expenditure. A better approach would be to use the overall R&D expenditures 
by both government and private firms, but this cannot be achieved because of 
data availability issue. 
 
 
. 
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5.5. Conclusions 
This study addresses RQ3 by applying a gravity model using the PPML 
technique to investigate the impact of public IP enforcement on bilateral FDI 
flows in OECD countries. By investigating the distinct effect of public IP 
enforcement and by employing the IPSS index, this study addresses the 
identified research gap (see introduction section) by producing up-to-date 
evidence for two time periods 2001-2011 and 2001- 2008. The results of this 
study in particular, emphasise the importance of public IP enforcement as a key 
FDI determinant that could potentially boost recipient countries’ location 
advantage and thus increase FDI flows. Since the level of IP law protection has 
been harmonised across the WTO countries, strong IP law protection is now 
taken for granted when investing to or from WTO countries and no longer adds 
to a country’s location advantage. On the contrary because public IP 
enforcement is undertaken by enforcement agents (such as police, lawyers, 
judges) whose own cultural influences, informal beliefs and past experiences 
can influence the effectiveness of IP enforcement (North 1990), enforcement 
levels still vary between WTO countries (WTO 2017). The results of this study 
pinpoint to a positive and significant relationship between the strength of public 
IP enforcement and bilateral FDI flows in OECD countries. This result is 
consistent with a transaction costs analysis of FDI, in which strong public IP 
enforcement minimises foreign investors’ transaction costs by decreasing the 
opportunistic behaviour of competitors to illegally acquire knowledge on the 
assets under transactions. Moreover it allows MNEs to uphold and pursue their 
rights in case of violation. From the Eclectic paradigm analysis of FDI, host 
countries with strong public IP enforcement offer an ownership and location 
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advantage and attract higher levels of FDI. Since FDI plays an important role in 
countries’ economic prosperity (Kahouli and Maktouf 2015), identifying its key 
determinants can allow recipient countries to adjust their programs to attract 
more FDI. The findings of this study offer some insights to policymakers on how 
to make their country more attractive for investment. Evidence from previous 
studies (pre-2000) and the results of this study suggest that countries that offer 
strong public IP enforcement are positively perceived by MNEs and have 
benefitted from increased FDI flows.  
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APPENDIX B 
Table 5.4 Correlation matrix 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 
          
2 0.03 
         
3 0.07 0.08 
        
4 0.01 0.09 0.27 
       
5 0.17 0.06 0.07 0.07 
      
6 -0.02 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.36 
     
7 -0.34 0.01 0.01 0.06 -0.51 -0.02 
    
8 0.26 0.19 0.05 0.07 0.23 0.43 -0.13 
   
9 0.07 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 0.16 0.60 -0.07 0.50 
  
10 0.02 0.09 0.00 -0.02 0.16 0.79 -0.01 0.52 0.69 
 
11 -0.04 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.54 0.58 0.00 0.30 0.39 0.49 
 
Where: 
1 refers to Ln (Distance) 
2 refers to Language 
3 refers to Ln (GDP for home country) 
4 refers to Ln (GDP per capita for home country) 
5 refers to Ln (GDP for host country) 
6 refers to Ln (GDP per capita for host country) 
7 refers to Trade Openness of host country 
8 refers to Tertiary education of host country 
9 refers to R&D expenditure of host country 
10 refers to Public IP enforcement of host country 
11 refers to IP law protection of host country 
 
 196 
 
CHAPTER 6 
OVERALL CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This final chapter summarises the main empirical findings of this study, the key 
contributions made to the academic literature, and the potential limitations and 
future research directions. 
This thesis conceptualises the effect of IP law protection and public IP 
enforcement through the lens of institutional and transaction cost theory. 
Specifically, it examines the effect of IP systems on the productivity of domestic 
firms influenced by the presence of foreign MNEs in the country and on bilateral 
FDI flows. It addresses three research questions namely: RQ1-What are the 
effects of the IP law protection and public IP enforcement on FDI horizontal 
spillovers?; RQ2-What are the effects of the IP law protection and public IP 
enforcement on FDI vertical spillovers?; RQ3-What are the effects of the IP law 
protection and public IP enforcement on bilateral FDI flows in OECD countries?  
By addressing the aforementioned RQs this thesis, fills the gap in the existing 
literature and makes the following contribution to the literature on the IP 
systems, FDI spillovers and FDI determinants. This thesis extends and updates 
the existing theoretical model on IP systems by conceptualising the distinct 
effect of public IP enforcement on FDI flows and FDI spillovers that has been 
neglected in the literature. Although the literature suggests that ‘the real issue is 
whether a country adequately enforces the laws and regulations it has in place’ 
(Maskus 2004:22), existing studies on FDI spillovers and FDI flows have only 
considered the direct effect of the strength of IP law protection   (Havranek and 
Irsova 2011; Smeets and de Vaal 2016). To address this dearth in the literature, 
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this study posits that the strength of an IP system is subject both to the 
availability of IP law protection and the effective enforcement of the legal 
framework.  
6.1. Conclusions on FDI spillovers 
In Chapters 3 and 4 respectively, this thesis revisited the highly researched 
topic of MNE productivity effects on domestic firms using a meta-analytic 
approach. The main contribution is that for the first time, the direct effect of the 
strength of pubic IP enforcement on FDI spillovers and the moderating effect on 
the relationship between the IP law protection and FDI spillovers are 
investigated. While it is acknowledged that prior research used quantitative 
approaches and considered the effect of formal institutions on FDI spillovers, 
the informal institutions and the interplay between the two were ignored. 
Previous research identified that one pillar of an IP system i.e. IP law protection, 
influences FDI spillovers in a positive and a negative way (Irsova and Havranek 
2013, 2011; Smeets and deVaal 2016; Yi et al. 2015). This thesis provides an 
example of how institutional theory as a whole can be applied in the 
investigation of FDI spillovers. Specifically it extends the FDI spillovers literature 
by explaining how the second neglected pillar of an IP system i.e. public IP 
enforcement, also influences the spillover effects of FDI.   
Building on institutional and transaction costs theory (North 1990; Williamson 
1981), this thesis developed a conceptual framework that demonstrates how IP 
law protection and public IP enforcement play an important role in the 
generation of FDI spillovers. It argued that stronger public IP enforcement as an 
institutional mechanism, minimises MNEs’ transaction costs by limiting domestic 
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firms’ opportunistic behaviour to illegally access MNEs’ ownership advantage in 
the form of IP. As a result public IP enforcement positively influences MNEs’ 
willingness to transfer and develop technology in the host country, domestic 
firms’ absorptive capacity and the ways the two types of firms interact (whether 
JV or other contractual agreements). While such a positive effect exists, 
Chapters 3 and 4 also revealed a negative relationship when a given country 
offers strong IP law protection and public IP enforcement. This result highlights 
how, in countries where MNEs are able to receive strong legal protection for 
their IP assets and can effectively enforce their IP in case of infringement, 
MNEs are expected to gain strong market power in their respective industries 
and stifle the productivity of domestic firms. By bringing an institutional context 
to the foreground and introducing IP systems as a core component of the FDI 
spillovers generation process, this thesis extends the literature on FDI spillovers 
that has previously relied on the absorptive capacity and endogenous growth 
theory to explain how domestic firms benefit from the foreign presence by 
identifying two new institutional mechanisms that were previously unknown in 
the literature. 
Methodologically, in chapters 3 and 4, a meta-analysis of the literature 
consisting of 49 published and unpublished FDI horizontal spillover papers and 
27 published and unpublished FDI vertical spillover papers for the period 1998-
2011 was conducted. The ordered probit model estimation technique and a 
categorical dependent variable capturing the existence and direction of FDI 
spillovers were employed. By using this approach, this study was able to 
overcome the methodological limitations of previous meta-analytic studies of 
FDI spillovers (Meyer and Sinani 2009; Gorg and Strobl 2001; Irsova and 
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Havranek 2013; Havranek and Irsova 2011) that the comparability of the t-
statistics or semi-elasticities across studies is economically and statistically 
problematic. In addition, the FDI horizontal and vertical spillovers studies 
improve upon empirical studies that use a measurement of IP systems that 
lacks a component that addresses the actual enforcement of law. Here, a newly 
developed international patent systems strength index (IPSS) by 
Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) is usedin order to capture the actual enforcement 
of law.  
6.2. Conclusion on bilateral FDI flows 
Chapter 5 of this thesis examined the much researched topic of the factors 
affecting MNEs’ FDI flows. Following the same conceptualisation on the distinct 
role of the public IP enforcement element of an IP system, Chapter 5 extends 
the literature on FDI determinants by conceptually investigating and empirically 
testing for the distinct effect of public IP enforcement on bilateral FDI flows in 
OECD countries. The main contribution of this study is that it moves away from 
the existing research conclusions that hold IP law protection as a key FDI 
determinant, and suggests that in the post-TRIPs agreement era the 
effectiveness of public IP enforcement alone will influence the levels of bilateral 
FDI. Prior research conducted in the pre-TRIPs agreement or implementation 
period era, identifies IP law protection as a key FDI determinant for IP 
dependent MNEs since the laws on granting and registering of IP differed 
greatly between countries. In the post-TRIPs agreement era, IP law protection 
was completely harmonised among the WTO countries (Peng et al. 2017) but 
differences remained in the level of public IP enforcement, because the TRIPs 
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agreement had not set any obligations regarding how IP laws should be applied 
in case of violations (Papageorgiadis and McDonald,2018).  
Building on the Eclectic paradigm (Dunning 1993), this thesis argues that the 
levels of public IP enforcement in a given country will act as a location 
advantage for IP dependent MNEs attracting (or not) inward FDI. Indeed the 
results suggest that the strength of IP law protection in a country has an 
insignificant effect on bilateral FDI flows in OECD countries while the strength of 
public IP enforcement in a country has a positive effect on bilateral FDI flows in 
OECD countries. Therefore these findings update the literature on FDI 
determinants by introducing a new FDI determinant that of the public IP 
enforcement.  
Methodologically this study is based on a panel data set covering 30 OECD 
countries over the period 2001-2012 employing the gravity model and the 
Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimation technique. The PPML 
technique in comparison with other estimation techniques employed in the 
literature, allows for the inclusion of ‘zero’ values for the dependent variable and 
at the same time mitigates the estimation bias associated with the inclusion of 
observations with a value of zero for the dependent variable.   
6.3. Overall policy and managerial implications 
The first important finding of this thesis is that in the post-TRIPs agreement era, 
stronger public IP enforcement becomes a location advantage to the host 
countries increasing bilateral FDI flows in OECD countries. The fact that the 
effect of strong IP law protection on bilateral FDI flows in OECD countries are 
found to be insignificant, may point towards the replacement of the IP law 
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protection as a key FDI determinant by the public IP enforcement in the post-
TRIPs agreement era. Since FDI plays an important role in countries’ economic 
prosperity (Kahouli and Maktouf 2015), identifying its key determinants can 
allow recipient countries to adjust their regulations to attract more FDI. The 
belief that FDI improves countries’ economic prosperity has led local 
governments to use incentive packages, such as tax breaks, to attract foreign 
investments (Yi et al. 2015). Based on the findings of this study, another policy 
option for countries wishing to attract technological intensive FDI would be for 
local governments to improve their institutions by strengthening the 
enforcement of IP laws. Countries ensuring that MNEs’ rights will be upheld in 
case of violation will stand to benefit from increased capital inflow as well as 
positive externalities, such as FDI spillovers. MNEs managers could also find 
value in this study’s findings. Strong IP law protection and public IP 
enforcement can inform MNEs’ decisions on where to locate. MNEs basing their 
success on intangible assets such as patents, will select locations that allow 
them to best exploit their ownership advantage. Strong public IP enforcement 
reinforces MNEs’ ownership advantage (if in the form of IP) as it ensures that 
their rights will not only be granted but also upheld in case of violation.  
The findings of this thesis on FDI spillovers, suggest that stronger public IP 
enforcement has a direct positive effect on FDI spillovers. Furthermore, these 
studies find that the levels of public IP enforcement negatively moderate the 
effects of IP law protection on FDI spillovers. This result showcases how MNEs 
can gain strong market power in their respective industries and stifle the 
productivity of domestic firms in countries where they are able to receive strong 
legal protection for their IP assets and can effectively enforce their IP in case of 
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infringement. In such cases, policymakers need to monitor closely the 
strengthening of public IP enforcement in their respective country and seek to 
identify and potentially intervene, in a timely manner, in order to avoid or 
overcome instances when the productivity spillovers start becoming negative. 
Several solutions to address the adverse effect of strong IP law and 
enforcement on domestic firms’ productivity are put forward in this thesis. First, 
policymakers may need to initiate a dialogue with countries facing such an issue 
as to how and if IP law protection could be relaxed. A possible solution from 
which both IP owners and domestic firms could benefit, is a reduction in the 
patent protection period. Policymakers could identify an optimal threshold at 
which IP owners can still reap the benefits of their investments, while domestic 
firms can access relatively new technologies, absorb them and incorporate 
them into their own practices in order to remain competitive against the foreign 
firms. Having said that it must be mentioned, that although IP law protection 
could potentially be relaxed, it is advisable that public IP enforcement remains 
strong. Although changing the formal institutions i.e. IP law protection maybe 
relatively straightforward, local governments may encounter issues when 
pushing for stronger IP enforcement. As has already been argued in this thesis, 
public IP enforcement is influenced by a country’s informal institutions, and as 
informal institutions are more difficult to change  a change in norms regarding IP 
violations in a society may occur far more gradually (North 1992).  Nevertheless 
local governments should insist on developing stronger public IP enforcement 
as it will ensure IP owners of both foreign and domestic firms, that their rights 
will be granted and upheld in case of violation. This will lead to increased flows 
of technologically intensive FDI, from which both economic and spillover 
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benefits can be gained, and the development of advanced technology inside the 
host country by the foreign and/or domestic firms. Second, to minimise the 
monopolistic power of MNEs and the adverse effect of competition on domestic 
firms, policymakers can initiate some changes in the following: i) market 
structure, ii) pricing regulations such as clawback policy and iii) competition 
policies.  Regarding the market structure, governments could control for the 
number of firms competing in IP dependent industries by lowering the barriers 
to entry. In this way more firms could enter the industry and offer alternative 
options confining the monopolistic power of MNEs. Moreover countries’ 
openness to trade provide the opportunity for domestic firms to import their 
necessary goods from other countries at lower prices, not having necessarily to 
buy them from the MNEs in the host country. In respect to the pricing 
regulations, governments may moderate tendencies towards monopoly pricing 
(charging premium prices). A suggestion could be the clawback policy 
implemented by the Greek government in 2012 to address the high spending in 
the Healthcare sector.29 Briefly the clawback calculation is based on the market 
share of the pharmaceutical companies in the Greek pharmaceutical industry 
and means that if a pharmaceutical company’s sales grow in line with medical 
demand, then its bill to the state increases. A clawback policy could compel IP 
holders to decrease their prices in order to avoid exceeding the governments’ 
predetermined refund limit. Lastly, governments could accompany the 
strengthening of public IP enforcement with appropriate competition policies 
(Maskus 2000; Smeets and de Vaal 2016) such as the enforcement of the 
                                                          
29In 2012, a mechanism referred to as clawback, for the automatic refund of amounts that 
exceeded the state’s public pharmaceutical expenditure budget was instituted in law (Souliotis 
et al., 2015). Following a ministerial decree the ceiling for pubic pharmaceutical expenditure 
was specified at 1% of the country’s GDP, which was applicable as of 2014 (Souliotis et al., 
2015). 
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Competition Act (1998). The Competition Act (1998) prohibits anti-competitive 
agreements between businesses (such as formation of cartels), making it illegal 
for a business to abuse a dominant market position (Office of Fair Trading 
2007).30 One type of practice that could indicate abuse is the charging of unfair 
prices, or price fixing or agreements to limit supply (Office of Fair Trading 2007). 
Thus for domestic firms to potentially experience positive FDI spillover benefits, 
governments and relevant public enforcement agents should be prepared and 
eager to detect violations of the Competition Act (1998) and award appropriate 
penalties to their offenders. The effective implementation of the aforementioned 
suggestions could confine the monopolist power of MNEs, resulting from the 
strengthening of public IP enforcement.  
From the MNEs’ perspective, stronger IP law protection and public IP 
enforcement allow for the successful exploitation of their ownership advantage 
while blocking the spillovers channels responsible for the diffusion of their 
knowledge to domestic firms. Such countries create incentives for MNEs to 
invest and to engage in collaborative agreements (like JV) with the domestic 
firms. Domestic firms are advised to explore the opportunity to collaborate with 
the foreign firms and get exposed to new technologies via the legal exchange 
and transfer of knowledge inside the contractual agreement. Moreover stronger 
IP systems can give incentives to domestic firms to stop basing their 
productivity on the infringement of goods and invest in the development of their 
own capabilities and come with their own innovative products (North 1992). In 
                                                          
30 This mainly applies to businesses that have a large market share, usually but not limited to 40 
per cent or more (Office of Fair Trading, 2007). Other factors taken into consideration in 
determining whether a company is dominant include, the number and size of competitors and 
customers and whether new businesses can be easily set up in competition (Office of Fair 
Trading, 2007). The type of practices that could indicate abuse include charging unfair prices or 
imposing other unfair trading conditions on customers, limiting production, or refusing to supply 
an existing customer without an objective reason (Office of Fair Trading, 2007). 
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addition, domestic firms can get exposed to MNEs’ knowledge via patent 
disclosures or by the mere presence of their products in the market, get inspired 
and engage in innovative activities that will allow them to improve and develop 
their capabilities and outputs further. As such they may become competitive and 
successfully compete with the MNEs.  
6.4. FDI spillovers: limitations and future research 
While the two sets of results from the FDI spillovers studies advance the 
existing literature on the impact of IP systems on FDI spillovers, they have 
some limitations. First, since a meta-analysis is based on the collection and use 
of published secondary data, the initial methodological procedures followed by 
the primary researchers for the collection of their data are not known to the 
current researcher, thus errors or biased opinions may be included in the 
original sample (Saunders et al. 2003; Eapen 2013; Meyer and Sinani 2009). To 
control for such issues a meta-analytic protocol suggested by Stanley and 
Doucouliagios (2012) was followed. Second, since the meta-analysis requires 
the aggregation of information from existing studies, the types of information 
provided by the primary studies may vary. For instance, there might be certain 
information omitted in the meta-analysis, due to either missing information or 
inconsistent or incompatible data reported in primary studies. Third, the number 
of primary studies included in these meta-analyses is constrained by the 
coverage of the IP enforcement index used by them. To address these three 
limitations, future research needs to validate the models used in this study by 
extending the coverage with the use of an updated IP enforcement index and 
primary studies which have not been included in the meta-analyses of this 
thesis. Moreover to overcome the limitation of using a meta-analytic 
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methodology but still aim for generalisability of research findings, future FDI 
spillovers studies can use a large firm-level dataset, as in Smeets and de Vaal 
(2016).  
Fourth, this study does not control for the effect of MNEs heterogeneity on FDI 
spillovers, because of the insufficient number of papers available looking at the 
effect of MNEs ownership and establishment type on FDI spillovers. Future 
research following an alternative methodology to meta-analysis, can build on 
this existing study and try  to unpack the moderating impact of public IP 
enforcement on the relationship between MNEs characteristics (such as 
ownership and establishment type) and FDI spillovers. Future research can also 
consider public IP enforcement as a determinant for the selection of the foreign 
affiliates’ ownership and establishment type, building and extending the existing 
literature on the factors affecting spillover benefits (Dimeli and Louri 2002; Puck 
et al. 2009),  
Fifth, this study does not control for the effect of spillover channels on the 
generation of FDI spillovers, because research on this topic is scarce and there 
was an insufficient number of published studies to be included in the meta-
analysis. Existing research has produced some limited evidence on the effect of 
export, competition and wage spillover channels (Gorg and Greenaway 2003) 
on FDI spillovers, but has not yet investigated in-depth the effect of 
demonstration and labour turnover channels. Future work could enrich this 
research area by not only controlling for the effect of spillover channels but also 
by considering the moderating role of public IP enforcement on the relationship 
between spillover channels and FDI spillovers.   
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The last limitation relates to the use of the IPSS index to capture the effect of 
the main variable of interest (i.e. public IP enforcement) in the FDI spillover and 
bilateral FDI flows studies of this thesis. This thesis takes a realism approach 
using a quantitative methodology to capture the effect of public IP enforcement 
on FDI spillovers, as such a quantitative measure for IP enforcement was 
necessary.  Although the IPSS index is a composite index attempting to capture 
as many different dimensions of patent enforcement as possible (it captures 
eight)it suffers from the following limitation. First, the responders ‘perception’ is 
at the heart of the index. Perceptions about a matter are formed through 
experience, cultural inheritance, and/or personal attributes. Different responders 
with different experiences, culture and personal attributes may have a different 
opinion on what constitutes IPR violation, the consumption of infringed goods, 
whether the judiciary is corrupt, and whether the police and border control do 
their job properly (all the aforementioned are elements of the IPSS index). For 
instance in a country where IPR are not respected and scores low at the IPSS 
index, there is a possibility that the responders are actually the ones that 
engage in infringing activities without compunction making their perceptions 
towards IP infringement biased. Along the same lines, a responder with high 
moral standards may consider the consumption of infringed goods 
inappropriate. Moreover, responders living only in one country are unable to 
compare and objectively assess the enforcement levels of their home country. 
In addition, perceptions of participants may not be reflective of their true opinion 
and may have been influenced by country specific phenomena at the time the 
data were collected. For instance at the peak of the economic crisis in 2012 
Greece scored 36 out of 100 in the Corruption Perception Index, whereas in 
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2017, this same index scored 48.  Furthermore, since corrupt practices are by 
default illegal, they are shrouded in secrecy; making it difficult for one to 
accurately measure the level of corruption in the judiciary per se (another 
element of the IPSS index). Lastly, the most challenging aspect of such 
perception related indices is to quantify the results gathered using the 
participants’ perceptions. The coding and transformation of such data may limit 
the explanatory power of the original data.   
To address the aforementioned limitations, this study’s results could benefit 
from a mixed method approach and the use of a qualitative methodology such 
as semi-structured interviews. Since one aspect of the public IP enforcement 
relates to the public enforcement agents’ ideologies and informal norms on what 
constitutes IPR violations, in-depth interviews could reveal information that 
cannot be captured with the use of Likert scale questionnaires often used in the 
collection of data for constructing indices. A research design where data for the 
dependant variable (domestic firms’ productivity) and the main independent 
variable (public IP enforcement) are collected via interviews could enrich this 
study’s findings providing insights into questions such as: why are laws not 
enforced in certain countries like China (Peng et al 2017)?; how do MNEs react 
in such cases?; how do domestic firms in countries with strong public IP 
enforcement cope with the aggressive competition? Although a qualitative 
methodology is not the mainstream approach in FDI spillovers research nor 
indeed the IB discipline generally, some studies do exist (Gerschenberg 1987; 
McKendrick et al. 2000; Lecraw 1977).  
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6.5. Bilateral FDI flows limitations and future research 
The limitations of this chapter mainly relate to the selection of the dependent, 
independent and control variables. Apart from the variables of interest, namely 
the IP law protection (proxied by the Park (2008) patent protection index) and 
the public IP enforcement (proxied by the IPSS index), independent variables 
were selected based on their recurrent appearance in the reviewed literature. 
Following the review papers of Faeth (2009), Blonigen (2005), and Chakrabari 
(2001) the most commonly used FDI determinants of market size, language, 
distance, GDP per capita, human capital and R&D expenditures, are included in 
the model. Because the main focus of this study is on the IP systems, the 
inclusion of other independent variables e.g. bilateral trade agreement, was 
beyond its scope. However, the addition of different variables could potentially 
alter the final findings and future research could experiment with additional or 
different variables and compare the findings with the established FDI 
determinants.  
Moreover since this study suggests that IP law protection as a determinant is 
replaced by public IP enforcement in the post-TRIPs agreement era, future 
research could provide more support and additional robustness by employing 
different IP enforcement measurements to investigate the phenomenon further.  
Regarding the dependent variable used in this study, the literature usually 
selects between the FDI stocks and FDI flows obtaining their data from 
quantitative databases such as the UNCTAD. A final recommendation for future 
work is that an alternative approach could use firm level survey data to 
investigate the effect of public IP enforcement on MNEs location choices. 
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